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THE MEANING OF MORALITY AND MORAL EDUCATION: AN INTERPRETATIVE STUDY OF THE MORAL EDUCATION CURRICULUM OF KOREA

BY

MAHN SEUG OH

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE

OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF SECONDARY EDUCATION

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

SPRING, 1986

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled THE MEANING OF MORALITY AND MORAL EDUCATION: AN INTERPRETATIVE STUDY OF MORAL EDUCATION CURRICULUM OF KOREA submitted by Mahn Seug Oh in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Supervisor

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External Examiner

Date: April 8 1986

A Dedication

To My Mother

In the movie, "Kung Fu," a son, surprised that his father - a *kung fu* master - heard the sound of a grasshopper without seeing it, asked him, "How is it possible to hear that?" The father re-asked, "How is it possible you do not?" Similar may be the true voice of the self. For us, as ordinary persons, it seems always difficult to hear the true voice of our selves, in spite of its nearest-ness to us. I dedicate this tiny piece of my effort to my mother who has devoted her life to hoping, encouraging, and praying for me, her lazy and ignorant son, to find and to be truly myself, and who is still praying for me to be a truly human being.

Abstract

What makes our being moral and teaching morality a controversial issue in our age? What understanding of morality and moral education do we need in order to address this issue in an appropriate way? To deal with these questions, this study attempts to search for a critical understanding of the meaning of morality and moral education embedded in the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea. To provide a context, the study opens with a portrayal of the socio-historical background of Korea and the place of moral education in the history of modern education in Korea. Within this general background, the initial questions and the significance of this study are presented.

It is hardly possible for us to understand the meaning of morality and moral education in an appropriate way unless we understand the historical place in our own understanding of morality and moral education. In order to make sense of our historical moment, some perspectives on moral education are described and discussed. In this attempt, the prevailing way of understanding morality and moral education in our contemporary age is characterized in terms of two instrumental perspectives, the 'totalitarian-instrumental' and the 'solipsistic-instrumental.' In order to situate these perspectives in a wider historical context, the 'primitive' perspective is also examined. After reflecting upon the limitations and difficulties of these perspectives, suggested is the 'critical-dialectic' perspective as an encompassing orientation to approach in a fundamental way the present dilemma of moral education.

Since my own interpretation of texts is central, this study is embedded within the orientation of modern hermeneutics. For self-understanding of our interpretative acts, fundamental insights disclosed during the development of modern hermeneutics are examined. Hermeneutic insights are then scrutinized with respect to our interpretation of written texts as well as of the world, i.e., the world of morality and moral education in the context of this

study. Some relevant insights of modern hermeneutics to the study are dicussed in terms of the meaning of a text, the place of preunderstanding in text interpretation, the location of a text's meaning, the truth of the interpreted, and problems of arbitrariness in interpretation.

Following the foregoing, my interpretation of the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea is presented. In order to understand the meaning of morality and moral education underlying the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea, I attempt to disclose its features that point to the meaning of morality and moral education. These features include the questioning of the traditional 'virtue-items' approach, the emphasis on the cultivation of moral character based on moral principles, the universalization of the formal structure of moral reasoning, the formulation and arrangement of main elements of moral education, and the construction of actual classroom activities. Fundamental problems are examined with relation to our questions concerning the meaning of morality and moral education.

In the final chapter of this study, which I have interpreted as a closing moment of this study as well as an opening moment of another inquiry, the historical moment of our age in understanding morality and moral education and its problematic characteristic are examined. This examination reflects on what is disclosed in an effort to understand the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea. Reflected upon also, is our own act of understanding made on the basis of the actual experience of text interpretation. In our further effort to improve moral education, some fundamental tasks are suggested and discussed. These tasks seek to restore the connection between morality and humanity, to rehabilitate the dignity of the self, to research for the dialectic relation between moral knowledge and moral life, and to explore the appropriate meaning of moral education. These tasks hold central the re-affirmation of humanity.

Acknowledgements

To let a blossom of chrysanthemum bloom,
Might a cuckoo have cried as such.

So a Korean poet, Jung-joo Suh, once sang. The blooming of a chrysanthemum and the cry of a cuckoo may be no more than ordinary events, especially for the Koreans, since we can see and hear them everywhere. But it is with an extra ordinary poetic insight that he relates the cry of a cuckoo - which can be understood as a symbolization of the whole ground of the blooming of a blossom of flower or the whole *karma* of a being in general - to the blooming of a chrysanthemum. Although there can be no blooming of flowers without the enjoined gifts of the world, i.e., the sun, soil, and rain, ... even thunder and storm, the merit of the world usually tends to be buried behind the glory of the blooming of a flower. Nevertheless, the world neither claims its gifts, nor abolishes its commitment because of the forgetfulness of appreciation. Such may be the blooming moments in our lives, which could not be at all possible without all those gifts from our ancestors and parents.

Behind this study, there were uncountable support and help of many to whom the merit of this study, if any, should be returned. To them, I would like to express my deep appreciation. First, I wish to thank my supervisory committee; Professor Ted Aoki as supervisor, and professors Ken Jacknicke, Terrance Carson, and Pat Rafferty as committee members. Professor Ken Jacknicke has supported me with a variety of valuable advice and help not only for my scholarly pursuit but also for my personal life in the foreign country. Professor Terrance Carson has guided me to the way of studying - indeed, a way of life - on the basis of his profound knowledge and practical experience of hermeneutics. Since I took my first course in English from her, Professor Pat Rafferty opened my eyes to the world of

aesthetic experience as well as the cultural anthropology.

Ted Aoki was not only my academic supervisor but a true mentor in my life. His understanding of and commitment to myself, i.e., my weakness and strength, my doubts and hopes, my anger and aspiration, were extraordinary and infinite. He discouraged me in order to encourage me. He spurred me on to burn out myself in order to be truly myself. Whenever I wandered into the dark and cloudy night, he was there before me, pointing me to the light not from without but from within. He showed me the way of *wu-wei* (無爲) teaching not by words but through acts. I also cannot forget by appreciation to Mrs. Aoki for her passionate love and support of my family as well as myself.

I would like to express my sincere appreciation to professors Don Massey and William Pinar as members of the examining committee. Professor Don Massey's reflective questions and thoughtful advice based on his genuine concern for the present pedagogical situation was valuable for self-understanding of my study and for my further efforts. The participation of professor William Pinar as the external examiner was especially gratifying, since his penetrating disclosure of the present pedagogical situation and his passionate concern for humanity had inspired me in many aspects of this study. Especially, his profound questions and reflection were most encouraging as well as enlightening.

It was very fortunate for me to pursue my study in the vigorous and rich learning community of the Department of Secondary Education at the University of Alberta. Open and reflective dialogue with fellow graduate students, not only in the course or seminar, but also in informal meetings was exciting and transformative. Eric Chappell, Stephen Bath, Vangie Kelpin, Mikio Fujita, Stefan Baldursson, Il Je Sung, and Sook Hur were helpful not only in sharing ideas but also in my effort to go beyond my own horizon. For a foreign student for whom English is a second language, it was difficult at times to communicate thoughts in English. In this aspect, I am especially indebted to Eric Chappell, Angéline Martel, Lise

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Table of Contents

Chapter		Page
I.	Introduction	1
	A. Context for the Study	2
	B. Main Focus of the Study	5
	C. Questions of the Study	7
	A Brief Portrayal of Moral Education in Korea	7
	Initial Questions of the Study	11
	D. Significance of the Study	12
	E. A Brief Outline of the Dissertation	15
II.	Some Perspectives on Moral Education	19
	A. Introduction	19
	B. Primitive Perspective	21
	C. Instrumental Perspective	24
	Totalitarian-Instrumental Perspective	25
	Solipsistic-Instrumental Perspective	26
	D. Reflection: Toward a Critical-Dialectic Perspective	28
III.	Research Orientation: Development of Modern Hermeneutics and Its Relevance to the Study	36
	A. Introduction	36
	B. Initial Projects of Modern Hermeneutics: Friedrich Schleiermacher and Wilhelm Dilthey	38
	C. Fundamentalization of Hermeneutics: Martin Heidegger	42
	D. Hermeneutics and the Experience of Belonging: Hans-Georg Gadamer	45
	E. Dialectic Hermeneutics: Paul Ricoeur	50

F. Reflection: Relevance of Hermeneutic Insights to the Present Study 55

What is a Text? 56

Place of Preunderstanding in Interpretation 57

Location of the Meaning of a Text 59

The Truth of the Interpreted 61

Problems of Arbitrary Interpretation 64

IV. An Interpretation of the Present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea 67

A. Introduction 67

B. The Question of the "Virtue-Items" Approach to Moral Education 72

C. Emphasis on Moral Character Based on Moral Principles 77

D. Universalization of the Formal Structure of Moral Reasoning 84

E. Main Elements of Moral Education and Their Arrangement 92

F. Construction of Classroom Activities 103

G. Reflection: Underlying Rationality and Related Questions 114

V. Reflection: Toward a Re-Affirmation of Humanity 127

A. Reflection on the Historical Moment in Our Understanding of Morality and Moral Education 128

B. Reflection on Our Act of Understanding 132

C. Fundamental Tasks for Further Understanding of Morality and Moral Education 136

Restoration of the Connection between Morality and Humanity 137

Rehabilitation of the Dignity of the Self 138

Re-Searching for the Dialectic Relation Between Moral Knowledge and Moral Life 141

Exploration of the Appropriate Meaning of Moral Education 144

D. Toward a Re-Affirmation of Humanity 149

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 154

APPENDICES 170

A. "Moral Education" in the *School Curriculum* 171

B. Time Allotment by Subjects 184

C. Tables of Contents of Moral Education Textbooks 187

List of Tables

Table		Page
1.	Basic Structure of Moral Education	95
2.	Main Contents and Objectives of Moral Education	95

I. Introduction

Throughout history, morality has been one of the most central themes in human life and moral education has been regarded as one of the most significant tasks in education. Even today, morality and moral education take central places in our ordinary life and in pedagogical situations. We make our own moral judgements and do our moral acts on the basis of a particular moral stance. We talk about others' moral decisions and acts by means of moral points of view. Many parents and teachers teach children to be moral in terms of a certain substantial content of morality, such as love, honesty, friendship, truthfulness, cooperation, and so on, no matter what category, such as moral rule, moral principle, or moral virtue, the content of morality belongs to.

It was traditionally possible to teach children to be moral without justifying why we should be moral, since the repudiation of being moral tended to be understood as the repudiation of being human. But, in our age where those things which are and can be verified by scientific means tend to be regarded as the only acceptable, meaningful, and valuable kind of knowledge, being moral and teaching children to be moral have become controversial. Cragg (1982) pointed out, when he dealt with moral education as one of the contempory moral issues:

> ... moral education has become a moral issue. In the past few years, educational authorities in Canada and elsewhere have been pressed to introduce moral-education programs as formal elements of their curriculum and timetable. The programs that have been introduced have generated a great ideal of public controversy (p. 503).

Is it really necessary and right for us to teach our children to be moral? In the age dominated by science - or more precisely, by the scientific methodological ideal - how is it possible to justify the significance of being moral and teaching morality? If we hope for ourselves and for our next generations to live in a society where people love, respect, and care for one another, instead of fight, despise, and exploit one another, and if we believe that being moral and teaching morality are important, difficult though it may be to establish such a

society, we need to justify our act of teaching morality. If not, our moral concern and our teaching morality would be regarded merely as an ideology and indoctrination (Green, 1964-5; Kohlberg, 1976; Simon, 1976). Can our moral concern and the reason of teaching morality be justified by scientific methodological means? If not, in what way can we justify the significance of our being moral and teaching morality?

It is in this situation that the whole socio-historical context of our age, where teaching morality becomes a controversial issue, should be scrutinized, regardless of whether we regard it as a manifestation of moral enlightenment, or as that of moral ignorance or decay in our age. What understanding of morality and moral education in our times makes teaching morality a controversial issue? In order to examine this question, we need a critical look at contemporary moral education practice, through questioning the underlying beliefs of this practice as well as our own beliefs concerning the meaning of morality and moral education. This is a basic aporia which calls for my interest in this study.

A. Context for the Study

In my country, Korea, we have preserved our own tradition over a comparatively long history. It was from the early nineteenth century that waves of contact with Western societies began to influence Korea. At the beginning, because of its incompatibility with our tradition, there was a strong resistance against this strange culture. But the exclusive denial of the new Western culture ended in the victimization of Korea by "the international law of the jungle" which dominantly governed relationships among states in the Modern Age. Korea was colonized before the Second World War by westernized Japan, and it was divided into two parts after the War under the governance of the West, particularly the United States of America.

After the Second World War, however, we began to adopt socio-political-economic systems from advanced Western societies. The collective anger and resentment of the tragic experience in the modern history of Korea had led many to believe that the westernization of Korea is imperative for survival in this world. Many efforts have been made to learn from and

actualize the new Western science, techniques, and systems. Consequently, we established advanced Western political, economic, and educational systems in Korea. Moreover, we achieved an incredible economic development, called the "Miracle of Han River," seen as a great triumph of Western technology and science in Korea. No doubt, by virtue of the westernization of Korea, we could enjoy a more convenient and affluent life than in previous times. It was an undeniable pride for most of us that our country was no longer categorized as an "underdeveloped country."

The westernization of Korea influenced not merely the formal or external structure of society, but also affected our consciousness concerning the meaning of human life and of education. During the period of westernization, for instance, we learned that we need power, particularly political, economic, and technological power, to survive in the world, and that Western science and technology will provide us with this power. Indeed, we endeavoured to learn the advanced knowledge and techniques and to put them into practice. As a consequence, we could get power from them. Most of those who have the advanced knowledge or skills could get good jobs which provided them with personal wealth as well as high social status. At a collective level, we also could improve the international status of our country by virtue of them. These experiences led us to encounter a deep dilemma concerning the meaning of human life.

What we learned in the process of the westernization was different from our tradition in many respects. For example, within our tradition, an individual human being is understood in a social context. Hence, whenever there is conflict between individuals' needs and those of others or community, it is viewed beyond question that individuals yield to others or community. However, within the westernized framework, individual needs tend to be regarded as more significant than those of others or community. Similarly, concerning the relationship between human being and nature, our tradition teaches us to live in harmony with nature, whereas Western tradition seems to teach us to surpass it. Again, whereas our tradition teaches us that we are not free but that we can become free through hard effort, the Western tradition

seems to advise us that freedom is unconditionally given to us by nature. Moreover, whereas in the traditional belief, the relationship between adults and children is understood in a situational way that children should respect and follow adults, and adults should love and teach children, in the westernized belief, this relation tends to be conceived as a mutual or equal one regardless of one's situational position. Most of all, whereas in our tradition moral consciousness is emphasized over knowledge or skills, and the primary and highest goal of education is viewed as cultivation and actualization of one's moral consciousness, within Western tradition knowledge and skills surpass moral consciousness, and therefore, in education, knowledge and skills are more emphasized than is moral consciousness.

These contradictory features between two traditions place many parents and educators within a perplexing dilemma in teaching children. On the one hand, we have learned from understanding the modern history of Korea that we cannot survive in this world without Western science and technology, but on the other hand, we have also learned from our recent history that they do not necessarily make our lives meaningful. Perhaps, the antinomy of the Korean situation may be that we can neither be Westerners nor remain traditional Koreans. This perplexing situation of Korea compels moral educators to ask: If both traditions seek to promote better conditions of human existence, why are they contradictory with each other? Is it possible to reconcile this contradiction in the context of education?

Within the foregoing context, the educator's task may not be simply a matter of choosing between two traditions because either choice is likely to lead to one-sided dogma which will not allow us to overcome the problem. Neither might it be a matter of mere negotiation between the two, because the contradictions are in many aspects so fundamental that by superficial negotiation there is danger of losing significant meanings of both. For this task we need, perhaps, to look at the contradictions as they are. A contradiction or dilemma may not be always vicious; rather we may be able to make it reveal the truth by our way of dealing with it. This may be what the contemporary notion of "dialectic" advises us. To make the contradictory situation of Korea reveal a truth concerning the meaning of human life and

of education, we may need to "place both in a single *logos*" (Ricoeur, 1978, p. 188). Such an approach to the contradictions beckons the following questions: What does it really mean to be moral? What understanding of morality and moral education do we need to overcome the dilemma of moral education in Korea? This study attempts to search for a critical understanding of the meaning of morality and moral education in the context of the public moral education curriculum of Korea.

B. Main Focus of the Study

This study intends to search for a critical understanding of the meaning of morality and moral education embedded in the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea. Of course, there can be many different ways of looking critically at the prevailing understandings of morality and moral education underlying contemporary moral education practice. But the main focus in this study is given to the series of moral curriculum texts of Korea, such as general curriculum guidelines, moral education curriculum guidelines, textbooks for moral education, teachers guidebooks for moral education of all school levels from the Elementary School to the High (Senior High) School. It can be said in this sense that this study is basically an interpretative study and that hermeneutics, as a study of our interpretative act or as "the theory of the operations of understanding in their relation to the interpretation of texts" (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 43), is central in this study.

We are living in the world of texts not only in the sense of the written text but also in the metaphorical meaning of the text. Through our interpretations of texts, we make sense of the world and we communicate to one another on the basis of our own interpretations. In this sense, it can be said that we live in and experience the world of the text and the text interpretation prior to any theoretical explanation about them and that the text and the act of text interpretation already penetrate our lives. Especially, the text and the interpretation of the text are central in education since the pedagogical situation, in its fundamental sense, consists in activities of communication of meanings based on the diverse interpretations of the world.

Nevertheless, in the contemporary pedagogical and academic discourse dominated by positivistic culture, the meaning of the text and our act of text interpretation tend to be misunderstood or narrowly understood. Regardless of whether the value of the text is emphasized or denied, it is thought that the text has and should have a correct meaning, and to understand it is to identify with this correct meaning. This narrow understanding of the text and text interpretation tends to lead us to inappropriate directions in our way of dealing with the text: either to absolutization and blind obedience to the answer provided by the text or to the total denial of the text because of its incomplete answer to the question. But can we get an absolutely correct meaning of 'love' by reading Shakespeare's *Hamlet*? Or, is this text totally meaningless or worthless because it does not provide us with a correct meaning of 'love'?

Since this narrow understanding of the meaning of the text and our interpretative act can lead us to misunderstandings of my interpretative act in this study as well as our act of text interpretation, it seems necessary to clarify the terms "critical" and "understanding." Both "critical" and "understanding" are used not only to characterize this study but also for the study to be guided by their meaning. The term "critical" is used to mean not only "to criticize," but also to mean "uncovering and making explicit the tacit and hidden assumptions and intentions" (Aoki, 1980, p. 13). By the term "understanding" is meant "going back behind what is said" (Gadamer, 1982, p. 333). Since, concerning the way of this study, the terms, "critical" and "understanding," including the term of "dialectic" are central, their rich meanings will be discussed later. However, it can be said generally that the notion of "critical understanding" discloses a new horizon for this kind of study allowing not merely objective categorical analysis of what is written but an uncovering and a questioning beyond what is written in the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea.

C. Questions of the Study

Questionability may be one of the most enigmatic aspects of the human being which allows us to inquire into the world and to make sense of it. It may be unthinkable without questions to inquire into the world and to produce any knowledge about it. This implies that questions are central in all acts of inquiry. But questions do not always satisfy this value of the question. A certain kind of question, such as those to which correct answers are predetermined or those which have no direction, can make us blind to the world or lead us nowhere. Therefore, to ask appropriate questions is important in all our inquiries. This seems what Gadamer (1982) tried to point out when he said that "the deciding of the question is the way to knowledge" (p. 328). As suggested in the title of this study, the main questions of this study are: What does it mean to be moral? What does it mean to teach children to be moral? In order to contextualize and elaborate the questions of this study, it seems worthwhile to draw a brief portrayal of the moral education curriculum of Korea.

A Brief Portrayal of Moral Education in Korea

In Korea, as forementioned, the moral consciousness of an individual human being has traditionally been regarded as the highest goal of human life, and, therefore, moral education had been regarded as a central part of education. For example, in *Myung Sim Bo Gam* (明心寶鑑)[1] which consists of traditional sayings and life examples in the whole spheres of life, such as the personal, interpersonal, familial, social, political, and academic, it is emphasized that learners practise morally good deeds by introducing various words of the traditional Sages, such as "Heaven gives prosperity for those who do morally good deeds," "Do morally good deeds as one finds water when s/he is thirsty" (chap. 1). Learning is also emphasized: "If one does not learn, it is like wandering in the dark night" (chap. 9). But, the

---

[1]Literally, the title of this book can be translated as "Thesaurus for the Enlightenment of Mind" or "Book of Treasures for the Awakening Mind." Although there is no precise record about the origin of this book, it had been widely used as a basic text for beginning learners since the Koryu Dynasty [935-1392] (Minsu Lee, 1969).

value of learning is signified in terms of its contribution to the realization of a good life, as it says: "One cannot know justice (or moral righteousness) without learning" (chap. 9). This dialectic understanding of the relation between learning and morally good life tends to be deeply embedded at all levels and spheres of traditional education.

However, after the Second World War, the whole idea and system of education changed following those of the advanced Western countries. In this process of the westernization of education, there was little consideration for the traditional understanding of education in its form and content. Even in the areas of those which are inevitably related to the traditions or socio-cultural uniqueness, such as Korean Language or Korean History, their form and content were reinterpreted and recontructed in terms of the new rationality. In a word, the history of modern education in Korea reflected the one-sided application of "foreign educational thoughts" (Donhee Lee, 1983, p. 152), especially those dominant in the United States of America. Thus, what is prevailing in the curriculum field of the U.S.A. became the taken for granted rationale for curriculum change in Korea. Soontaek Kim (1983) provides a description of this tendency when he wrote:

> It is notable that the education of the U.S.A. which had strongly affected Korean education had changed around the 1960s. When we [educational theorists in Korea] were about to understand the 'experience-centered' education suggested by educational missions from the U.S.A., American education was emerging from 'experience-centered' education to 'discipline-centered' education. But, at that time, we could not accept 'discipline-centered' education, since we were at the beginning of the 'experience-centered' education (p. 298, my translation).

What logically follows from this rationale is that the curriculum of Korea should be changed to 'discipline-centered' education as soon as possible because this orientation became dominant in the U.S.A., regardless of the appropriateness of its underlying rationality or practical relevance to the Korean situation. In fact, the history of curriculum change in Korea tends to repeat with a temporal gap its history in the U.S.A. The curriculum field during the period from 1955 to 1962 was governed by Deweyian progressivism. The Tylerian rationale was dominant in the curriculum field of Korea during the decade from 1963 to 1972. Since 1973 Brunerian ideas had dominated the curriculum field of Korea until the present curriculum,

advocating its orientation as 'human-centered' education or the 'whole person' approach (Soontak Kim, 1983), came into being in 1982.

During the early period of modern education in Korea, the status of moral education was ambiguous. It tended to be assumed that moral education underlies all educational activities regardless of subject matter, but at the same time, moral education tended to become, at a formal level, no one's concern in education. Since the curriculum change in 1963, however, moral education began to be dealt with in education as an independent subject matter. The general tendency of the curriculum field in Korea, as previously described, also tended to affect the moral education field as well. During the decade from 1963 to 1972, the field of moral education tended to be governed by the Tylerian and/or behavioristic approach based on the functionalist paradigm. During the period from 1973 to 1981 dominated by the Brunerian 'structure of discipline' orientation, the cognitive-developmental approach tended to be emphasized in the field of moral education.

In the present curriculum of Korea, as implied in the characterization as 'human centered' education or 'whole person' approach, moral education appears to be emphasized more than in any other time in the history of modern education in Korea. The present curriculum which has been used since 1982 places emphasis on the promotion of students' moral development, as well as physical and aesthetic development which tended to be overlooked in the former curriculum (KEDI, 1982a, p. 1). In the present Moral Education Curriculum, the attempt is made to approach moral education in a holistic way, i.e., to view moral education as an integral part of all the subject matter and to understand moral act and moral reasoning as a whole (KME, 1982a, p. 5). Let me draw a brief description of the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea in a general way in terms of its claimed interest, content, time allotment, main materials, and evaluation.

Stated Interest of Moral Education: According to the Moral Education Curriculum of Korea, moral education is defined as "helping students to form sound morality," and the meaning of morality is conceived to have two aspects; i.e., intellectual morality which means

the "ability to judge and choose moral principles or laws," and behavioral morality which means the "ability or disposition to practise moral principles or laws." The general goal of moral education is based on this "integrated" concept of morality, that is to say, "to enhance an integration of moral character" by cultivating both abilities of morality (KME[2], 1982b, pp. 3-4).

This goal is perceived in a comprehensive way in accordance with the "developmental level of students." At the Primary (Elementary) School level, "internalization of the basic virtues," "formation of good life habits," and "enhancement of moral judgement" are emphasized. At the Middle (Junior High) School level, "enhancement of moral judgement" and "formation of autonomous morality" are emphasized. And at the High (Senior High) School level, "objectification of autonomous morality," "integration of moral character," "formation of value orientation," and "understanding of ethical theories" are emphasized (KME, 1982b, pp. 10-11).

Content of Moral Education: The content of moral education consists of basic virtues in terms of three domains of human life: personal, social, and national. At the domain of personal life, "maintenance of physical and psychological health," "cultivation of personal character and good mind," "development of rational attitude in life," are included. For social life, "maintenance of sound interpersonal relation," "respect of laws and social order," "participation in family and social welfare," are emphasized. And for national life , "awareness of ethnic and cultural heritage," "awareness of the national tasks," "participation in the efforts for national development," are included (KEDI, 1982a, pp. 12-13; KME, 1982b, pp. 14-15).

Time Allotment for Moral Education: Moral education is provided through kindergarten to high school level. From kindergarten to the second grade of the Primary School, moral education is to be performed within the integrated curriculum. But from the third grade of the Primary School, moral education is dealt with as an independent subject matter. For the rest of the Primary School grades, two hours out of the 27-32 total hours of

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[2]Korean Ministry of Education

schooling per week are allotted for moral education. At the Middle and High school levels, two hours out of the 34-36 total hours of schooling per week, and at the High School level, one hour out of 34-36 total hours per week, are allotted (KEDI, 1982a, pp. 5-28).

Materials for Moral Education: The main curriculum material for moral education is the textbook. There is one nationally prescribed textbook for each semester of a grade at the Primary School level, for each grade at the Middle School level, and for all grades at the High School level. These textbooks are provided by the Ministry of Education. Also suggested is the use of other materials which "can impress" the children. For teachers of moral education, the Ministry of Education provides a *Teachers Guide Book* for Moral Education (KME, 1982a; 1982b; 1982c) , which consists of the general orientation concerning moral education and the procedure for classroom activities in accordance with the content of the textbook. The "moral education" part of the *School Curriculum* for each school level (KEDI, 1982a; 1982b; 1982c) which is provided by the government is also available for teachers as a general guideline to moral education.

Evaluation of Moral Education: Concerning the evaluation, three points are emphasized in the *School Curriculum*: a comprehensive evaluation, maintenance of validity and objectivity, and feedback of evaluation. According to the *School Curriculum* for the Middle School, for example, it is emphasized that (a) moral thoughts, attitudes, and habits are targets to be evaluated in addition to the acquisition of knowledge; (b) validity and objectivity should be ensured in the evaluation of morality; (c) it is important to establish a cycle that feeds back evaluation results to pupils' lives (KEDI, 1982a, p. 14).

Initial Questions of the Study

A formal curriculum can be regarded as a manifestation of the most dominant belief and interest of a given society in a given era which are perceived by a group of developers. Likewise, the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea can be regarded as an expression of the most taken-for-granted belief and interest concerning the meaning of morality and

moral education, which are understood by a group of moral curriculum developers.

In order to search for a critical understanding of the meaning of morality and moral education embedded in the Moral Education Curriculum of Korea, the following questions for this study are initially raised. (1) In the Moral Education Curriculum of Korea, what are the underlying assumptions concerning the meaning of morality and moral education? More specifically, what is believed about the essence of a human being? What is assumed concerning the meaning of a good life? How is the existence of the individual human being in society understood? What view of moral knowledge is dominant? What view of education and of moral education is prevailing? What is expected by moral education? What roles of moral educators are assumed? (2) What aspects of human life are to be emphasized by such assumptions? And what aspects are to be forgotten? (3)For the improvement of moral education in Korea, what understanding of morality and moral education do we need? On what ground can we re-orient the task of reconstructing the moral education curriculum of Korea?

This study is basically an interpretative study. In a fundamental sense, the act of interpretation is, as Gadamer (1982) pointed out, to understand the question which the text attempts to answer. And the act of interpretation also can be understood as a continuous dialectic between question and answer. It is in this sense that the above questions are to be regarded as the initial ones. These questions are inevitably to be refined, elaborated and re-quested through the whole process of the study.

D. Significance of the Study

This study attempts to search for a critical understanding of the meaning of morality and moral education embedded in the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea. What is it to signify this study? Where does the value of this study lie? In a fundamental sense, it can be said that the significance of an inquiry lies in its practical applicability, since without that any inquiry can lose its meaning and direction. For example, a medical inquiry can be pointless or even misleading unless it concerns the practical cure of the patients or the healthy life of

people. This practical value embedded in our act of inquiry, although it tends to be ignored or trivialized in most contemporary academic discourse, may be what Aristotle (1925) tried to point out when he said:

> We are inquiring not in order to know what virtue is, but in order to become good, since otherwise an inquiry would have been no use (p. 1103b).

Especially, in the sphere of educational inquiry, the practical value of an inquiry is not only inevitable but also important. We want to know about our children and students in order to improve our interaction with them, and through our inquiries we transform our understanding which discloses to us the higher possibility of our interaction with them. In this sense, Langeveld seems to point out rightly when he said that "the study of pedagogy... wants to know what it researches in order sooner or later to know how to practically act" (in van Manen, 1985, p. 1). But, how can an inquiry contribute to any transformation of our pedagogical practice? With respect to this study, in what way can our critical understanding of morality and moral education contribute to the improvement of contemporary moral education practice?

Concerning this question, there seems to be a prevailing belief in the contemporary field of educational inquiry dominated by positivistic culture that an inquiry does and should provide a correct set of answers to practical questions. This belief tends to lead to two contradictory extremes with respect to the relevance of an inquiry to practice: either to total annihilation of an inquiry because of its lack in providing a precise set of answers or to blind absolutization of a set of answers provided by an inquiry. Reflecting upon our experiences of the pedagogical situation, this belief is misleading, at least, in two senses. Firstly, an answer provided by an inquiry can be no more than 'one' answer within the whole context of the practical situation. Secondly, the pedagogical situation is so complex and diverse that there can hardly be a general law or answer which governs and thus is applicable to all the practical situations in the same way that the theoretical or mathematical knowledge does.

In the pedagogical situation, the practical application of an inquiry can be understood as a self-reflective and self-creative process instead of immediate or blind obedience to the

abstract law or general answer given by an inquiry. Nevertheless, to ignore the rich and complex dimension in our acts of practical application of an inquiry can make us either encave ourselves within our own fixed horizons or be enslaved by a fixed horizon of an inquiry. It can be said in this sense that the universal significance or general value of our inquiry can neither exist nor be claimed, but rather it can be discovered and affirmed by those who make sense of and make use of it in terms of their own particular socio-historical contexts in which they are situated.

In a most personal sense, my underlying interest in this study is to seek possible directions for improvement of moral education in my country, Korea, where I was born, lived, and will live, and which I love and hope it will be a better place for our children to live in the future. It is, however, not my intention to make a set of explicit recommendations or guidelines to change the existing system or the formal curriculum of moral education of Korea on the basis of this study. This does not mean that this study has no concern about the task of improvement of moral education in Korea. First of all, this study will contribute to deepening my personal understanding of the problems and a possible way for the amelioration of moral education, and for guiding me in my future efforts in moral education. It will also provide me with guidelines for discourse on moral education in order to dialogue with those who share concerns for the amelioration of moral education. It is in this way that I hope this study will be able to contribute to the improvement of moral education in Korea.

However, in a general sense, I do not deny the possible relevance of this study to the improvement of moral education in other countries. If the task to improve the condition of our co-existence in and with the world cannot be limited only to Korea but it is the task for all human beings, the improvement of such condition cannot be the task only for a person or a society but for all human beings and all societies. In particular, unlike in the primitive or pre-modern society, moral problems in contemporary society tend to become global: Unlike the misuse of a hammer, the misuse of nuclear weaponary cannot only destroy the user but also this weaponary can thoroughly destroy our whole globe. In this sense, I hope that this study

can contribute, even a little, to improvement of moral education practices at a global level through which we can help our children to understand moral problems of our age and to participate in efforts to improve the conditions of co-existence in and with the world. But this possibility can hardly be expected unless the meaning of this study is understood by readers in terms of their own socio-historical situation.

E. A Brief Outline of the Dissertation

It seems historically an unique phenomenon of our time that being moral and teaching to be moral become a controversial moral issue. Before making any immediate judgements whether the phenomenon is a manifestation of moral enlightenment or of moral decay in our age, we need to understand the whole socio-historical context of our age in which this phenomenon has been nourished. What understanding of morality and moral education make our being moral and teaching morality a controversial issue? What understanding of morality and moral education do we need in order to approach this issue in an appropriate way?

In an effort to deal with these questions, this study attempts to search for a critical understanding of the meaning of morality and moral education embedded in the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea. In this chapter, in order to contextualize this study, the socio-historical background of Korea and the place of moral education in the history of modern education in Korea were described briefly. With this general background, the main focus, the initial questions, and the significance of this study were presented and discussed.

As Ricoeur (1978) pointed out, "no one is situated or can situate himself at the zero point of ethics" (p. 180), it may hardly be possible for us to understand the meaning of morality and moral education in an appropriate way unless we understand our historical place in the understanding of morality and moral education. In order to make sense of our historical moment in dealing with morality and moral education, some perspectives on moral education will be described and discussed in the second chapter. In this attempt, the prevailing way of understanding morality and moral education in the contemporary age will be characterized in

terms of 'instrumental perspectives' including the 'totalitarian-instrumental' and the 'solipsistic-instrumental.' In order to situate these perspectives in a wider historical' context, the 'primitive' perspective will also be examined. Reflecting upon the limitations and difficulties of these perspectives in our efforts to improve the condition of our co-existence in and with the world, the 'critical-dialectic' perspective will be suggested as an encompassing orientation to approach in a fundamental way the present difficulties and dilemmas of moral education.

This study is embedded within the orientation of modern hermeneutics since my interpretation of texts is central in this study. For self-understanding of our interpretative acts, the fundamental insights disclosed during the development of modern hermeneutics from Schleiermacher to Ricoeur will be critically examined in the third chapter of this study. Reflecting upon the history of modern hermeneutic insights and upon our own experiences of interpretation, I wish to give scrutiny to some relevant insights in terms of the questions: What is a text? What is the place of preunderstanding in our interpretative acts? Where does the meaning of a text lie? How is it possible for us to judge the truth of the interpreted? And how can we protect ourselves from arbitrary interpretation? The relevance of hermeneutic insights not only to our interpretations of written texts but also to our interpretations of the world, i.e., the world of morality and moral education in the context of this study, and the inseparable relation between our interpretation of a text and that of the world itself to which a text addresses, will also be discussed.

The fourth chapter of this study consists of my interpretation of the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea. In order to understand the meaning of morality and moral education underlying the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea, I will try to reveal its fundamental features. The task of interpretation, however, cannot be merely to identify and to provide a description of these features, but to disclose the whole ground on which these features can be manifested at all. For this task, the attempt to uncover the underlying rationality on which the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea is standing will also be

made, situating the features in a wider social and historical context of the curriculum field. An effort to relate the claimed ideas to the actual curriculum practice will be made in order to unveil the underlying rationality embedded in the whole process of curriculum development from the general orientation to the construction of concrete classroom activities. Also, the fundamental problems and questions will be examined with relation to our questions concerning the meaning of morality and moral education.

In a fundamental sense, there can be neither a precise starting point nor a final ending point of an inquiry, but rather it is always an ongoing and never-ending act. Nevertheless, in a practical sense, it is also inevitable for us to finish our inquiry at a certain moment. This implies that any ending of an inquiry can never be free from the infinite nature of our understanding and thus it is always temporal and incomplete. In the final chapter of this study, understood as both a closing moment of this study and an opening moment of another inquiry, the historical moment of our age in understanding morality and moral education and its problematic characteristics will be examined by reflecting on what is disclosed in the effort to understand the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea. An overall reflection on our act of understanding is also made on the basis of the actual personal experience of text interpretation in this study.

To improve moral education by going beyond the contemporary situation, some fundamental tasks will be suggested and discussed. These tasks will be oriented to the restoration of the connection between morality and humanity, to rehabilitation of the dignity of the self, to the researching the dialectic relation between moral knowledge and moral life, and to the exploration of the appropriate meaning of moral education.

The crisis of morality and moral education in our age can be seen basically as that of humanity and all the above tasks can be understood as an effort to rehabilitate our own humanity. This task can neither be a matter of the invention of a new humanity nor can it be a matter of imposition from the outside. Humanity is already here and there in ourselves, our lives, and the history of human lives. What remains for us may be to re-discover it and to

re-affirm it. Thus, the task of re-affirmation of humanity will be considered as an essential task in our further effort to improve moral education.

II. Some Perspectives on Moral Education

A. Introduction

In contemporary global society, we, as individual human beings have undergone a variety of problems which threaten our existence in the world. The fear of nuclear war, population explosion, the exhaustion of natural resources, the increment of environment pollution, the doubt of control over technocratic mega-systems, moral bankrupcies in the political, economic, and many of the professional areas, and the increasing tendency of instrumentalization of human beings, tend to be more and more difficult to ignore as conditions of human existence in the world are threatened.

The elements which threaten our existence are not only from the outside but also from within the individual human being. Previous wisdom has gradually lost its meaning as a ground to reflect upon our daily life. Instead, a "hedonism which promises material ease and luxury" (Bell, 1971, p. 57), an "achievement ethic" or the "consumption ethic" tends to be substituted in its place (U.S. Dept. of Health and Welfare, 1973). Perhaps one of the most fundamental problems may be the pervasive feelings of powerlessness of the self. The number of those who regard themselves as merely victims of the systems, institutions, or technology, tends to be increasing, as Lasch (1984) observed. They seem no longer to believe in their power to improve or change the existing conditions which threaten the conditions of human existence. Lea Dasberg (1983) envisaged this tendency:

> We are blaming others and regarding ourselves as victims, not as actors of history. The old wisdom that man himself spoiled his paradise and only man himself can bring it back is effaced (p. 120).

More than any other epoch in our history we need to concentrate our whole wisdom to overcome these external and internal conditions. The high expectations of ordinary people and educators for the reform of the school's moral education (Ryan and Tompson, 1975; Jane,et al., 1976) can be interpreted as an expression of increasing awareness of the problems of contemporary society and our hope for a better society through better education.

The contemporary field of moral education, however, seems to be undergoing many difficulties. At the theoretical level, for instance, if we, as moral educators, look at the theories of moral education, it might not take long to recognize that there is no agreed theory; rather we might find a variety of incompatible contradictions. Any attempt at moral education without a ground of theory may be accused of being arbitrary. If we select a theory and try to teach students morality on that ground, it may be difficult to defend against a variety of objections. Sobel (1980), for example, expressed this difficulty:

> [If any program for moral education is announced], ...the response will be: Who asked you to teach moral values to our children? What values are you teaching? Whose are they? How in a pluralistic society can you defend indoctrination? You're not indoctrinating? Then, you are guilty of secular moral relativism (pp. 16-17).

Is it impossible for us, as teachers or parents, to teach our students and children to be moral? What makes it so difficult to teach morality? What do we need to overcome the perplexing problems and dilemmas in moral education? Although there has been increasing awareness that the act of education is a moral enterprise, and that educators can no longer pretend to be value neutral since moral education "permeates the very fabric of teacher-student relationship" (Purpel, 1976, p. 8), this awareness itself does not give us the ground on which we can reorient our act of teaching. Before making any frivolous decision whether or not we have to teach morality, or before making any exclusive choice among alternatives, we may need critical self-understanding about our historical moment with respect to the way of dealing with morality and moral education in the context of human life.

In this chapter, I will attempt to characterize this moment in terms of the "instrumental perspective" which tends to be dominant not only in the academic area but also in the everyday life-world. For our self-understanding of this perspective, I will examine its historical context since historically this perspective came into being as a counter-perspective against the pre-instrumental perspective. Therefore, I will characterize the latter perspective as the "primitive perspective." Reflecting on the prevailing way of understanding morality and moral education, I will examine its limitations and difficulties in our efforts to improve the condition of our co-existence in the world, and will suggest the "critical-dialectic perspective"

as an alternative encompassing orientation to approach in a fundamental way the contemporary problems and dilemmas in moral education.

B. Primitive Perspective

Before looking at the primitive perspective on moral education, it seems to be necessary to examine the meaning of the term, "primitive." In its ordinary usage, the word "primitive" tends to be used with a negative connotation - naive, crude, rudimentary, less developed, etc. - pointing to the lack of something. But the etymology of the word shows the other side of its meaning. In English, the word "primitive" takes its root from the Latin word "*primitus*," or "*primus*" which means "original," "first," or "prime." In Korean, the corresponding word, "*won-si* (原 始)" consists of two Chinese characters, *won* which means "basic," "original," or "fundamental," and *si* which means "beginning" or "first." Both in English and in Korean, the etymological meaning of the word signifies its meaning as "fundamental" or "primary." It can be said in this sense that the tendency of the word "primitive" to be understood in a negative way expresses a repudiation or devaluation of our original or fundamental essence. I use this term in the wider sense.

The primitive perspective on morality and moral education can be captured by the belief of primitive man [3] through which he understands himself and his relation to the world. Debrock (1976) describes the consciousness of the primitive man:

> Primitive man is a man who has no power over nature, but is overpowered by nature. The consciousness of primitive man is a consciousness in which fear plays an important role. This fear is less a fear for the power of nature than for the unpredictability of its power (p. 4-5).

This fear of uncertainty may be at the heart of primitive man. For him, the world may appear

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[3]The word, "man," is used in a wide sense in this study, not merely as the meaning of "an adult male human," but as the meaning of "a human being," "individual, person," or "mankind" in general. In Korean, there is the word, *in-gan* (人間), which connotes individual human being(s) and which signifies not only the individuality and subjectivity but also mutuality of human existence. I intend to use the word, "man," as corresponding to *in-gan* in Korean. By this word, hence, I include not only individual adult male human being but also adult female human being, and male and female children as well.

with paradoxical faces: as an infinite source as well as an irresistible threat on his life. In this situation, man's well-being or disaster totally depends on the power of the world. The uncertainty of the world and man's dependency on it may lead him to symbolize the image of the world in a certain form such as god(s) or other super-human being.

The belief in the existence of this super-human being takes a central role in the primitive perspective. Man's understanding of himself and his relations to the world are based on this belief. Therefore, as Hegel characterizes, the world becomes a "dominating subject" and a symbolized will of the world takes an "obligatory" role in human life (Balbus, 1982, pp. 279-292). This belief is also embedded in the way of understanding other human beings and their society, i.e., other human beings as well as their society are understood in terms of the "divine will" of the super-human power. Hence, within this perspective, the individual human being is surpassed by the natural world, society and other human beings.

The meaning of morality and moral education is based on this belief. In the primitive perspective, morality originates from external human beings because any violation will make the divine being angry and will call for an inevitable disaster. In primitive society, moral knowledge is produced by a human being because the super-human being does not express its will in a precise way. The production of moral knowledge, the work of making the "divine will" explicit, is not open to ordinary people but limited to a particular person who is believed respectable enough to interpret the "divine will." Nevertheless, once a particular set of moral knowledge is produced, it tends to have an obligatory function for all the members of the society, even for the producer and the ruler of the producer. Although, this moral knowledge tends to be less precise or clear, all elements of the knowledge are conceived as a whole in the image of the super-human being.

The appropriateness of this moral knowledge is examined by reflection on the "divine will" which is expressed in terms of human well-being. And the appropriate moral knowledge is cumulated and transmitted to the next generation as a form of wisdom. In this perspective, moral education is seen to be fundamental for their well-being and there is little confusion

about what is good or bad. In this view, therefore, it is taken-for-granted that parents and educators teach children to know and to follow the "divine will" through transmitted moral knowledge.

In the primitive perspective, as seen above, the powerless and submissive image of human beings tends to surpass the active and creative dimensions of human beings. It may be possible in this perspective that individuals are exploited or mistreated by those who deny the existence of the super-human power. It cannot be denied that there were a number of such cases in human history. Nevertheless, a man of morality in the sense of this perspective may accept the arbitrary manipulation of moral knowledge and its abuse as an expression of the "divine will." Moreover, unlike the existence and the work of human being, those of super-human being are neither visible nor recognizable by means of our ordinary perceptions. This uncertainty leads many civilized men to doubt the meaning of "divine will." The corruption of the belief in super-human being tends to undermine the whole ground of the primitive perspective.

Thus, in the process of human civilization, especially of Western Civilization, the primitive perspective tended to be devalued, neglected and forgotten. It may be most probable in this historical context that the primitive perspective comes to lose its place in the field of moral education, as being regarded as a naive and useless worthwhile only for a museum. Perhaps, for civilized men as "scientific and technical giants" (Dedrock, 1976, p. 3) who believe "everything exists to pleasure and delight him" (Hegel, 1967, p. 579), old sayings such as, "Look at gold as if it is a stone," "One who hears the voice of *Tao* in the morning would not regret even if he dies in the evening," or "Do not let your left hand know what your right hand is doing," may be meaningless, or even ridiculous. However, there seems to remain space worthwhile for us to reinterpret this perspective through which we can take a new look at our contemporary situation. This task to reinterpret and reunderstand the primitive perspective seems to call for our efforts not only because we can never cut off the primitiveness in our consciousness even though we can deny or forget it, but also because the civilized perspective,

as is the primitive perspective, can never be absolutely perfect.

C. Instrumental Perspective

The instrumental perspective on morality and moral education can be conceived as a counter perspective against the primitive one. In the primitive perspective, men, world, and their relations are understood in terms of divine will, but in the instrumental perspective, the super-human power has lost its place and man is substituted. Wheelis (1971) characterized this moment in a succinct way:

> In the Modern Age, the will of God is replaced by the dream of mechanism [scientific and technological world view]. The belief that man by his own reason can know the universe is necessarily accomplished by a changed vision of that universe. ... at the beginning of the Modern Age they [the world and its works] are seen to function independently as a machine (p. 30).

In the instrumental perspective, the divinity of the super-human being loses its meaning in human life, and the view is held that the world has neither will nor subjectivity. Instead, the world is conceived as a "language of mathematics," as Galileo believed (Mumford, 1970, p. 104), or as "a kind of clockwork" in Kepler's term (Koestler, 1963, p. 340). The divine will does nothing and man can acquire power by virtue of one's own reason through which he can find natural laws written in the language of mathematics. In this belief, therefore, "human knowledge and human power meet in one" (Bacon, 1939, p. 28). By formulating natural laws, man can get power without the help of divine will.

If man acquires power himself, who is to make decisions on how to use it? In the primitive perspective, the use of power is only a matter for the super-human being. Even if man gets power, he is to use it in accordance with divine will because it is not his own possession but is an endowment of the super-human power. But in the instrumental perspective, the use of man's power depends on one's will since he acquires it himself. Hence, in this perspective the world becomes an object over which man exerts his power. Hegel characterized this relation between man and the world as "objectification" (Balbus, 1983, pp. 279-292).

This belief affects not merely the way man relates himself to the natural world but also his relation to other human beings and society. Human life is viewed "but a motion of limb" (Hobbes in Bronowski, 1979, p. 197), and human beings and society lose their divine meaning, replaced by instrumental meanings. Knowledge, including moral knowledge, assumes a significant role in this perspective because it becomes a main source of power. But knowledge has only instrumental value for power and, therefore, traditional moral knowledge is rejected because of its incompatibility with power, or transformed in terms of its instrumental value for acquiring power.

In this perspective, as described above, man's relationships to the world and other human beings become instrumental. Here, there may be few apparent problems in man's relation to nature since the natural world does not express any immediate resistance. But this is not the case in man's relationship to others because, unlike nature, other men do not accept one's instrumental use of them without resistance. So, it may be a natural termination of this perspective that human relationship becomes, as Hobbes understood it, endless "struggles." If all men desire to treat others as instruments to get power, who is to coordinate contradictory relations among human beings? On what grounds? These become the most fundamental questions within the instrumental perspective. In dealing with these questions, there seem to be two distinctive sub-perspectives; i.e., the totalitarian-instrumental perspective and the solipsistic-instrumental perspective.

Totalitarian-Instrumental Perspective

In both the totalitarian and solipsitic perspectives, the role of the super-human being of the primitive perspective is replaced by human beings. In the totalitarian perspective, this role is taken by a particular group of persons: a group of rulers, a group of experts, or a collaboration of both. The basic interest of this perspective tends to be the effective total control of the rest of the people, assuming that men naturally pursue self-interests and hence it is necessary to control men's contradictory self-interests for the good of society by means of a

set of strict rules. Hence, in this perspective, morality becomes an instrument for social control.

Thus, in order to control various acts of the people, moral knowledge is re-defined in a specified and fractioned form. Traditional moral knowledge or wisdom is also re-interpreted and re-constructed in terms of its usefulness for effective social control. This task is performed by experts who used to regard their works as objective and value-neutral. In this process moral knowledge tends to be "law-like propositions which are empirically testable" (Giroux, 1983a, p. 328), predictably in control of concrete behaviors of other human beings called "subjects." Hence, in this perspective, a specified and fragmented set of moral knowledge has an obligatory function in human life but this knowledge tends to be alienated from ordinary men because there is no accessibility for them to participate in the production of it.

In this perspective, moral education is highly emphasized in terms of its utility for a given society or for maintenance of social order. The subjective dimension of an individual tends to be totally neglected, emphasizing habituation, modeling or behavior modification of the given law-like orders. The role of the teacher is also conceived as being significant. It is expected that the teacher provide students with a ready-made set of moral knowledge, and guard, evaluate and control students' daily behaviors in terms of a given set of behavioral morality. But the teachers' subjective participation in moral education is limited, or even prohibited. Instead, teachers are expected to teach children the prescribed morality produced by a particular group of experts and/or the powerful.

Solipsistic-Instrumental Perspective

Unlike the totalitarian perspective, in the solipistic perspective the role of super-human being is assumed by each individual person. Hence, in this perspective, each individual human being is viewed as a creator and controller of the world. Individual characteristics, such as needs, interests, instincts, feelings, beliefs, desires, knowledge, skills, are highly respected and even glorified. And all external beings, such as the natural world, society and others, are conceived as "objects" over which one can exert power. Morality is understood in terms of its

instrumental value for one's individual needs and interests. Whatever provides one benefit is regarded as moral or good, and if not, it is not.

According to this perspective, hence, there can be no substantial moral knowledge. Traditional moral values tend to be neglected because of their incompatibility with self-interests. When a man, for example, helps others, his act is interpreted in terms of his own self-interest and if he denies the involvement of his self-interest, he is seen as hypocritical or morally less-developed. In this perspective, morality tends to be reduced to values, and moral values also tend to be equated to those of things or commodities, as Simon (1976) claimed:

> We ask students to spend some time listing the brand names in their home medicine cabinets. Just think of your own medicine cabinet as you are sitting reading this. What's in it? How many creams, ointments, and salves have you been sold? Do you use a brand-name, buffered product instead of plain old aspirin? How did you get started on that? What about the spray cans? ... As long as you have the door to your cabinet open, why don't you pull out the cosmetic tray? How vulnerable are you to avoiding the hysteria surrounding all of us about getting a wrinkle? Getting old has become such a negative value (p. 127).

Thus in this perspective, any form of social norms, moral principles, or traditional moral wisdom tends to be regarded as meaningless and rejected. The production of moral knowledge depends on individual human beings, and the appropriateness of moral knowledge is determined by its consequent benefit for the individual.

In the solipsistic-instrumental perspective, it is viewed that there is no sense teaching morality in school or at home, because "in consideration of values there is no single correct answer" (Kohlberg, 1976, p. 185). If there is no correct answer concerning moral values or morality, and if only a correct set of knowledge should be taught, how can moral educators teach morality? Ways of dealing with this problem within this perspective are: (1) to ignore moral education in school, and instead to teach only exact knowledge and skills; (2) to emphasize only the formal cognitive structure of moral reasoning; or (3) to cultivate skills to create individuals' own values.

D. Reflection: Toward a Critical-Dialectic Perspective

As seen above, there seem to be deep contradictions between the primitive and the instrumental perspectives. In the primitive perspective, the world (natural and social) is viewed as a work of a super-human being. Nature, society, and others are viewed dominant over individual man. Thus, the individual human being is surpassed by others (nature and other human beings) and the known is also surpassed by the unknown. In contrast, within the instrumental perspective, the world is conceived as an object, an instrument of human beings, which works in accordance with precise natural laws (mechanical mathematical laws). Man's relations to nature, society, and others are oppressive and dominating. Thus, individual human being surpasses over natural and human others and the known also surpasses over the unknown.

It seems that the instrumental perspective has had a dominant role in Western Civilization. Especially from the beginning of the Modern Age, this perspective has penetrated dominantly into almost all disciplines, not only in the natural sciences but also in the social sciences. No doubt, this perspective has provided a rationality which has made possible highly developed contemporary civilization. Those who live in contemporary society should not forget to appreciate its contributions. However, this may not mean that the instrumental perspective provides the only way to reach the truth or to improve the conditions of human existence.

The instrumental perspective tends to be conceived as a more developed form of human symbolization than the primitive one. Nevertheless, it may be undeniable that, like the primitive one, this perspective also stands on a superstitious belief in super-human existence: the belief in natural (mechanical and mathematical) laws. The differences are merely that in the primitive perspective the world is believed as a subjective living being but in the instrumental perspective the world is conceived as an objectively inert thing. It can be said in this sense that the instrumental perspective is properly applied to our relation to instrumental objects. But it may be hardly acceptable that this perspective is also appropriate to understand non-instrumental beings like human beings, since none of us may claim that we are totally instrumental objects.

and neither other human beings nor society which consists of human beings can belong to this category. Even many aspects of the natural world may not be reduced to this category.

This implies that from the outset morality can hardly be compatible with the instrumental perspective. If this perspective is based on the belief of the world (nature and human beings) as instrumental objects, then, any notion of ethics or morality, which may begin with the belief that human beings are living subjects and ends in themselves, cannot inherently be viable within this perspective. Debrock (1976) remarked:

> A quick glance at history reveals an almost lawful relationship between man's scientific knowledge and man's moral consciousness; the greater his scientific knowledge, the smaller his ethical thinking (p. 3).

It seems to be hardly deniable that the whole history of modern ethics and moral education has been dominated by this tendency. Abbs (1979) points out the tendency of the exclusive emphasis on reason in the whole Western tradition of philosophy, where "religious, aesthetic, and moral insights, dilemmas and achievements were all classified as merely emotive (or 'private'), and could not be placed upon the philosophical counter for intelligent discussion" (p. 16). The field of ethics and thus of moral education could not be outside of this tradition. The prevailing approaches to moral education also express this tendency. It seems to be the natural termination of moral education within this tradition that moral education ends in two distinctive extremes: either (1) in the unification of all human moral acts into a set of standardized moral acts or laws on the side of system, i.e., instrumentalization of all human beings as means for a given system (totalitarian-instrumentalism); or (2) in the encouragement of anarchistic indulgence into unreflected self-interests on the side of individual i.e., instrumentalization of all others as means for narcissistic self-gratification (solipsistic-instrumentalism). Otherwise, an eclectic position can be also possible within this perspective as attempted in cognitive formalism: formal totalitarianism and substantial solipsism.

Thus, within the instrumental perspective, there seems to be little space for human beings to co-exist and to explore the non-instrumental, intrinsic, and sublimate dimensions of

our life. Instead, struggles to dominate others become endless and vicious. Hence, as Lasch (1984) showed, life becomes the Promethean struggle for survival and the minimal survival of the individual, as an isolated being, becomes the highest value which prevents us from questioning the purpose of survival. Within this mentality, it may be also taken for granted that the meaning of education is conceived merely as the instrument for either collective or individual survival in the hostile natural and human environments, and non-instrumental and non-material meaning of education are to be overlooked, devaluated, and finally forgotten. This may be one of the most fundamental sources of confusion and difficulty in the field of moral education. Gadamer (1975) pointed out:

> The advance of modern science gave to human culture tremendous power for changing the world in a significant way. However, the quality of social [as well as moral] education and life did not develop in the same manner. The disproportion between our skill and our moral political wisdom is the real root of our disease and difficulty (p. 331).

This suggests that we need to go beyond the prevailing instrumental perspective in dealing with contemporary problems and difficulties in the field of moral education.

By "going beyond," I do not mean that we must reject the instrumental perspective in moral education. I mean that we need a more critical understanding of this perspective. When we are inside a forest, we can hardly see its true location in the whole landscape. Likewise, within a given perspective, it may be hardly possible to examine its true meaning. Hence, we need another place - a proper place where we can more critically understand the contemporary problems and difficulties in the field of moral education. I call this place the "critical-dialectic" perspective.

Since around the end of the last century, there have been many efforts to go beyond the prevailing instrumental perspective. Such efforts to go beyond may include those of phenomenology, hermeneutics, existentialism, and critical theory. All these efforts can be summoned together not only for re-orienting the contemporary difficulties in the field of moral education but also for re-searching the more appropriate location of morality in human life. However, it is not my intention to adopt any of the particular kinds mentioned above. Instead,

I will listen to any of them which reveals truthful aspects and the meaning of morality and moral education in a "critical-dialectic" way.

Before characterizing the "critical-dialectic" perspective, let me portray briefly the meaning of the words, "critical" and "dialectic." The meaning of the word "critical," which has been deepened and refined by the critical theorists, can be hardly defined, because in the most full sense, this word can be understood at best by what contemporary critical theorists do. Hence, instead of defining the meaning of the word, I describe its significant aspects with respect to our efforts to search for a proper place of morality and moral education in the pedagogical as well as everyday life. Palermo (1975) characterized the shared concern of the critical theorists as "uncover[ing] the manner in which theoretical reason has been redefined as a positivist instrumental tool of political repression" (p. 137). Palermo's characterization of the works of the critical theorists signifies the substantial characteristics by the notion of the "critical" as exposing the hidden oppressive interests of the dominant ideology by means of the technocratic rationality.

However, Aoki (1980) discloses a fundamental dimension of the word, "critical." He characterizes the meaning of the word by the notion of "critical reflection." This can be exemplified by "transcending the immediate level of interpretation," "an understanding of what is beyond," "making the unconscious conscious," "liberating from the unconsciously held assumptions and intentions that lie hidden" (p. 13-14). A fundamental point which Aoki signifies by the notion of critical reflection seems to be the very attitude or orientation towards the truth of the world, instead of depending on the taken-for-granted, enforced, invented, or articulated form of truth about the real world. This attitude or orientation may renew not only our way of understanding and of relating to the external world but also may refresh our way of looking into ourselves and our actions.

The word "dialectic" tends to be understood and often to refer to skills or an instrument to counter opponent's arguments. In the academic tradition, the dialectic is often used as a method to reduce natural or historical phenomena into objective laws. Considering

the Greek root of the word *dialectike*, "the art of conversation, discussion," or *dialectikos*, "one skilled in argument or debate," there seems reason enough to use it in forementioned ways that reflect an understanding of the meaning of conversation or discourse. However, if we consider that the art of conversation can be signified by its invitation to the truth of the world that goes beyond understanding it as as merely "winning every argument" (Gadamer, 1982, p. 330), and if we understand the meaning of truth as "approximation of perception [the known] to thing," rather than " approximation of thing to perception" (Heidegger, 1979, p. 295), the word "dialectic" reveals another meaning. Carson (1984) pointed out this layer of the meaning of conversation when he understood conversation as a mode of curriculum study. He wrote:

> Conversation is related to questioning in the sense that participants in conversation are directed by a sense of openness, by something presently indeterminate which is worthwhile talking about. The topic and the world which the topic belongs to are held in common by the conversants, but the question arrives during the course of the conversation, in Gadamer's words it 'presses itself upon us' as the negativity of experience counters preconceived opinion (p. 63).

If we understand conversation in this wide sense as a mutual act of making sense of the world, it can be said that the meaning of dialectic, as an 'art of conversation,' does not lie in the winning of arguments or in the production of objective laws, but in its disclosing power of the world. This real value of dialectic seems what Gadamer envisages when he says that:

> Dialectic consists not in trying to discover the weakness of what is said, but in bringing out its real strength. It is not the art of arguing that is able to make a strong case out of a weak one, but the art of thinking that is able to strengthen what is said by referring to the object (p. 331).

Similarly, Kosík (1976) shows such a dimension concerning the meaning of dialectic, saying that: "Dialectic is after the 'thing itself.' But the 'thing itself' does not show itself to men immediately. To grasp it calls not only for a certain effort but also for a detour" (p. 1). The notion of *yin* and *yang* in the Oriental classical philosophy also signifies this fundamental meaning of dialectic in a metaphorical way: Any of *yin* and *yang*, as the paradoxical two aspects of true world or universe, "*Tao*," cannot be surpassed by the other and they cannot be synthesized as well, because, although they appear in a paradoxical form, together they reveal the true world or universe (See, for example, Chan, 1963, chap. 11). The above notion of the

"dialectic" seems to bring to light a fundamental dimension concerning our way of understanding and approaching the true world in a full sense, which seemingly appears in a paradoxical form.

Thus, in the critical-dialectic perspective, as the words "critical" and "dialectic" imply, it neither attempts to create a new image of man, world, and their relation, nor to invent a new set of moral laws. Rather, this perspective can be characterized by its attitude or orientation which tries to approach the truth of the world as it is, instead of reducing it into an invented structure. This leads us to regard our primordial naked life experiences as a fundamental ground of all understanding, not as the truth of the world itself but as a primary window through which the true world reveals itself. This does not mean that all forms of abstraction are denied in this perspective; rather both abstraction and naked experience are viewed as an inseparable whole which leads us to orient ourselves to the world through the continuous dialectic of both. What is denied in this perspective is a one-sided domination of each concerning the relation between man and the world. The forgotten primordial connection between them is to be restored in this perspective; the self, others, and world are understood as a co-existing whole. This is not because we need to create such a view but because that is the ontological condition of our existence; my life can hardly be meaningful without others and we cannot exist without the world. In this co-existing condition, any of them can neither be surpassed by any of others, nor be an instrument or means for any of the rest. Rather, each is regarded as an end and each cares for the others as well as him/her/itself.

With respect to morality and moral education, the critical-dialectic perspective discloses many forgotten aspects. For example, this perspective brings forth a deeper way of our understanding morality. In this perspective, morality can neither be separated from the self, nor can it be regarded as a fixed set of moral laws or principles. The truth of morality dwells in our everyday life, and in the life of our ancestors as well. We experience what makes our life more meaningful; we listen to others' experiences, including the written or spoken experiences of our ancestors. With those experiences we abstract a form of life which makes our life more

meaningful and live with it to live a more meaningful life. By this continuous dialectic process of reflection and act as well as of concrete life experience and abstraction, we deepen the meaning of our life and our moral consciousness. Thus, as Ricoeur(1978) pointed out, in the critical-dialectic perspective, there can be neither a zero-point of morality nor any end of morality. We are always on the way to endless deepening of our meaning of life and moral consciousness. Carter (1984) put this in this way:

> Moral education is ongoing development of a way of being in the world, a way of life which traditionally have been named 'wisdom.' It is just that so few reach beyond the beginning and the middle to the more developed end, which itself continues to expand, enlarge, and deepen. Wisdom, too, is a process without termination (p. 202).

In this perspective, traditional moral knowledge, or moral wisdom is neither negated nor do we follow it as irresistible orders of the divine will. Instead, it is regarded as an example which invites us to a deeper meaning of human life, because my own experience is temporal and thus limited. We re-experience what the original Sages experienced, and we try to understand the true meaning of our being, which may guide us to live in a more meaningful way. Thus, others' experiences are integrated as a part of my experience and my experience is also transformed in a deeper way. In this process, the self and others are signified by one another. Past and future as well as tradition and change are integrated in a whole context.

Still, however, it is hardly enough, with the critical-dialectic perspective, for moral educators to resolve a variety of problems in moral education and also to reconstruct an alternative form of moral education. It is in this sense that I regard the critical-dialectic perspective as an attitude or orientation which enables us to renew our way of looking at morality in the context of our lives as well as of education. If it can be said that a fundamental orientation of this perspective is to restore the forgotten primordial relation between man and the world (natural and human world), this may not be confined to a particular person or a particular group of persons, but remains to all of those who try to live as human beings. Likewise, the task in the critical-dialectic perspective to re-orient, re-understand, and re-discover the meaning of morality and moral education may be hardly separable from the task for the amelioration of the conditions of human co-existence. This task, hence, may call

for much effort and participation of those who are concerned about the improvement of existing conditions which threaten our co-existence in the world with the world, even though it can be initiated by an individual or a group of individuals who share this concern.

In this study, I will take the critical-dialectic perspective as an initial place in our looking at morality and moral education. By the notion of the critical-dialectic perspective, I do not mean a perspective that is fixed, unchangeable, or absolute through which we can resolve the problematic situation of human existence in this troubled age. Rather, I regard that this perspective, like other perspectives, is to be critically re-examined on the basis of its meaningfulness in a deeper understanding of the living conditions for our co-existence. It is in this sense that I take this perspective as an initial place for this study. Through the whole process of the study, this perspective will also be scrutinized in terms of its practical relevance to our concern with the improvement of moral education.

However, as the initial place of this study, some significant points of the critical-dialectic perspective can be made concerning our way of looking at morality and moral education. It allows us, at least, to go beyond over-simplification of morality understood as merely a standardized set of moral laws or as means for gratification of personal self-interests. It also guides us not to reduce moral education into one-sided dogma, such as the totalization of students' concrete moral acts, unification of the formal structure of students' moral reasoning, or the equation of students' moral consciousness to unreflected needs or desires. Instead, it leads us to call for the forgotten primordial connection not only between the self and the world (natural as well as human) but also between morality and meaning of human life. It also discloses a possibility for us through moral education to invite students to the whole truth of a meaningful life in their lives.

III. Research Orientation: Development of Modern Hermeneutics and Its Relevance to the Study

A. Introduction

The task of this study, a critical understanding of the meaning of morality and moral education embedded in the Moral Education Curriculum of Korea, implies the centrality of texts and their interpretation. But, what is a text? What does it mean to interpret a text? For what do we interpret a text? What is it to say that an interpretation is an appropriate one? These questions may be inescapable not only for the characterization of this study but also for the self-understanding of my act of research. It is in this sense that this study, since it deals centrally with those questions, is embedded within the orientation of modern hermeneutics.

The meaning of hermeneutics is rooted in the ancient Greek word, *hermeneia* or *hermeneuein*, which means "interpretation" or "to interpret." If we remain faithful to this original meaning of the word, it can be said in a loose sense that hermeneutics is "the theory or philosophy of the interpretation of meaning" (Bleicher, 1980). Before Schleiermacher, who can be regarded as a founder of modern hermeneutics, hermeneutics remained within the boundary of philology, as a way of "illuminating ... the surface or vocabulary levels of texts" (Howard, 1982, p. 9) in Biblical and classical interpretative practice. Since the modern scientific revolution, hermeneutics tended to be regarded as a subdiscipline of theology, philosophy, literature, or a particular methodology for scientific investigation. Positivistic presuppositions that "the phenomena of human thought, feeling, and action are subject to fixed laws, the phenomena of society cannot but conform to fixed law" (Mill, 1884, p. 607), have accelerated this narrow view of hermeneutics. Hence, the concern of hermeneutics has tended to be restricted to the development of the methodological principles or techniques which will assure the exact interpretation of the text. Today, this view of hermeneutics seems to be prevailing not only in ordinary usage but also in the academic area. For example, the lexical meaning of hermeneutics, as "the study of the methodological principles of interpretation" (*Webster's New*

Collegiate Dictionary), expresses this tendency. Howard points out this tendency in the academic area as follows:

> Hermeneutics will not appear as a typical listing in a catalog of university studies. The field is usually thought as a subdiscipline for theology, where it covers the study of methods for the authentication and interpretation of text (Howard, 1982, p. 1).

Modern hermeneutics has come to being as a self-reflective counteraction to this dominant tendency of the so called "culture of positivism" (Whitty, 1974), especially in the field of the social sciences. This aporia which spurred the birth of modern hermeneutics is expressed by Dilthey's characterization of human science as "understanding" instead of "explanation" in the natural sciences as a reaction to Kantian epistemology in the human sciences. Gadamer expresses this aporia in his attempt to unfold the meaning of hermeneutics, not as a methodology of human sciences, but as an effort to seek out what the human sciences truly are. He elucidates that hermeneutics

> ...starts with the resistance within modern science against the universal claim of scientific method. It is concerned to seek that experience of truth that transcend the sphere of the control of scientific method wherever it is to be found, and to inquire with modes of experience which lie outside science: with the experience of philosophy, of art, of history itself. These are all modes of experience in which a truth is communicated that cannot be verified by the methodological means proper to science (Gadamer, 1982, p. xii).

In the development of modern hermeneutics, there have been many efforts to inquire into and to enrich the complex and dynamic dimensions of our interpretative acts. There have also been a variety of exchanges of ideas and debates among the conflicting insights not only within hermeneutic tradition but also within other newly emerging intellectual traditions such as phenomenology, critical social theory, existentialism, and structuralism. To understand modern hermeneutics, we need to understand its history. But, within the hermeneutic point of view, to understand history is, as Gadamer pointed out, neither to put the past into the past itself nor to reduce it to causal regularity, but to overtake it in our present situation. What is it that the history of modern hermeneutics speaks to us for our self-understanding of interpretation of a text? In particular, what is it that the modern hermeneutics speaks to me in the context of the present research? For this, the fundamental insights elaborated during the development of the

modern hermeneutic enterprises, especially those of Scheleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, Gadamer, and Ricoeur are discussed in this chapter. With relation to the present study, some relevant insights are also examined.

B. Initial Projects of Modern Hermeneutics: Friedrich Schleiermacher and Wilhelm Dilthey

When we trace the history of modern hermeneutics, we can see that there has been a continuous self-reflective reaction against the dominant theological, epistemological, and metaphysical presuppositions which limit our understanding of human life in its full sense. This hermeneutical project to restore the understanding of the fullness of human life, especially in the social sciences, was launched in the nineteenth century by Schleiermacher, the acclaimed father of modern hermeneutics. Before Schleiermacher, there existed a philology of classical texts and an exegesis of sacred texts, but, in these traditions, the work of interpretation had been understood and practised in different ways.

Schleiermacher's epoch-making hermeneutic project of general hermeneutics as the art of understanding was rooted in his discontent with the status of hermeneutics in his own time. This discontent is reflected in his remark:

> Hermeneutics as the art of understanding does not exist as a general field, only a particularity of specialized hermeneutics (translated and quoted in Palmer, 1969, p. 84).

He elucidated that this art of understanding is, in its essence, the same regardless of the kind of text - legal documents, religious scripture, or works of literature - even though there are certainly differences among diverse kinds of texts. There can be, he asserted, principles or rules embedded in all understanding of various texts which would provide the basis of all special hermeneutics. Nevertheless, such a hermeneutics had never existed. For Schleiermacher, thus, the fundamental task of hermeneutics as the art of understanding was to formulate these rules or principles.

It seems to be important in this project that Schleiermacher contrasted two poles of interpretation: "grammatical" interpretation and "psychological" or "divinatory"

interpretation. The former dealt with objective and general laws based on language, and the latter focussed on the individuality of the author, his peculiar genius. According to Schleiermacher,

> Just as every speech has a twofold relationship, both to the whole of the language and to the collected thinking of the speaker, so also there exists in all understanding of speech two moments: understanding it as something drawn out of language and as a 'fact' in the thinking of the speaker (in Palmer, 1969, p. 88).

In Schleiermacher's initial efforts to search for the general condition of reliable understanding of text interpretation in the direction of the author's individual spirit, there was a kind of balance between two modes of interpretation. Language skill, here, remained as the key for understanding the speaker in what is spoken. But later, there was a decisive shift in his insight, i.e., the exclusive emphasis on "psychological" interpretation. According to his insight, "to consider the common language is to forget the writer; whereas to understand an individual author is to forget his language" (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 47). The first interpretation was regarded as objective but negative, since it indicates the limits of understanding. Hence, the proper task of hermeneutics, for Schleiermacher, was to be captured by the second interpretation through which one can understand the subjectivity of an author who speaks.

Although this psychological character of Schleiermacher's insight has been called into question, Schleiermacher's contribution to modern hermeneutics is remarkable. He unfolded the complex and dynamic world of the text and its primordial connectedness to individual human life. And it is by Schleiermacher's contribution that hermeneutics is seen no longer merely as a method or subdiscipline of theology, literature, or law, but as the art of understanding any utterance in language.

Dilthey took up the project of general hermeneutics proposed by Schleiermacher and pursued this project in the wider context of historical or human sciences. Carrying out this project, he was well aware of Kantian philosophy and was familiar with the newly emerging positivism of Comte and Mill in the late nineteenth century. He regarded that Kantian epistemology developed in the *Critique of Pure Reason* was successful in providing the solid condition of reliable knowledge in the field of natural sciences. But, he also recognized its

limitation in the historical or human sciences, since the objects of human sciences "appear as coming from within, as a reality," unlike objects of natural sciences which "appear to consciousness as coming from outside, as phenomena" (Howard, 1982, p. 15).

Dilthey adopted the sharp dichotomy between the methods of the natural and the historical sciences offered by a German historiographer J.G. Droysen: "explanation (*Erklären*)" for the natural sciences, and "understanding (*Verstehen*)" for the human sciences (Howard, 1982). He accepted that nature, since it is "non-self" and impersonal object, can be interpreted in the explanatory terms of mathematical and ahistorical principles, but he did not believe that life can belong to the same category. He claimed:

> ... for the natural sciences an ordering of nature is achieved only through a succession by means of linking hypotheses. For the human sciences, on the contrary, the connectedness of psychic life is given as an original and general formation. Nature we explain, the life of the soul we understand (translated and quoted in Howard, 1982, p. 15-16).

For Dilthey, our experience of culture or human phenomena cannot be relegated to an impersonal category which can be explained by mathematical and ahistorical formula, since in such cultural phenomena as historical documents or works of art, there is the fundamental "connectedness (*Zusammenhang*)" of psychic life. Hence, he believed that human phenomena are not to be explained but to be understood.

What is, then, the operation of psychic life, as the distinctive character of human phenomena, in the human sciences? Dilthey classified the various aspects of human life, which are not in the realm of metaphysics but in that of lived experience (*Erlebnis*) itself, into three major categories; ideas, actions, and expressions of lived experience. He regarded that ideas and actions as "manifestations of life (*Lebensäusserungen*)," and that, in the "expressions of lived experience (*Erlebnisausdrucke*)," human inner experience comes to fullest expression. But Dilthey used the term "expression (*Ausdruck*)," not as an embodiment of one's naked feeling but as a kind of "objectification" of the mind (Palmer, 1969, pp. 111-114). He claimed that the expression "contain[s] more of the context of inner life than any introspection can perceive, for it rises up out of the depth which consciousness never lights up" (in Palmer, 1969, p. 113).

He searched for the ideal of this expression in great works of art:

> No truly great work of art can try to mirror a reality foreign to the inner content [*geistigen Gehalt*] of its author. Indeed, it does not wish to say anything at all about its author. True in itself, it stands there fixed, visible, enduring (in Palmer, 1969, p. 113).

Such a formulation of "expressions of lived experience" in terms of great works of art seems to be very significant in the sense that it allowed him, at least at the theoretical level, to establish the condition of reliable knowledge in the human sciences within Kantian epistemology. Dilthey believed that the difference between natural and human sciences does not lie in their ways of knowing but in the distinctive character of their contents. Thus, the task to remain, for Dilthey, was to objectify the contents of human sciences without destroying its connectedness to life. Dilthey pursued this task by means of objectifying the great works of art as the "expressions of lived experience," the truth of which is fixed, visible, and enduring.

By this formulation, it became clear that the human sciences must focus on texts, expecially great texts, the objectified expressions of lived experience, as objects of studies.

> Everything in which the spirit of man has objectified itself falls in the area of the *Geiteswissenschaften*. Their circumstance is as wide as understanding, and understanding has its true object in the objectification of life itself (in Palmer, 1969, p. 112).

For Dilthey, the task of the human sciences became the reconstructing or reproducing the objectified and fixed truth of life expressed in the great texts through an orderly and systematic manner of understanding. By this characterization, human sciences become inevitably historical as well as hermeneutical, and the art of understanding becomes central for this task.

Thus, Dilthey's life-long project of general hermeneutics as the foundation of human sciences appeared to be settled through the distinction between the natural and human sciences, the thesis of lived experience and life, and the interpretation of life as expressions of lived experience through great works of art. But, his preoccupied acceptance of Romanticist philosophy and Kantian epistemology seems to have made him subordinate the hermeneutic problem to the psychological problem of knowledge of others, and thus prevented him from going beyond the field of interpretation for the source of all objectification (Ricoeur, 1981).

Nevertheless, the significance of his effort in the history of modern hermeneutics should not be overlooked. First of all, he placed hermeneutics in the wider context of human sciences and animated the text by restoring its connectedness to life. Especially, his insightful disclosure of dynamic dimensions in human understanding, such as temporality, circularity, historicity, and incompleteness of understanding, is significant, still remaining as fundamental themes of human understanding.

C. Fundamentalization of Hermeneutics: Martin Heidegger

As we have seen, Dilthey's formulation of hermeneutics was basically within the Kantian epistemological presupposition as implied both in one of Dilthey's major works, *Critique of Historical Reason*, and in his fundamental question: How is historical knowledge possible? Under this presupposition, hermeneutics remained merely one variety of the theory of knowledge and thus claims to the truth of interpretation relied basically on its methodological ideal. In this historical context, it is Heidegger who raised the radical question of this epistemological presupposition itself.

Heidegger's hermeneutic enterprise, although it may hardly be simplified, can be characterized as "going to the foundation." His metaphorical notion of metaphysics expressed in the Preface of "What is Metaphysics?" shows this character in his effort. He posed a question of ingredients of the soil, as a ground or foundation of a tree, in Descartes' metaphorical formulation of metaphysics, where metaphysics is viewed as roots, physics as trunk, other sciences as branches (Heidegger, 1949). As implied in this metaphor, Heidegger's whole life-long enterprise can be viewed as efforts to go to the ground or foundation, even though it always remains "bottomless" in Derrida's term (1976), or "infinite" in Levinas' language (1979).

Of course, Heidegger could not and did not start his enterprise at the zero point. Behind him, there were Western philosophical traditions. He was well aware of Dilthey's project of general hermeneutics and Husserl's phenomenological enterprise. But his effort was not merely

to accept and develop their ideas, but to radicalize them through his disclosure of *Dasein*, the "being-there that we are," and its relation to Being, which, for him, has been a question forgotten in Western intellectual history.

In the introduction to his major work, *Being and Time*, Heidegger radicalized the traditional presuppositions of being, where "being" was conceived as universal, indefinable, and self-evident. By these presuppositions, he argued, "we have made plain not only that the question of Being lacks an answer, but that the question itself is obscure and without direction" (1962, p. 24). Thus, he claimed, the question of the meaning of being should be re-asked and reformulated. For this, Heidegger unfolded *Dasein* and its relation to Being. In his formulation, *Dasein* designates the place where the question of Being arises; it is a being within Being rather than a subject for which there is an object. He described this fundamental relationship of *Dasein* to Being as follows:

> Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an *issue* for it. But in that case, this is a constitutive state of Dasein's Being, and this implies that, in its Being, has a relationship towards that Being - a relationship which itself is one of Being (Heidegger, 1962, p. 32. Original emphasis).

For Heidegger, Being is not a kind of objective entity which is, as traditionally believed in Western metaphysics, universal, undefinable, and self-evident apart from human existence. Instead, it is a reflection on the irreducible givenness of human existence, *Dasein*, which always understands itself in terms of its existence - in terms of a possibility of itself.

With this fundamental relationship of Being to *Dasein*, Heidegger raised the question about the foundation of traditional sciences. In history, for example, what is philosophically primary is, for him, neither "a theory of the concept-formation of historiology, nor the theory of historiological knowledge, and nor the theory of history as the object of historiology," but the "interpretation of authentically historical beings as regards their historicity" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 30). Here, hermeneutics, not as the methodology of human sciences in its derivative sense, but as an explication of the ontological ground upon which these sciences are contructed, becomes central in all human sciences.

In Heidegger's enterprise, although hermeneutics still remained as the art or theory of understanding held by Schleiermacher and Dilthey, there seems to be a fundamental difference not only in its relation to the human sciences but also in the meaning of understanding. In Schleiermacher's insight, understanding was grounded in his philosophical affirmation of the identity of inner reality, and, for Dilthey, understanding was conceived as a deep level of comprehension of the objectified "expressions of lived experience" which are created by the great writers or artists. According to this formulation of human understanding, we are not what we are, but we are what others are, since we find ourselves in terms of the great works of art. Heidegger clearly saw a limitation of this view. For him, the other itself is at issue, since the other, as well as the self, is more unknown to the self than any natural phenomenon can be. He tried to show us the ontological structure of understanding in terms of its orientedness towards the *Dasein*. According to him, understanding is the power to grasp our own possibilities for being within the context of the life-world where we exist. It is, thereby, conceived as a mode or constituent element of being-in-the-world rather than something to be grasped as a fact and thus to be possessed. The state of interpretation in Heidegger's insight was located in this context. He wrote:

> In interpretation, understanding does not become something different. It becomes itself. Such interpretation is grounded existentially in understanding; the latter does not arise from the former. Nor is interpretation the inquiry of information about what is understood; it is rather the working-out of possibilities projected in understanding (Heidegger, 1962, pp. 188-189).

This implies that interpretation of texts or works of art is inevitably interrelated to our understanding of things and thus the understanding of things which a text addresses; its development is also related to our interpretation of things and is prior to our interpretation of the text. This relation of understanding and interpretation seems to be clear when we take a simple example: If we have no experience of interpreting any text and thus no understanding of text interpretation, it may hardly be possible to interpret the text which is written about interpretation.

This fundamental structure of understanding and interpretation which Heidegger unfolded, makes the task of hermeneutics difficult and problematizes the previously dominating foundations of all sciences, and signifies the centrality of hermeneutics in all sciences. Heidegger could no longer regard the roots as the fixed and absolute ground or foundation of the tree. Instead, he led us to ask: What is it that makes this tree exist at all?

It is by virtue of Heidegger that we can go to the ground or foundation upon which all the sciences are possible. This may be the main part of the contributions of Heidegger's enterprise, although we may not overlook other contributions of his insights in his reflective disclosure of the ontological structure of understanding and interpretation, which can be captured mainly in terms of temporality, circularity, and presuppositionlessness of them. But, at what price? Reminding us of Plato's insight that "the ascending dialectic is the easiest," Ricoeur expresses Heidegger's problematic contribution as follows:

> With Heidegger's philosophy, we are always engaged in going back to the foundations, but we are left incapable of beginning the movement of return which would lead from the fundamental ontology to the properly epistemological status of human sciences (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 59).

This may mean that we need to locate Heidegger's contribution in its proper place. If we understand Heidegger's contribution as the deconstruction of the previous foundations of sciences through his disclosure of the fundamental structure of understanding, the remaining task may be to reconstruct a proper foundation of sciences, especially of human sciences, without regression. This task seems to be what Gadamer at the general level, and later, Ricoeur at the regional level, have pursued.

D. Hermeneutics and the Experience of Belonging: Hans-Georg Gadamer

As a student of Heidegger, Gadamer has, in terms of his own unique insights, extended and elaborated the existential ontological hermeneutics of Heidegger. He seems to have recognized the contribution of Heidegger to the development of hermeneutic insights. But he also seemed to see a possible deep abyss into which Heideggerian ontology would lead; the possibility of total Nietzchean annihilation of any effort to search for the foundation in the

human sciences at the price of going beyond the Kantian methodological ideal, the Diltheyan concept of spirit, and the Husserlian formulation of trancendental consciousness purified by phenomenological reduction (Gadamer, 1982). This implies the character of Gadamer's hermeneutic enterprise as an effort to formulate a new foundation of the human sciences and human experience of the world without falling into historical regression. This character in his enterprise seems to make his task difficult but significant.

A fundamental and thus decisive presupposition of modern sciences, especially the human sciences, for Gadamer, can be captured by "alienating distanciation (*Verfremdung*)" which has contributed to the destruction of our primordial relation to "belonging (*Zugehörigkeit*)." Thus, in Gadamer's eyes, the important task of hermeneutics was to overcome this alienating distanciation in human sciences through rehabilitation of our experience of belonging. Throughout his major work, *Truth and Method* , he basically pursued this task in the three spheres of our experience: aesthetics, history, and language. In the introduction of *Truth and Method*, he expressed this character in his hermeneutic enterprise as follows:

> Hermeneutics developed here is not... a methodology of human sciences, but an attempt to understand what the human sciences truly are, beyond their methodological self-consciousness, and what connects them with the totality of our experience of the world (Gadamer, 1982, p. xiii).

Gadamer's effort to unfold the meaning of prejudice as the inescapable condition of understanding seems to have a central significance in this task not only for the rehabilitation of the experiences of belonging but also for overcoming the alienating distanciation in the human sciences. He brought into question the fundamental prejudice of the Enlightenment in terms of "the prejudice against prejudices" (Gadamer, 1982, p. 239-240). Addressing the current pejorative status of prejudice, as "unfounded judgement," he reminded us of the Latins' understanding of prejudice, not as false judgement, but as "the idea that it can have a positive and a negative value" (p. 240). Gadamer showed the positive side of prejudice in understanding through Heidegger's fore-structure of understanding and its circularity. According to Heidegger, the circularity of understanding, not merely that between parts and

whole in Schleiermacher's sense, but also that between fore-meaning and new meaning, underlies all human understanding. Heidegger warned us not to see this circularity merely as a vicious one, since, if we do so, every understanding would be misunderstood from the ground up. Instead of getting out of this circle, for Heidegger, we need to come into it in a right way, i.e., in the way sensitive and open to the "things themselves" rather than staying in "fancies or popular conceptions," since there is "a positive possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing" in this circle (Heidegger, 1962, p. 195). Gadamer described this structure as follows:

> A person who tries to understand a text is always performing an art of projecting. He projects before himself a meaning for the text as a whole as soon as some initial meaning emerges in the text. Again, the latter emerges merely because he is reading the text with particular expectations in regard to a certain meaning. The working-out of this fore-project, which is constantly revised in terms of what emerges as he penetrates into the meaning, is understanding what is there (Gadamer, 1982, p. 236).

In this ontological structure of circularity in our understanding, the methodological ideal or scientific objectivism can be captured as a derivative of this circular structure of understanding, one among other prejudices. And this "prejudice against prejudices" also can be viewed as a prejudice which delegitimates other prejudices by means of one dominant prejudice.

However, this does not mean that all prejudices, including the prejudice against prejudices, have to be preserved in our understanding as they are. Instead, they can be regarded as a kind of fore-ground for understanding in its full sense, through which we can develop a better understanding. For him, we need to be aware of our own prejudices so as to allow the text to present its own truth against our own fore-meanings. Gadamer put this as follows:

> Conscious understanding will be concerned not merely to form anticipatory ideas, but make them conscious so as to check them and thus acquire right understanding from the thing themselves (Gadamer, 1982, p. 239).

With this insight on the inevitable location of prejudice in understanding and the right way of dealing with them for better understanding, Gadamer tried to rehabilitate tradition and authority. But this must not be confused with the blind obedience to them, since, for Gadamer, true meaning of the authority of a person, as well as tradition, does not come into being because of the superiority of a person or tradition, but because "he[or it] has a wider view of things" or "superior knowledge" (p. 248).

This insight on the location of prejudice in understanding takes a significant role in Gadamer's reflective disclosure of historical consciousness, the highest form of which is characterized "effective historical consciousness (*wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein*)." His analysis of the three kinds of relationships between 'I' and 'Thou' shows the operation of prejudice in historical consciousness (Gadamer, 1982, pp. 321-325). In the first kind of 'I-Thou' relations, "we understand the other person in the same way that we understand any other typical event in our experiential field, i.e., he is predictable." In this relation, I understand others in terms of my own prejudice and the prejudice of the other is negated. If we apply this to the hermeneutic problem, "the naive faith in method and in the objectivity" or "the prejudice against prejudices" in general belongs to this category. In the second mode of 'I-Thou' relation, the 'Thou' is acknowledged as a person, but the understanding of 'Thou' is still a form of self-relatedness. To put this in another way, both my and other's prejudices are acknowledged but each prejudice is separated and isolated. Hence, "there is a constant struggle for mutual recognition," for domination of one person by the other. In the hermeneutic sphere, Gadamer saw this example in historical consciousness as generally called, which "knows about the otherness of the other." One might add the 'reception theory' in the sphere of literary theory to this example (Eagleton, 1983, pp. 74-84). The third mode of relationship, which Gadamer regarded as the hightest type of hermeneutical experience, is characterized by the openness to the other. In this relation, we understand the 'Thou' truly as a 'Thou', i.e., we do not overlook the other's claim but listen to what s/he has to say to us. To relate this relation to prejudice, we are aware both of our and others' prejudices but we are open to hear from others in order to go beyond our own prejudices and thus reach a better understanding. In relation to the hermeneutic experience, Gadamer called this highest type of hermeneutic experience as the "effective historical consciousness," and its realization as the "fusion of horizons (*Horizontverschmelzung*)."

Gadamer's ideas of "the effective historical consciousness" and of the "fusion of horizons" have remarkable significance in text interpretation. According to Gadamer, we

understand the text through the question that lies behind what is said. This takes place by our achieving the "horizon of the question" within which the sense of it is determined. This is not an arbitrary procedure, but is related to the answer that is expected in the text, because a person asking is part of the tradition and regards himself as addressed by it. However, since a text does not speak to us in the same way as another person does, we have to make it speak through the opening to the experience of history, i.e., the "effective historical consciousness," which leads us to the "fusion of horizons" in our understanding of the text. Gadamer described this operation in text interpretation in a summarized form.

> We, who are attempting to understand, must ourselves make it [a text] speak. But we found that this kind of understanding, 'making' the text speak, is not an arbitrary procedure that we undertake on our initiative but that, as a question, it is related to the answer that is expected in the text. The anticipation of answer itself presumes that the person asking is part of the tradition and regards himself as addressed by it. This is the truth of the effective historical consciousness... we described its realization as the fusion of horizons of understanding, which is what mediates between the text and its interpretation (Gadamer, 1982, p. 340).

For Gadamer, it is through the "proper achievement of language" that this fusion of horizons in our understanding can take place at all. This makes language take a central place in hermeneutics. But, what is language? What is the operation of language in our understanding? We may be able to see, in Gadamer's reflection on language, that there is a penetrated experience of belonging in the sphere of language like that which is expressed in his reflection on prejudice. Gadamer's insight on language can be captured by his single sentence: "Being that can be understood is language" (Gadamer, 1982, p. 432), which has a parallel character of Heidegger's signification of language as the "existential constitution of *Dasein*'s disclosedness" (Heidegger, 1962, pp. 203-214). This insight brings to light the primordial kind of belonging in our experience of language, as Gadamer wrote: "language is a central point where 'I' and world meet or, rather, manifest their original unity" (Gadamer, 1982, p. 431). Thus, for Gadamer, the hermeneutic problem was not a problem of the correct mastery of language, but that of correctly coming to an understanding about what happens in the medium of language.

Although Gadamer's contributions to the development of modern hermeneutics are manifold, a fundamental significance of his efforts can be situated within the tension between

the alienating distanciation and the experience of belonging. Following his teacher, Heidegger, Gadamer put the whole foundation of the sciences into question in terms of "the prejudice against prejudices." But, unlike Heidegger, Gadamer goes further in his efforts to search for an encompassing and universal foundation of sciences especially of human sciences, in terms of the rehabilitation of the experience of belonging, especially of the "effective historical consciousness," the "fusion of horizons," and the "universal linguality (*Sprachlichkeit*)," in human experience. This line of Gadamer's effort can be signified as a "path of descending dialectic" character of his enterprise in Plato's terms. In this context, it seems to be meaningful to be reminded that Ricoeur characterized Gadamer's endeavour as "the beginning of the movement of return from ontology towards epistemological problems" (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 60). Nevertheless, his preference to tradition and belonging over evolution and distanciation, and also o understanding over explanation, called forth questions from another line of hermeneutics. These conflicts became fundamental themes of further hermeneutic reflection, particularly that of Ricoeur.

E. Dialectic Hermeneutics: Paul Ricoeur

In the previous chapter we characterized the meaning of the word "dialectic" neither as a skill or technique to win in an argument nor a methodologial device to reduce contradictory aspects of things to one totality, but as an art of thinking to make the truth of things, which appears in a paradoxical form, reveal itself. If we understand the "dialectic" in such a way, the hermeneutic enterprise of Ricoeur can be characterized as "dialectic hermeneutics." In the age of the crisis of foundations, Ricoeur seems to be well aware of newly emerging disciplines, such as phenomenology, existentialism, critical theories, structuralism, ordinary language philosophy and of diverse and conflicting presuppositions among them. For him, this situation is disastrous especially for the human sciences which require our fundamental reflection. With this basic aporia, Ricoeur attempted throughout his works to disclose the origin of contradictions among conflicting presuppositions and to go beyond the current unhappy

situation of the human sciences.

With relation to hermeneutics, Ricoeur's insight on the conflict between explanation and understanding, where the dialectic character in his enterprise is deeply embedded, can be regarded as the summit of his reflection on the foundation of hermeneutics as well as the human sciences. On the one hand, this insight seems to be significant in the sense that it opens the primordial linkage between belonging and distanciation in our act of interpretation of the written text as well as the text metaphor. On the other hand, it also provides a possibility of valid interpretation going beyond both extremes of absolutism and skepticism in interpretation through the dialogue between ontology and epistemology.

As previously seen, there had been, in the development of modern hermeneutics, a fundamental dichotomy of understanding and explanation since Dilthey's claim that "nature we explain, the life of soul we understand." It had been claimed that unlike the natural sciences the human sciences are to be characterized in terms of understanding rather than explanation, and many efforts had been given to the disclosure of the dynamic structure of understanding. This situation of exclusiveness, for Ricoeur, is misleading and problematic since it undermines the status of the human sciences as sciences. He described this situation as follows:

> Explanation has been expelled from the field of human sciences; but the conflict reappears at the very heart of the concept of interpretation between, on the one hand, the intuitive and unverifiable character of the psychologizing concept of understanding to which interpretation is subordinated, and on the other hand the demand for objectivity which belongs to the very notion of human science (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 151)

Ricoeur viewed that this situation leads us to a deep antinomy, as implied in the very title of Gadamer's work, *Truth and Method*; either we adopt the methodological attitude and lose the ontological density of the reality we study, or we adopt the attitude of truth and must then renounce the objectivity of the human sciences. He characterized his effort in this situation as "a rejection of this alternative and an attempt to overcome it" (p. 131).

How is it possible to overcome this antinomy? At what price? Among Ricoeur's efforts to unfold the dialectic characteristic between understanding and explanation, his re-attention to the positive and productive function of distanciation, and thus the inevitable necessity of a

dialectic between participation and distanciation seem to be paramount in this context. Ricoeur basically agreed with Heidegger and Gadamer that understanding is not tied to the understanding of other's subjectivity, but it is a structure of being-in-the-world, i.e., the projection of our own possibilities at the very heart of the situations in which we find ourselves. Hence, for Ricoeur, what must be interpreted in a text is "a proposed world in which I could inhabit and wherein I could project one of our ownmost possibilities" (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 142). He called this "proposed world" as "the world of the text" which corresponds to Gadamer's notion of "the matter of the text." Like Gadamer, who viewed that understanding is application (*Anwendun*), he also regarded that the appropriation (*Aneignung*), as the applicatin of the text to the present situation of the reader, as the end of interpretation. He expressed that:

> Ultimately, what I appropriate is a proposed world. The latter is not *behind* the text, as a hidden intention would be, but *in front of it*, as that which the work unfolds, discovers, reveals. Henceforth, to understand is *to understand oneself in front of the text* (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 143. Original emphasis).

But, unlike Heidegger and Gadamer, Ricoeur claimed that distanciatio is the necessary condition of understanding. He viewed that the text, as a discourse fixed by writing, is not merely the inscription of some anterior speech; instead, it is really a text when it inscribes what the discourse means. This implies that writing-reading relation is not a particular case of speaking-answering relation, since, unlike the situation of dialogue, the writer does not respond to the reader in a reading situation: "the reader is absent from the act of writing; the writer is absent from the act of reading" (p. 144). This suggests that the text itself is a product of distanciation where both the actual author and ostensive reference of the text are absent. But this is not to be regarded merely as negative since it is by virtue of the distanciation that the reader can participate in the world unfolded in front of the text instead of limiting one's understanding to a particular event or a particular person's subjectivity. Ricoeur viewed that "the effective historical consciousness" contains within itself the moment of this distanciation since "the history of effect is precisely what takes place under the condition of historical distance" (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 160). He also viewed that the dialectic between participation and

distanciation is the key to Gadamer's concept of "a fusion of horizons." Ricoeur wrote:

> Where there is a situation, there is a horizon which may either be narrowed or expanded. This makes possible communication at a distance between two differently situated consciousnesses. Their intentions blend in the distant and open horizon. We do not live therefore within closed horizons or within a unique horizon. The tension between the self and the other, between the near and the far is accomplished on the distant horizon (Ricoeur, 1973, p. 160).

Ricoeur's insight on the dialectic between participation and distanciation unfolds the critical moment embedded in our interpretative acts (Ricoeur, 1973; 1981). It is in this sense that we can see a possible rapprochement between hermeneutics and critical social theory. In fact, he endeavoured to show the mutual complementarity without abolishment of the distinctive characteristics of each. Reflecting on the origins of the debate between two poles which are especially culminated by that between Gadamer (1982) and Habermas (1977), Ricoeur characterized their fundamental gestures as follows:

> The gesture of hermeneutics is a humble one of acknowledging the historical conditions to which all human understanding is subsumed in the reign of finitude; that of the critique of ideology is a proud gesture of defiance directed against the distortions of human communication (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 87).

Ricoeur viewed that each speaks from a different place which has its own legitimacy, but he emphasized the complementary character between these two orders of sciences and two modalities of interests basically in terms of the dialectic between participation and distanciation in our history (Ricoeur, 1973). Allegedly, on the one hand, the interest in emancipation would be empty and anemic unless it received a concrete content from our practical interest in communication and unless it is not confirmed by our capacity of creative reinterpretation of our cultural heritages. On the other hand, a hermeneutics (or a practical interest) would be no longer hermeneutics of traditions if it would cut itself off from the regulative idea of emancipation. He wrote:

> The moment these two interests become radically separate, then hermeneutics and critique will themselves be no more than... ideologies! (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 100).

This insight on the dialectic between participation and distantiation based on the characteristics of the text also provides a significant ground for Ricoeur's reflection on the operation between understanding and explanation in text interpretation. He viewed that the

Romanticistic attempt to solve the methodological paradox in human sciences is inappropriate since it tries to apply the dialogical situation to the text interpretation as the standard for the hermeneutic operation. Instead, in his view, we have to re-establish its own paradigm for text interpretation, because the relation between writing and reading is irreducible to the dialogical relation between speaking and hearing. Following the structuralists' insights, he characterized the main features of the text as follows: (1) the fixation of meaning, (2) its dissociation from the mental intention of the author, (3) the display of non-ostensive references, and (4) the universal ranges of its addressees (Ricoeur, 1977). These four traits taken together, he claimed, constitute the "objectivity" of the text, from which a possibility of explanation is derived. Here it must be noted that neither objectivity nor explanation is derived from another field but from within, as he made clear:

> There is no transfer from one region of reality to another - let us say, from the sphere of facts to the sphere of signs. It is within the same sphere of signs that the process of objectification takes place and gives rise to explanatory procedures (Ricoeur, 1977, p. 328).

On this ground, Ricoeur tried to show us the dialectic between understanding and explanation operating in the interpretation of the text. As an example, introducing Hirsch's (1967) insights that although there are no rules for making good guesses but there are methods for validity guesses, he regarded this dialectic between guessing and validation as a figure of the dialectic between understanding and explanation. Ricoeur made it clear that what governs in this process of validation is not a logic of empirical verification but a logic of probability. In the actual situation of reading, the text does not speak in such a way that a person speaks to us. This weakness of the text can only be rescued by our interpretation which basically depends on our guesses of its meaning as a whole. In this process, we may question the validity or probability of our interpretation through which we protect ourselves from the merely arbitary guess. This process of validation, which is basically proceeded by explanation, in turn, leads us to reach a better understanding of the world unfolded by the text, and also makes it possible for us to communicate with one another about the world of the text. This seems to be a projected world which Ricoeur tried to disclose for us by the dialectic between explanation and

understanding. Ricoeur described the significance of this insight in text interpretation as follows:

> If it is true that there is always more than one way of construing a text, it is not true that all interpretations are equal and may be assimiliated to so called "rules of thumb." The text is a limited field of possible constructions. The logic of validation allows us to move between two limits of dogmatism and skepticism. It is always possible to argue for or against an interpretation, to confront interpretations, to arbitrate between them and to seek for an agreement, even if this agreement remains beyond our reach (Ricoeur, 1977, p. 331).

Ricoeur's contribution to the development of modern hermeneutics seems to be prominent in many aspects. The insights on the dialectic between participation and distanciation, the dialectic between understanding and explanation, and the reflective analysis on the nature of the written text not only allow us to situate hermeneutics in a wider context of social and natural sciences but also show us a possibility of a comprehensive foundation for hermeneutics as well as for the human sciences in the era of the crisis of foundation. Especially, his re-introduction of the distanciation, explanation, and epistemology, not in the derivative sense from the other sciences but in its own sense within, can be regarded as a summit of his hermeneutic enterprise, through which we can situate our acts of interpretation in the wider context.

F. Reflection: Relevance of Hermeneutic Insights to the Present Study

We have seen the development of modern hermeneutics in terms of significant efforts mainly of Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, Gadamer, and Ricoeur, who have endeavoured to disclose hermeneutics as a foundation for the historical or human sciences, against the pervasive domination of positivistic thought. In this process, we have seen a variety of contradictions and transformations of insights. What we need to do here is to find their proper locations within the totality of our interpretative acts, instead of regarding them as meaningless. The task of hermeneutics itself may contain the temporal and infinite character like that of understanding, calling for further reflection through actual participation in the world of the text and text interpretation.

As Gadamer pointed out in his insight of the 'effective historical consciousness,' to understand the history of hermeneutic tradition does not mean to become solidified into the self-alienation of past consciousness, but to overtake it in our own present horizon of understanding. Gadamer's insight of historical understanding seems to show the most significant value of our horizons as historical beings. What are the insights of hermeneutics for self-understanding of our interpretative acts in the present situation? With relation to this study, the insights of modern hermeneutics seem very significant, for it attempts to search for a critical understanding of the meaning of morality and moral education embedded in the Moral Education Curriculum of Korea and the interpretation of texts takes a central place in this study. What insights of hermeneutics are significant in the present situation of this study? What are the contributory aspects of hermeneutics for the self-understanding of my interpretative acts in this study? Although there can be many different ways of characterizing the significant insights of hermeneutics, some fundamental aspects can be addressed in terms of their relevance to this study.

What is a Text ?

Since the place of texts is central in this study, our self-understanding of the text is crucial not only for carrying out this study but also for a general understanding of the character of this study. What is a text? Concerning the nature of the text, there seems to be a prevailing myth that the text has one correct meaning and to understand it is to identify with this correct meaning. In fact, the current typical treatment of texts in the educational situation tends to be governed by this presupposition. Teachers tend to teach, willy nilly, a set of correct meanings of given texts. Students learn and memorize them and they are evaluated in terms of these correct meanings. Freire's (1970a) characterization of the prevailing oppressive mode of education as the "banking concept of education" and Pinar's (1984) "postman" metaphor of the teacher in such a form of education show the pervasiveness of this presupposition in the field of education.

Within the hermeneutic point of view, this presupposition should be questioned since this view of text is not only incorrect but also misleading. Although the nature of the text has been one of the fundamental themes for hermeneutic reflection since Schleiermacher, Ricoeur's recent analysis of the text seems to be insightful. He characterized the text as "a discourse fixed by writing" by means of the very character of *langue* (language) which is different from the spoken discourse, *parole* (speech). He unfolded the nature of the text in terms of its distinctive traits from those of the spoken discourse: atemporality; impersonality on the speaker's side; the lack of the world; and the absence of the particular interlocutor (Ricoeur, 1977). Thus, he showed the untenability of the prevailing myth about the text, emphasizing from the beginning the alienated nature of any text. In this sense, there is a parallel between Ricoeur's insights on the text and Gadamer, who pointed out that "all writing is ...a kind of alienated speech" (Gadamer, 1982, p. 354).

This alienated character of the text already implies the inevitability and importance of interpretation, and thus the centrality of hermeneutics in reading the text. Like Gadamer, who envisages that the alienated character of the text itself requires our "transformation back into speech and meaning," i.e., the real task of hermeneutics (1982, pp. 354-355), Ricoeur also points out that "interpretation is the 'remedy' for the weakness of [written] discourse" (Ricoeur, 1977, p. 320). This hermeneutic insight concerning meaning of the text signifies the centrality of interpretation in this study as an interpretative study. In this sense of text interpretation, the main task of this study cannot be the identification of the correct meaning of the text but as the remedy for the weakness of the text.

Place of Preunderstanding in Interpretation

As seen above, the interpretation of the given texts, as the remedy for the weakness, takes an important place in this study. But, how and to what degree is it possible to cure the weakness of the text through our interpretation? In examining this question, we need to underscore the self-understanding about our acts of interpretation. The hermeneutic insight on

the circularity of understanding seems to be helpful in this context. Since the emergence of modern science, there has been a prevailing myth about scientific objectivity which is reflected in the Cartesian epistemological model. Within this myth, objectivity is conceived as "not purely subjective," "unbiased," or "disinterested," the highest ideal of which can be achieved only by means of scientific proof, i.e., the empirical verification (Hoy, 1978). In the hermeneutic reflection, this prevailing myth is questioned.

According to the prevailing myth of scientific objectivity, any preunderstandings based on our lived experience are surpassed by the objectified proposition or law by means of the scientific methodological ideal. But, unless we have no preunderstanding of 'love' or 'friendship' and our actual lived experiences with lovers or friends, how can it be possible for us to understand the meaning of 'love' or 'friendship' proposed by a text? It is in this sense that the prevailing myth of scientific objectivity can be called the tyranny of 'a' presupposition, or 'the prejudice against prejudices,' as Gadamer characterized. For this myth tends to lead us to delegitimate our lived experience and preunderstandings by means of a prejudice of the scientific methodological ideal.

It is in this context that Heidegger's reflective disclosure of the circular structure of understanding comes to us in a meaningful way. According to Heidegger, as we have seen, our understanding always presupposes preunderstanding of the whole since we cannot understand at all without our preunderstanding. This insight may be visible when we take the above example; it may be hardly possible to understand the meaning of 'love' or 'friendship' inscribed in the text unless the reader has any preunderstanding of it. This implies not only that our preunderstanding is inescapable but also that it is to be rehabilitated for our authentic understanding of the text. Concerning our act of interpretation, Heidegger's insight of the circularity embedded in our act of understanding suggests that there can be no presuppositionless interpretation and that our preunderstanding is the most fundamental foundation of all interpretations and understandings.

With relation to this study, the hermeneutic insight on the circularity of understanding and the centrality of the preunderstanding allows me to be aware of my interpretative act of the texts. It is not only impossible but also misleading to remove my preunderstanding when I interpret the texts. But rather, my preunderstanding concerning the meaning of morality and moral education, which can be called my historical horizon, should be recognized and summoned in the process of the study not only because my preunderstanding, as my historical horizon, is the inescapable starting point for the interpretation of the texts, but also because it is only possible through the awareness of my horizon to go beyond it, instead of overvaluing what is nearest to me without awareness of it. This implies that my concern with my own preunderstanding is not to preserve it but to go beyond it. But how is it possible to go beyond my own preunderstanding? This question leads us to the next reflection.

Location of the Meaning of a Text

Our reflection on the place of preunderstanding in the act of interpretation shows that it is a circular process between our preunderstanding and the new understanding. Then, within this process, what is it to be interpreted? No doubt it is the text. But it must be remembered that the text, because of its alienated nature, does not express its meaning in the same way that a person does for us. Hence, through interpretation we need to secure its meaning. But, where does the meaning of a text lie? This question has been central in hermeneutic reflection, since the very answer to this question is crucial in our way of dealing with the text. Concerning this question, in order to move beyond the prevailing reified treatment of the text, two distinctive answers seem possible: on the side of the author's subjectivity or on the side of the reader's subjectivity. In the hermeneutic tradition, the former treatment of the text can be found in the insight of Dilthey who regarded the text, the great works of art, as the objectified expressions of life experience, the truth of which is fixed. Within this insight, the meaning of the text lies in the objectified mind of the author. Hirsch's (1967) recent formulation of the author's intention as the ground of valid interpretation can be seen as the revival of this insight. The

latter type of formulation about the meaning of the text can be found in the reception theory of Iser (1978) or Fish (1980), where it is held that the meaning of the text relies on the reader's subjectivity. Within this formulation, as Fish claims, "reading is not a matter of discovering what the text means, but a process of experiencing what it does to you" (Eagleton, 1983, p. 85).

Reflecting on our act of reading texts, we may not deny the inevitable involvement of both subjective dimensions of the author and the reader. Without personal experience we can neither write nor understand a text at all. Nevertheless, our reflection on our act of reading also leads us to recognize that unlike Diltheyan beliefs, there are few texts which tell us the fixed truth, and even if there is, we cannot understand it without our own interpretation which is possible by virtue of our own lived experience. It also makes us see that unlike the implication of reception theory, our interpretation of the text is neither always nor necessarily arbitrary. At this moment of our reflection, we need to note the distinctive ideology embedded in both extremes: the totalitarian ideology in the Diltheyan formulation, as Crossman (1980) points out, where the author becomes the king, and the "liberal humanist ideology" in the receptionistic formulation, as Eagleton characterizes (Eagleton, 1983, p. 79), where the reader becomes the king. We may hardly regard both extremes as a possibly true remedy for the weakness of the text. The limitations of both have already been seen in the discussion of Gadamer's insight on the 'I-Thou' relations, and in our reflections on both totalitarian and solipsistic instrumental perspectives.

How, then, is it possible to go beyond both extremes without exclusive denial of the inevitable involvement of subjectivity in our text interpretation? To this question, Ricoeur's insights on the world of the text is helpful. He showed us by disclosing the alienated nature of the text that the author's intention and the meaning of the text cease to coincide (Ricoeur, 1977, pp. 316-322). With respect to the subjectivity of the reader, he pointed to the distanciating moments in our reflective reading where we find ourselves through losing ourselves (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 145), unlike within the naive understanding wherein one encaves

himself within his own subjectivity. According to Ricoeur's insight, what is interpreted is neither the author's intention nor the arbitrary fancy of the reader. Rather, what is interpreted is "the proposed world" unfolded in front of the text, where we could inhabit and wherein we could project one of our own possibilities.

This hermeneutic insight on the meaning of a text seems to provide us significant implications not only for the self-understanding of our interpretative acts but also for the appropriate way of dealing with the text. Relating this insight to the present study, what is to be interpreted is the world of morality and moral education which is unfolded in front of the Moral Education Curriculum of Korea. This world may no longer be regarded as that of the author's subjectivity or that of my own subjectivity as a reader, but the world which the text itself discloses to us and to which I could belong and project one of our own possibilities of being-in-the-world. It seems by virtue of this self-understanding that we can re-orient to the world of the text going beyond not only the reified treatment of the text but also both the totalitarian and anarchic treatment of it.

The Truth of the Interpreted

Following Ricoeur's insight on the world of the text, we can return to the proposed world of the text, instead of limiting our interpretation to the author's or the reader's subjectivity. But, this does not mean that to identify with the proposed world is the end of our interpretation, for the proposed world can hardly be the total possibilities of the world. This seems clear when we reflect on our acts of writing. When we write about a subject matter, we are in a particular historical horizon in its time and space, even if we suppose that we do not make any intentional distortion in writing. Even those which are within this particular horizon can never be expressed as a whole in our actual writing. Metaphorically speaking, we may be able to say that what can be written is no more than the visible top of an iceberg, if the possible totality of the world addressed by a text can be allegorized to an iceberg. A text is neither a thing which is given to us from the above nor that which encompasses all the possible totality

of the world.

Our reflection on our writing, thus, suggests that the proposed world of the text is merely one possible world within the possible totality of the world - the visible top of the iceberg. Nevertheless, to limit our task of interpretation to the proposed world may lead us to "live on the surface of things, and on the surface of ourselves," as Pinar points out (1984, p. 4). This implies that a further inevitable task of our interpretation is to search for the proper location of the proposed world unfolded in front of the text within the possible totality of the world. There can be little space of interpretation if the totality of the world is fixed and visible enough for us to recognize it immediately. But, as seen previously, the totality of the world always remains 'bottomless' and 'infinite,' beyond our complete reach and possession. This implies that the possible totality of the world itself inevitably relies on our limited grasp based on our own horizons. Here, the tensions among horizons of the text and of the different interpreters' own horizons come into being and become inescapable. This makes the task of hermeneutics problematic and never-ending.

If we are aware of these tensions, how is it possible to interpret the text in an appropriate way? It is in this context that the insight of Heidegger comes to us in a meaningful way. His insight on the circularity of understanding, that of preunderstanding and new understanding, shows us the possibility and necessity of our orientation to the possible totality of the world through restoration of preunderstanding, where it is possible to orient to it, instead of encaving ourselves within the proposed world. He also showed a possible way to secure the appropriateness of our interpretation in terms of the "things themselves," instead of depending on arbitrary fancies or popular conception. But since the "things themselves" do not speak to us of possible totality, to make them intelligible we need a detour which also depends on our interpretation.

Gadamer showed the possibility of securing the appropriateness of our interpretation through his insights on "the fusion of horizons" and on the priority of the question. According to him, we are always within the situation, within our own horizon, which implies that the

knowledge of ourselves is never complete. The text also comes to us with its horizon which is never complete. The appropriate interpretation can be achieved neither by losing my horizon within that of the text nor by reducing the horizon of the text to mine, but through the fusion of my and the text's horizons. It is by virtue of the question, in Gadamer's insight, that this fusion of horizons can be realized; by virtue of the question, we can understand the text as a possible answer to it. Through questioning, thus, we can orient ourselves to the invisible world of the iceberg, since questioning allows us to be open to other possibilities instead of regarding the proposed world of the text as the fixed or absolute one. This insight discloses the critical moments embedded in our acts of interpretation which implies the centrality of the dialectic between participation and distanciation as Ricoeur pointed out. It is through this dialectic process, more precisely a circular process, that we can secure the possibility of the appropriate interpretation of the text by situating the proposed world of the text within the wider context of the total possibility of the world.

With relation to this study, the implications of this reflection seem to be manifold. We can neither accept that there is the absolute truth of morality and moral education in the moral curriculum documents or textbooks of Korea, nor regard that the task of interpretation is merely to identify with the world of morality and moral education proposed in the texts. Rather, our reflection leads us to see the meaning of morality and moral education proposed in the texts in the wider context of the total possibilities of their meanings. Although this possible total world of morality and moral education is always beyond our complete reach, we can see the possibility of making it disclose itself in front of us through orienting to the "things themselves", i.e., our moral lives, "questioning," and the continuous dialectic between participation and distanciation. Through this process, we may be able to locate the proposed meaning of morality and moral education in a more appropriate way within the wider context.

Problems of Arbitrary Interpretation

Our previous reflection suggests that there can be no one correct interpretation of the text and that it is always possible to interpret the same text in different ways, since we, interpreters, are living within our own horizons which are neither fixed nor complete. Does this mean that all interpretations are equal in their appropriateness? Does this mean that my interpretation of the texts in this study is totally an arbitrary one? How is it possible to protect myself from arbitrary interpretation? This question calls for another reflection.

As we have seen previously, the insights of Heidegger and Gadamer already imply a possible way to protect our interpretation from the merely arbitrary one without losing its openness to the possible totality of the world, by means of our orientation to the "things themselves" for Heidegger, and the realization of the "fusion of horizons" for Gadamer. Through their insights we can encounter the problem of arbitrariness in our interpretation at the philosophical, or more specifically, ontological level. Here, however, the "things themselves" as well as the "horizons" of both ours and the text's do not reveal their totalities in a clear way. In our efforts to make them intelligible, we also inevitably depend on our interpretation of them. In this process, we inevitably choose and interpret some parts of them, such as insights, ideas, or episodes, which appear to be significant with regard to the subject matter at stake. To put this in an Oriental metaphor, we choose a blade of grass to understand the whole world. What is it to guarantee that the blade of grass shows the truth of the whole world? In an ultimate sense, there can be no way to provide the absolute answer to this question, since any interpreter cannot be more than a human being who has a horizon and thus always thinks and lives within a finite boundary. However, there seems to be a possibility to solve this problem in a practical way within our limited horizons.

Ricoeur's insight on the dialectic between understanding and explanation is significant in this context. According to his insight, as we have seen, understanding and explanation are two sides of a coin in our interpretation: Explanation is the inevitable path of understanding, and understanding is the inevitable ground of explanation. Understanding and explanation are

not exclusive but complementary to each other. Here, we need to be reminded that the meaning of explanation is not necessarily derived from the other field like that of the natural sciences but within, which are governed by a "logic of uncertainty and of a qualitative probablity," instead of "empirical verification" (Ricoeur, 1977). Although it may be always impossible to provide an absolutely correct and thus the final interpretation of the text, our interpretation "must not only be probable but more probable than another" (Ricoeur, 1977, p. 330-331). Hence, it is through the dialectic between understanding and explanation that we can protect our interpretation from the arbitrary one and thus make it communicable, at a practical level.

With relation to this study, although it may never be possible to provide the final interpretation of the texts, it may be possible through the dialectic between my understanding and explanation and through making this process intelligible, to provide a more probable interpretation of the texts and to make it communicable. However, this does not mean that I limit my interpretation merely to the identification of the proposed world of the texts but that I try to place it in the wider context of other possibilities. Even in this process it may be possible through this dialectic process of understanding and explanation to protect my interpretation from the arbitrary one, since the invisible parts of the iceberg can also be disclosed in a probable way through making them intelligible.

In my effort to characterize the insights of modern hermeneutics and to reflect on their relevance to this research, the main focus has been given to the way of text interpretation, which can be called the methodological orientation of the study. However, as implied in our previous reflection, hermeneutic insights also show a new possibility for us to understand the world itself - the world of morality and moral education in the context of this study. Our previous reflection suggests that the understanding of the text is not separable from the understanding of the world about which the text is written. This situation implies the inevitable tension between the proposed world of the text and the perceived world of the interpreter. The insights of modern hermeneutics unfold this structure in our interpretation and provide a way

to deal with this tension in a more appropriate way.

In this situation, however, the world itself does not show us its true meaning in an immediately intelligible form; our daily activities with a friend or a lover themselves do not speak the true meaning of friendship or love. Thus to understand the true meaning of a world we need to make it speak, which primarily relies on our own interpretation of it. Such is the world of morality and moral education. To understand its meaning, we need to make it speak through our appropriate interpretation of it, although the possible totality of the world and the final interpretation of its true meaning always remain beyond our reach. Any theory or philosophy including that of morality and moral education cannot be free from this fundamental structure as well as this primordial limitation of our understanding and thus that of our knowledge.

Modern hermeneutics discloses this dynamic structure embedded in our understanding of the world. It also shows us a possibility of a more appropriate kind of understanding of the world in terms of such insights as the fusion of horizons, the dialectic between participation and distanciation, and that between understanding and explanation. It can be said in this sense that the insights of modern hermeneutics provide me not only the methodological orientation but also the substantial orientation of this study. This shows the inevitable common thread between the critical-dialectic perspective on moral education discussed in the previous chapter and the insights of modern hermeneutics.

IV. An Interpretation of the Present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea

A. Introduction

This study pursues a critical understanding of the meaning of morality and moral education embedded in the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea. Since the interpretation of the text is central in our effort to pursue this task, we endeavored to understand our interpretative act in the previous chapter through our examination of the fundamental insights disclosed during the development of modern hermeneutics from Schleiermacher to Ricoeur, and through our critical reflection upon our own experience of interpretation. We also have examined relevant insights of modern hermeneutics with relation to this study. With this self-understanding of our interpretative act, in this chapter, we will enter into the concrete world of the text, the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea.

The present curriculum of Korea, promulgated in December 1981 by the Korean Ministry of Education and in effect since the academic year of 1982, tends to be characterized as the 'whole person' approach, or 'human centered' education (Soontaek Kim, 1983; Donhee Lee, 1983). This characterization seems to take its rationale from the basic guideline of the present curriculum advocated in the *School Curriculum*.

> ...school curriculum should be designed to promote holistic development so that each student can grow up as a person of health with a well rounded personality and a sound body, as a high minded person of sensitivity with elevated taste and a love of beauty; as a person of competence with a rational mind for solving problems by examining knowledge and skills; as a person of high morality who respects human diginity in both his conduct and in his principles; and as a person of responsibility both for his personal and collective way of life (KEDI[4], 1982a, p. 1).

This advocation expresses an ideal of the educated person as a person of health, of beauty, of reason, and of morality. Considering the reality of educational practice where the fragmented information of the subject matters has been over-emphasized, the new orientation of curriculum as the promotion of holistic development of students can be regarded as acceptable for many of Korean educators as well as parents, even though there remains a question of what

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[4]Korean Institution for Educational Development. *School Curriculum* of each school level is translated by KEDI (KEDI, 1982a; 1982b; 1982c).

this ideal really is and how it can be translated into curriculum practice beyond the level of the merely abstract rhetoric.

The present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea also, in principle, takes its direction from this orientation, i.e., a holistic approach in moral education, not merely in the sense of moral education as an integrated part of education as a whole, but also in the sense of promotion of a holistic development of morality. Looking at the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea, the attempt to approach moral education as a whole in both senses appears to be made. For example, concerning the relationship between moral education and other subject matters, it is claimed:

> Moral education is carried in other subject matters.... The role of moral education as an independent subject matter is to integrate the knowledge, abilities, and attitudes acquired through other subject matters and connect them to the character formation of students in a meaningful way (KME[5], 1982a, p. 5).[6]

With respect to the problems of moral reasoning and act, it is also viewed that morality consists of rational or intellectual and actual or practical aspects and claims that both aspects of morality should be emphasized in a balanced way since "moral act without reasoning is blind and moral reasoning without act is vain" (p. 9).

According to our ordinary understanding of moral education, there appears to be little room for questioning this basic orientation of moral education at an abstract level. Here, we need to reflect on the problem of abstract words, like the word 'democracy.' Those who live in a democratic society tend to regard that everything is acceptable or good if it is claimed under the name of democracy using such words as 'democratic procedure,' 'democratic decision-making,' 'democratic principles,' no matter how it is actually manipulated. Such may be the ordinary way of understanding curriculum. When we look at a particular curriculum, we tend to focus on the claimed rationale expressed in terms of abstract words. If the rationale is acceptable or agreeable, we tend to accept the whole curriculum, and if not, we tend to reject it

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[5]Korean Ministry of Education. Although the "General Guideline for Moral Education" are differently described by school level, the main contents and ideas are common (KME, 1982a; 1982b; 1982c).

[6]My translation. Hereinafter, the quotations from Korean texts are my translation unless the translator is specified.

as a whole, regardless of its actual operation in the whole process of education. It can be said in this sense that the characterization of the present curriculum of Korea as the 'whole person' approach or 'human centered' education can be superficial unless we attempt to understand it with relation to concrete curriculum practice. Here, we need to ask: What is it to characterize a man of morality? What is it really like if we look at morality as a whole? How is this abstract idea actually translated into curriculum practice?

The underlying interest of this study, which attempts to search for a critical understanding of the meaning of morality and moral education embedded in the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea, may be understood in this context. In my efforts to understand the present Moral Education Curriculum, the main focus will be given to the following questions as raised in the introductory chapter. Concerning the meaning of morality: How is morality understood? What is the underlying belief concerning the meaning of morality? What is assumed concerning the nature of human being and human life? How is the existence of individual human being in a society or community understood? By such assumptions, what aspects of human being, human life, and human relations are to be emphasized or overlooked? Concerning the meaning of moral education: What are the underlying assumptions concerning the meaning of education and moral education? What views of knowledge and moral knowledge are dominant? How are the moral norms or virtues interpreted? What is expected by moral education in school? What roles of teachers are assumed? With such assumptions, what aspects of moral education are to be exaggerated or neglected? Of course, it may be possible to examine these questions in a separate way. But, to examine them in this way can lead us to lose the whole sense of questions, since in our ordinary endeavour to understand a moral education curriculum, they are usually interconnected one to another. This implies that we need to examine them in an interrelated way.

We need to note here, however, that to understand a text means neither to identify or agree with the world interpreted by the text, nor to criticize or reject it. Instead, as we reflected on in the previous chapter, our task in the effort to understand a text is to search for a proper

place of the proposed world of the text within the possible total world addressed by the text. Although this possible world as a whole is always far beyond our complete reach, to understand a text in a more appropriate way, we need to be open and sensitive to the possible total world through questioning of the prevailing preoccupations as well as of our own beliefs.

We are also reminded that there can be no final interpretation of a text and that our effort to understand a text is an ongoing task in which there is neither an Archimedean starting point nor the final end, and that, in this effort, our preunderstanding is not only inevitable but also can be productive according to the way we deal with it. In relation to this study, these suggest that in our effort to understand the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea, we need to situate it in a wider social and historical context and that our understanding of the meaning of morality and moral education embedded in the Moral Education Curriculum of Korea, cannot be separable from our own understanding of the meaning of morality and moral education, even though our hermeneutic reflection suggests to us that our interpretation of the text is also no more than 'an' interpretation and in no way final.

As an effort to understand the meaning of morality and moral education embedded in the present Moral Eucation Curriculum of Korea, I will try to make its significant features sensible with respect to the meaning of morality and moral education, in terms of its questioning of the traditional 'virtue-items' approach, its emphasis on the cultivation of moral character based on moral principles, its universalization of the formal structure of moral reasoning, its formulation and arrangement of main elements of moral education, and its construction of actual classroom activities.

Prior to doing this, let me examine briefly the meaning of the word, 'feature,' since if we understand it in a narrow sense, our interpretative act can be misled from the outset. The lexical meaning of this word can be understood as a distinctive physical appearance of a thing or a person in a descriptive sense, or the act of producing a feature in a performative sense (*Webster's New Colletiate Dictionary*). The etymological meaning of the word which originates from the Latin word, *factura*, as the 'act of making,' also signifies the performative dimension

of this word. In this sense of the word, 'feature,' the act of making a feature and its practical use are immanent in our lives. Nevertheless, in the milieu dominated positivistic culture, the act of making a feature tends to be narrowly understood; the feature of a thing is fixed and universal, and the aim of an inquiry is to find this feature by means of a precise methodological procedure. What is misleading in this understanding of feature is that the truth of a thing is converted into the sum of the features articulated by the scientific method. In a word, the world becomes a picture drawn by the positivistic scientists, as Heidegger (1977b) pointed out. This narrow understanding of the feature tends to prevent us from understanding the world of the thing as it is from which any feature is derived and without which no feature can be understood.

In order to protect ourselves from the narrow meaning of the feature, we need to understand the meaning of the term, 'feature,' in a wider sense. In this study, therefore, I regard a feature as a 'place' or 'window' through which we can look at the world as a whole and through which the truth of the world reveals itself. In this sense of the feature, the value of a feature can be understood in terms of its power to disclose the world instead of its methodological precision. Thus, the act of making a feature cannot be regarded as the end of an inquiry but it is a necessary path in our effort to understand the world - the world of morality and moral education in this study - as a whole. This suggests that the task of interpretation in this study cannot be merely to identify and to provide a description of the features, but to disclose the whole ground on which these features can be manifested.

In order to understand the features in a wider context, I will attempt to uncover the underlying rationality on which the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea is standing, situating it in a wider social and historical context of the curriculum field in Korea. An effort to relate the claimed rationality to the actual curriculum practice will also be made to unveil how the abstract ideas are translated into the actual classroom situation. At the end, the underlying questions embedded in this whole procedure and related fundamental problems will be re-examined and reflected on with relation to our fundamental questions concerning the

meaning of morality and moral education.

B. The Question of the "Virtue-Items" Approach to Moral Education

There can be no Archimedean starting point in curriculum change but any curriculum change begins with the reflection upon the existing curriculum. The present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea also begins with the questioning of the previous moral education curriculum. Since, behind the questioning of the previous curriculum, a certain understanding of morality and moral education is already implied, we can regard it as a feature or a place through which we can look at the meaning of morality and moral education embedded in the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea.

The present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea addresses the problem of the previous moral education curriculum to justify the necessity of change. It regards the previous moral education curriculum as the 'virtue-items' approach, where virtue-items to be taught in school are sequentially arranged in terms of their levels of difficulty, and where it is supposed for teacher to teach them from the easier to the more difficult in accordance with the students' grade. According to the present Moral Education Curriculum, this 'virtue-items' approach to moral education is characterized as follows:

> The 'virtue-items' approach to moral education is, in a word, the most directive mode of moral education which provides lists of virtues to be followed by students and makes students practise them in their daily life through internalization by means of memorization or other means (KME, 1982a, p. 18).

With this characterization of the previous moral education curriculum of Korea, it is not clear what constitutes the 'virtue-items' in the educational context, what aspects of the previous education deserve to be characterized as the 'virtue-items' approach, and in what sense the previous approach to moral education is really problematic. Although it is claimed in the Moral Education Curriculum that "the common critique of teachers and of the experts about the existing moral education was the extreme inflexiblility of the 'virtue-items' approach" (KME, 1982a, p. 18), it is still ambiguous with this claim as to who constituted the group of teachers and the experts, whether the constituted members of the group are

appropriate to represent the genuine concerns of the public to moral education, or whether even their opinions were interpreted and generalized in an acceptable way. To make this ambiguity more transparent, it seems helpful to see the problem in a wider historical context of the modern curriculum field of Korea.

In the history of modern education of Korea, there has been a chronic problem of over-emphasis on isolated factual knowledge, typically called 'fragmentary knowledge' centered education. One of the most typical examples of this approach can be found in a T.V. program called 'Scholarship Quiz.' In this program, the quiz master reads a question to which there is only one correct answer in front of the candidates who are selected from local examination contests among excellent high school students. While the quiz master is reading a given question, the candidate who first provides the correct answer scores a point. The student who gets the highest score becomes the winner of the contest. Some amount of money and other awards are given to every monthly and weekly winner, and to the winner who wins in the final contest, which is held at the end of the year among all the monthly winners, a considerable number of scholarships and awards are provided.

This 'Scholarship Quiz' program does not merely express public consciousness of education, but it also tends to make the public regard education as information-giving activities, and equate excellence with dictionary-like students. This preoccupation on 'fragmentary knowledge' centered education has prevailed widely in educational practice. Although the origin of this practice tends to be viewed as a pervasive remnant of colonial education or as one of decayed Confucian education, it seems to be difficult to trace back to its precise origin. However, this preoccupation was recognized as a problem to be overcome from the beginning of modern education in Korea. An awareness of this problem and the necessity for improvement was stipulated in the *Primary School Curriculum* which was first made by the Korean government in 1949 and was used in schools after the Korean War (1950-1954).

> Our previous education led a student to be a man of fragmentary knowledge. This curriculum, therefore, puts emphasis on the holistic and comprehensive content which is appropriate for various needs of students, and through which students can develop their own potential characteristics at best (in Soontaek Kim, 1983, p. 213).

In spite of this earlier awareness of the problem and efforts to improve, it was not resolved but became more pervasive, and still remains today as one of the most chronic malaises of Korean education. The selection of students by the entrance examination, high competition in the entrance examination for upper schools, the blind reliance on multiple-choice questions in educational evaluation used to be regarded as important causes of the problem. However, one of the main sources of failure in the efforts to resolve the problem can be grasped in terms of the predomination of educational engineering embedded in the Tylerian and Bloomian approaches to education. In the efforts to introduce educational engineering and to apply it to the curriculum field of Korea, Bommo Chung's contribution cannot be ignored. Especially his book, *Curriculum* (1956) which can be regarded as a classical text in modern curriculum field of Korea, had tremendously influenced Korean curriculum field. Soontaek Kim (1983) describes the deep influence of Chung as follows:

> Since the publication of Chung's *Curriculum*, various texts were published during the second period of Korean curriculum history [1963-1972], but most of them were similar to Chung's in their basic orientation. This can be interpreted as a sign that the Tylerian classical approach to curriculum began to govern the whole curriculum field in planning and managing the curriculum in Korea (p. 218).

Thus, the Tylerian approach to curriculum began to be widely expanded and thus to be dominant in the curriculum thought and practice of Korea. For example, Bloomian mastery learning model took on almost an unchallengeable status in the curriculum field during the seventies (Hogwon Kim, 1970; 1977). Mastery Learning Programs for the main subject matters were diffused to all the Middle School students with the status of a quasi-textbook during the middle of 1970s. Classification of educational objectives in terms of Bloom's taxonomy also became an almost compulsory requirement for teachers during the seventies. Although it is not my intention here to provide detailed characterizations of these ideas, the point I make is that this approach, which "can be likened to adjusting an automobile engine part in order to make it function more effectively" (Pinar, 1981, p. 89), contributed, instead of overcomimg it, to the perpetuation of 'fragmentary knowledge' centered education, with its mechanistic assumption on the content of education.

The question of the 'virtue-items' approach in the previous moral education curriculum can be understood in this historical context of the general curriculum field of Korea. Of course, there may be an irreducible difference between the emphasis on the 'virtue-items' in moral education and the 'fragmentary knowledge' in education in general. For example, the latter tends to stress the knowledge which students are expected to have, whereas the former tends to stress the behavior or concrete act which students are expected to do. In spite of the apparent difference, both are, in a fundamental sense, based on the common interest of effective management and control of the teaching-learning process. Here, we can be reminded of Pinar's (1981) characterization of the traditional approach in the curriculum field of the United States as "scientific management" governed by administrative convenience, which understands curriculum as "the organization of time and activities to be managed according to sound business principles" (p. 2).

> To achieve this end, an idea of 'scientific management' was articulated, perhaps most prominently by Frederick W. Taylor. In Taylor's model, the principles of efficiency, control, and prediction were central [Kliebard, 1975a]. Franklin Bobbitt extended this model into the curriculum domain, arguing that to achieve maximum efficiency the curriculum must be effectively managed and outcomes precisely predicted. This model meant that the classical ideals of education, that is, intelligence and sensitivity, were no longer useful; the goals of curriculum must be specified (Pinar, 1981, p. 2).

It was traditionally possible to teach about ourselves as well as about the social and natural world without rigorous specification of its elements. But according to the Tylerian approach to education, goals of education are to be specified in the form of manageable, testable, predictable, and controllable objectives. To apply this idea to moral education, for example, traditional virtues, such as 'love,' 'friendship,' 'truthfulness,' etc., can no longer be acceptable as stated content of moral education. Instead, they need to be specified in observable and controllable terms as educational objectives, so as to be followed by students in everyday life "through internalization of memory or other psychological means" (KME, 1982a, p. 18). The most faithful example of this idea in moral education can be captured by the "behavior modification" approach. This behavior control method has been widely used in educational practice of Korea since the middle of the seventies (Sungjin Lee, 1974). In this approach, as

widely known, the behavior to be modified is to be specified as precisely as possible. If this objective is specified, a series of activities to modify a student's behavior is proceeded by means of the systematic reinforcing schedule, so called 'conditioning' which is basically similar to the process of animal training.

It seems a natural corollary that the dominance of Tylerian approach to education has accelerated the chronic malaise of 'fragmentary knowledge' centered education as well as the 'virtue-items' approach to moral education. In the present Moral Education Curriculum, although the 'virtue-items' approach in the previous moral education is questioned, the utility of this approach itself is not denied. According to the present Moral Education Curriculum, it is believed that this approach can be "effective," when "the intelligence or thinking ability of a student is low," or when "a certain set of unified behaviors are required for all members of a society" (KME, 1982a, p. 18). What is questioned is its appropriateness with respect to the aims of education. It views that the 'virtue-items' approach is basically to require students to follow 'virtue-items' in a blind way and this leads students to be "slaves of 'virtue-items'" (KME, 1982a, p. 19). Unlike Kohlberg (1970b, 1976), who believes that the 'bag of virtues' approach does not work, we would not deny that the 'virtue-items' approach used to be effective, at least temporarily, in the actual situation, when we reflect on our experience of school children who tend to follow comparatively well a variety of restrictive classroom regulations, even oppressive regulations. Nevertheless, to engage merely in the debate as to whether or not the 'virtue-items' approach is effective, tends to prevent us from looking at the fundamental problems of this approach (see, for example, Hamm, 1977). Although the present Moral Education Curriculum problematizes this approach in terms of its educational consequence as making students slaves of 'virtue-items,' Giroux discloses a deeper layer of this problem when he reflects on the prevailing functionalistic approach to citizenship education:

> The functionalistic dimension in the citizenship transmission model not only closes its 'eyes' to the falsehoods perpetuated in many social studies textbooks... it also supports a model of role socialization which, in fact, is a 'refinement of role conformity.' The existential reality of teachers, students, and others in the world of schooling and the social forces that both constrain and shape that reality are lost in this model (Giroux, 1983a, p. 331).

This reminds me of an Oriental maxim, "A leaf of a tree can block the whole mountain." One of the fundamental problems of the 'virtue-items' approach may be, as Giroux signifies, that it blocks the whole truth of the moral world by means of specified 'virtue-items.' It prevents students from being able not only to understand "the facts which make up reality," but also to understand "the factors that establish the facts so that they can change their inhuman reality" (Marcuse, 1969, pp. 122-123). In this sense, it may be understandable that the present Moral Education Curriculum posits the previous 'virtue-items' approach as problematic and attempts to go beyond it.

C. Emphasis on Moral Character Based on Moral Principles

In the previous part, we could understand the problem of the previous 'virtue-items' approach and the necessity to go beyond it. Then what is to be substituted for the place of the previous moral education? On what understanding of morality and moral education? The present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea put an emphasis on the cultivation of moral character in the place of the previous 'virtue-items.' What is understood by the cultivation of student's moral character? This emphasis on the students' moral character can also be regarded as a feature or a place through which we can orient to the whole world of morality and moral education.

According to the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea, the goal of moral education is "to cultivate moral character instead of making students "slaves of the 'virtue-items'" (KME, 1982a, p. 18). This moral character is so complex and perplexing that it cannot be taught in such a way as the 'virtue-items' approach. Hence, the task of moral education to go beyond the previous approach is seen to cultivate the inquiry capacity which encourages students "to establish their points-of-view based on their own thoughts, through which students can examine evidence which supports their points-of-view and that which contradicts them" (KME, 1982a, p. 18). When we consider that the world of morality is infinite and that moral education based on the 'virtue-items' approach or functionalistic model

prevents students from this reality, the above claim on the task of moral education, as encouraging students to inquire into reality by themselves, appears to be necessary to resolve the previous problems of moral education. Nevertheless, the notions of 'moral character' are ambiguous enough to be open to a variety of different interpretations. What is understood by the notion of 'moral character'?

In the present Moral Education Curriculum, morality is conceived in terms of "rational or intellectual morality" and "behavioral or practical morality" (KME, 1982a, p. 4). The former is defined as the "ability to judge and choose the rationality of moral principles through which one evaluates one's own acts as well as other's." The latter is defined as the "capacity or disposition to practise moral principles" (KME, 1982a, p. 4). It views that the criterion to evaluate the intellectual morality is "rationality" and the criterion to evaluate the behavioral morality is "consistency," and the task of moral education is, therefore, to enhance the rationality of intellectual morality and to help students to practise moral principles in a consistent way (KME, 1982a, p. 4). This conceptual structure of morality is significantly related to the notion of 'moral character.' According to the present Moral Education Curriculum,

> the moral principles which are internalized through choice or moral judgement cannot be meaningful unless they are integrated as a whole, since they can be contradictory to one another. If these contradictory principles govern one's moral life, s/he cannot be regarded as a person of consistent moral character. Moral principles can guide one's life as a whole only when they are meaningfully integrated without contradictions (KME, 1982a, p. 4).

According to this characterization, morality can be understood as a characteristic of a person through which one judges and chooses moral principles and applies them to one's actual moral situation. However, this conception of morality does not provide any ground on the basis of which we can judge whether an act is morally acceptable or not, since any moral judgement and choice in a particular situation can be arbitrary. This may be the reason why 'rationality' is adopted as the criterion of intellectual morality and 'consistency' as that of behavioral morality. That is to say, although the moral act of a person in a real situation is related to various moral principles, even contradictory ones, and one's choice of a principle and one's act

based on that principle can be diverse, its moral acceptability can be judged in terms of the rationality in one's moral judgement and of the consistency in one's act which characterize one's moral character. Thus, according to this formulation, a person of 'good moral character' is conceived as one who has moral principles in a rationally integrated way and can manage one's behavior in a consistent way by means of one's integrated moral principles.

In this formulation of moral character, the notion of 'moral principle,' is central. To understand the notion of moral character embedded in the present Moral Education Curriculum, let me interpret this further. When we talk about morality or moral education, we frequently use a variety of words, such as moral rules, or laws, moral virtues, socio-cultural norms, or moral principles, etc. But in the ordinary usage of this group of terms, the meanings of the words tend to overlap one another. For example, when we are asked to which category 'love' or 'friendship' is to belong, regardless of whatever grammatical structure it is expressed, we may not be able to provide any precise answer to the question. Unlike ordinary people who understand 'love' or 'friendship' itself no matter what explanatory category it belongs to, many ethical theorists have endeavoured to clarify the meanings of the words. In the present Moral Education Curriculum, however, morality is conceived in terms of 'moral principles' both in intellectual and behavioral morality instead of 'virtue-items' as in the previous moral education approach. But, what is understood by 'moral principle'? What is it to make moral principle distinctive from 'virtue-item'?

In the present Moral Education Curriculum, moral principle is characterized in terms of level of abstraction and universality. To show the difference of moral principle from 'virtue-item,' it uses 'honesty' as an example (KME, 1982a, p. 19). According to this explanation, the virtue of 'honesty' is not to be understood in its narrow sense merely as "an act not telling a lie," but it is also to be understood in terms of "life ethics" or as "a part of human character" (KME, 1982a, p. 19). 'A man of honesty,' therefore, does not necessarily mean merely he who does not tell a lie, but it also designates, at an abstract level, a man of good character as a whole. This implies that to judge whether an act is honest does not depend

on one's concrete act but depends on the higher abstract principles or one's moral character as a whole. It describes the relation of the virtue of honesty to moral principle as follows:

> 'A man of honesty' does not always mean a person who never tells a lie, but it also denotes a man who lives in accordance with the principle of honesty. A man who lives his life with the principle of honesty is one who can differentiate the situations where one should not tell a lie, and can act according to one's own conclusion which comes from one's deep reflection on the various situations related to honesty on the basis of one's integrated moral value system (KME, 1982a, p. 19).

According to our ordinary experience of honesty, the claim that a man who tells a lie can be regarded as a man of honesty is surely awkward. As an effort to understand this claim, let me provide an example. In a famous Korean fairy tale, "Woodman and Dryad," a young deer begged a woodman to help when she was tracked by a hunter. He hid the deer inside his woods. After a while, the hunter came and asked the woodman if he had seen the deer. The woodman told him she had run away, pointing to the deep valley in the opposite direction. In this situation, it may not be difficult for us to agree that the woodman's act cannot be regarded as morally unacceptable in spite of his telling a lie, if his act is based on caring for an animal or helping the weak. But, is this woodman honest? If we understand the meaning of the word, 'honesty,' merely as 'adherence to the facts or factual truth,' it can be said that his act was dishonest in spite of the moral acceptability of his act.

However, the meaning of the word is richer in both Eastern and Western traditions. The English word, for example, 'honesty,' takes its roots from the Latin word, *honestus*, which means 'honorable, legitimate, truthful.' According to Webster's dictionary, the word 'honesty' includes the meaning of "fairness and straightforwardness of conduct." The corresponding Korean word of 'honesty,' *jung-jik*, consists of two Chinese letters, *jung* (正) which means 'righteousness' or 'uprightness' and *jik* (直) which means 'straightforwardness' or 'directness.' What is disclosed by the etymological meanings of the word is that the meaning of 'honesty' cannot be understood in an isolated way, but rather it is to be understood in the whole context of human life and humanity itself. This reflection seems helpful in understanding more clearly the difference between 'moral principle' and 'virtue-item.' In the Moral Education Curriculum, 'virtue-item' seems to connote concretely specified and isolated

standards of moral acts expressed in behavioral terms, e.g., "don't tell a lie," whereas 'moral principle' connotes the abstract or general understood in relation to our moral life as a whole. In this sense, there seems to be reason enough in the claim that many of the traditional virtues should be understood as moral principles instead of, as reductionist, isolated 'virtue-items' given in the form of specified behavioral rules, and that the main concern of moral education is to teach students not in terms of 'virtue-items' but in terms of 'moral principles.'

This claim is similar to Kohlberg's critique of conventional morality and his emphasis on moral principles. In keeping with the 'formalistic' or 'deontological' tradition of Western moral philosophy from Kant to Rawls, Kohlberg (1969; 1970b; 1976) has developed his cognitive-developmental approach to moral education. In his approach, the distinction between 'moral rule' and 'moral principle' is central. He criticizes the traditional approach to moral education, which is based on "conventional morality" or "bag of virtues," not only since there are no such thing as 'moral virtues' but also since this approach does not work and is also morally and constitutionally illegitimate (Kohlberg, 1970b). Hence, in his approach, moral principles as universal guides to make moral decision are emphasized, since "moral principles are freely chosen by the individual because of their intrinsic moral validity," unlike "moral rules which are supported by social authority" (Kohlberg, 1976, p. 183). For him, conventional moral rules are conceived as those which are "grounded primarily on 'thou shalt nots' such as presented by the Ten Commandments, prescriptions of kinds of items" (p. 182), which basically rely on social authority. But moral principles are quite different from moral rules since they allow us to make adequate moral judgements which are universally applicable to all human kind. He explains the fundamental distinctiveness of moral principles from the conventional moral rules as follows, using his well-known moral dilemma of a druggist and a sick woman (see Kohlberg, 1970a, Appendix).

> The druggist is not acting morally, though he is not violating the ordinary moral rules (he is not actually stealing or murdering). But he is violating principles: He is treating the woman simply as a means to his ends of profit, and he is not choosing as he would wish any one to choose (if the druggist were in the dying woman's place, he would not want a druggist to choose as he is choosing) (Kohlberg, 1976, p. 182).

According to this explanation between moral principle and moral rule, the former can be conceived more or less as more formal, abstract, and universal, whereas the latter can be understood, more or less, as more substantial, concrete, and situational. It is in this sense that there is fundamental similarity between the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea and cognitive-developmental approach of Kohlberg. Although this explanation seems to provide us with a clear picture, at least at the conceptual level, on the relation between 'virtue-items' or 'conventional moral rules' and 'moral principle,' there is a fundamental ambiguity, when we apply this idea to practical moral acts and moral education. In the present Moral Education Curriculum, a man of moral principle, a man of good moral character, is he who makes moral judgement and acts on the basis of his own reflective thinking through which he can judge whether a particular virtue or moral rule is applicable or not. What makes one's moral judgement and act morally acceptable, here, relies on the higher and universal moral principle one chooses. But how can it be dealt with if moral principles are conflicting in a given moral situation?

In the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea, this problem is resolved by assuming the integrity of moral principles which characterizes a man of moral character. According to the present Moral Education Curriculum,

> moral principles cannot be meaningful if they are isolated because they can be contradictory to one another. If the contradictory moral principles govern one's moral life, he cannot be regarded as a man of consistent moral character. Hence, moral principles can take a role of guiding human life as a whole only when they are integrated without contradiction in a meaningful way. Thus, moral character of a man depends on the integrating as a whole in one's structure of interrelated moral norms (KME, 1982a, p. 4).

Within this assumption, any contradiction among moral values, norms, rules, or even principles is conceived negatively. If it is possible for us to have a variety of moral principles, virtues, etc., in an integrated way without any conflicts among them, there may be no reason to negate this assumption. But, is this actually possible? In the present Moral Education Curriculum, an attempt to resolve this problem is made by assuming a hierarchical structure among them: 'moral principles' over 'virtue-items,' and more abstract and general moral principles over less

abstract and general ones. But it does not provide any explanation about the concrete relationship among them.

In this respect, Kohlberg seems to provide a more plausible answer. As implied in the account of moral judgement given above, Kohlberg assumes that there is the ultimate moral principle. He introduces Kant's 'categorical imperatives' as an example. His own moral judgement in the above is also based on Kantian 'categorical imperatives,' i.e., the maxim of respect for human personality and the maxim of universalization. Kohlberg posits justice as the ultimate moral principle. We need not deny that justice is important in human life. But the problem is that justice is ambiguous enough to be interpreted in different ways. Kohlberg seems to admit this problem when he recognizes that "at every moral stage, there is a concern of justice (for example, in stage 6) superior to others (in lower stage of moral development)" (Kohlberg, 1976, p. 183). This implies that to justify the ultimacy of justice, we need another higher moral principle which gives a precise order to the rest of moral principles. This problem may be the most perplexing dilemma in ethics which most of the ethical theorists have tackled but failed to solve, finally ending with Nietzchean moral nihilism or at best with 'emotivism.'

It can be regarded as a significant effort for going beyond the previous 'virtue-items' approach that the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea attempts to understand morality and moral education as a whole. It tries to understand traditional virtues as 'moral principles' within the whole context of moral life and human character instead of reducing them to the isolated and observable standard of behavior as the previous 'virtue-items' approach did. It also attempts to understand moral education as the cultivation of a person of moral character who has moral principles in an integrated way without any conflict and practises them. This formulation of morality and moral education appears to be plausible at an abstract level. But, in the practical moral situation, there arises a fundamental difficulty concerning the problem of contradiction among moral principles. In order to overcome this problem, the present Moral Education Curriculum assumes a hierarchical structure among moral principles. But, we noted that his assumption is also untenable. This situation leads us to

a fundamental dilemma in the way of dealing with moral principles in moral education.

D. Universalization of the Formal Structure of Moral Reasoning

If moral education is understood as the cultivation of a person of moral character who has moral principles in an integrated way without conflicts among them, and if the precise hierarchical order among the moral principles cannot be assumed, how can it be possible to deal with moral principles in moral education? It may be in this context that the shift of emphasis in moral education from substantial contents such as virtues, norms, or rules, to the formal structure of moral reasoning is significant as an effort to get rid of the above fundamental dilemma. This shift of the emphasis can also be regarded one of the significant features of the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea since it invites us to the whole world of moral reasoning.

In the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea, this shift of emphasis is claimed as follows:

> The new moral education curriculum puts its emphasis on the learning of moral principles, i.e., students' self-discovery of moral principles, through cultivation of students' ability of analysis, inference, application, and synthesis of various moral problems which they encounter in their daily life (KME, 1982a, p. 18).

Behind this claim, we can see an assumption that any attempt to deal with substantial content of morality is not acceptable in moral education, since there is no universally right answer concerning the question of substantial content of morality. This assumption is common in most approaches to moral education which deny any attempt to teach substantial content of morality. For example, Simon, one of the leading proponents of the 'values clarification' approach to moral education, clearly advocates that his approach is "based on the premise that none of us has the 'right' set of values" (Simon, 1976, p. 127). Kohlberg also shares this assumption as he claims that "when one turns to the details of defining each virtue, one finds equal uncertainty or difficulty in reaching consensus" (Kohlberg, 1976, p. 184). Thus, within this assumption, any approach which intends to teach substantial content of moral virtues, norms, values, etc., is regarded as 'indoctrination.'

If we accept this assumption, it may appear natural that in order to avoid indoctrination, moral education should put emphasis on letting students discover their own substantial content of morality. This seems to be the significant and fundamental reason why the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea emphasizes the cultivation of the student's ability to inquire or discover, reminiscent of Kohlberg's emphasis on 'student's moral reasoning' or Simon's 'valuing process.' But a fundamental paradox concerning moral education underlies here. This paradox comes into being with another assumption, which is implied in the above assumption, that any attempt to teach substantial content of morality is indoctrination since there is no content of morality which is universally right. This assumption implies that to avoid indoctrination any education should teach only those things which are universally right. Thus it follows that we should negate any attempt to teach the substantial content of morality but teach students to discover them. This negation does not mean we teach nothing in moral education since we are still teaching something instead of teaching the content of morality. Can we regard this something as universally right? Puka (1976) expresses this paradox as follows:

> If we do not know what morality is, we cannot teach it. In such crucial ways we do not know what morality is. Yet we must teach it because it is of prime importance and must be learned (p. 75).

How can we overcome this paradox of moral education? In the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea, there is no precise answer to this particular question. Instead, it seems to accept the Kohlbergian idea in general. Kohlberg seems to provide a crucial alternative to deal with this paradox by the claims of universality of the formal or cognitive structure of moral reasoning. Based on the ideas of Dewey and especially Piaget on the stage theory of child's cognitive development, Kohlberg developed his six stages theory of child's moral judgement which consists of three levels and six stages. To verify the universality of his stage theory, he conducted a variety of empirical researches. On the basis of results from his researches, he argues that the stages have definite empirically universal characteristics, i.e., (1) stages are 'structural wholes' or organized systems of thought, (2) stages form an 'invariant

sequence,' which means that individuals never skip stages and movement is always to the next stage up, and (3) stages are 'hierarchical integration,' which implies that moral judgement in the lower stage is included in the higher stage (Kohlberg, 1976, p. 186). Based on his researches including cross-cultural research, he also claimed that these six stages are universal regardless of culture.

If we accept Kohlberg's idea, the above paradox can be easily resolved conceptually. We do not need to teach any substantial content of morality in moral education. Instead, we can teach the cognitive structure of moral reasoning or "the formal conditions of a moral choice and action" (Kohlberg, 1976, p. 182) which are universally and empirically valid. This idea seems what is followed by the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea. It characterizes a man of moral character, an ideal man to be pursued in moral education, as he who has moral principles integrated as a whole, without any contradictions among them. This assumption is hardly possible without the Kohlbergian claim of the universality of formal conditions in moral reasoning. In the "Instructional Principles of Moral Education," it suggests teachers to emphasize the 'process of rational discourse.' This principle is explained as follows:

> Moral norms (as substantial contents of morality) must be understood on the basis of intellectual rationality. In the process of moral discourse, the conclusion itself should not to be regarded as important. What is primarily emphasized is the process itself which leads to such a conclusion. Therefore, it is not the significant role of teacher to reach a good conclusion but to lead the process well.... Teacher is the authoritative figure not in the content of moral judgement but in the procedure of moral judgement (KME, 1982a, p. 16).

To be sure, there is a fundamental correspondence in this claim to that of Simon's (1976) values clarification approach which emphazes "focus on the process of valuing" (p. 126) instead of the substantial content of virtues itself, and to that of Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental approach which emphasizes the cognitive structure of moral reasoning. Here, if we can admit that unlike the substantial content of morality which cannot be verified as right or wrong, a process of moral judgement or the formal structure of moral reasoning can be regarded as universally right, as Kohlberg indeed claimed, there may be little difficulty of accepting it as necessary, even if it is not sufficient. But, can the cognitive structure of moral

reasoning, unlike the substantial content of morality, be really counted on as to be universally right? In what sense? These seem to be the most fundamental and difficult questions related to the questions of knowledge, truth, reality, and method.

However, it seems important for us to examine what is assumed concerning the above questions in the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea. For this, it seems necessary to re-examine the claim that to avoid indoctrination moral education should emphasize the rational procedure of moral reasoning instead of its conclusion. Reminded of the assumption that we should teach only what is universally right, the underlying belief embedded in this claim can be captured such as (1) any substantial content of morality is not universally right, and (2) there is a universally right procedure of moral reasoning. What follows with this logic is that moral education should put emphasis on the procedure of moral reasoning.

Let us examine the former belief first. What is it to be counted as universally right? In what sense of truth can the substantial content of morality not be counted as universally right? These questions are closely related to the whole history of Western scientific revolution. One of the dominating beliefs in this history can be captured in terms of the scientific ideal of truth, where truth is conceived in propositional and empirical terms. Within this tradition, the truth of the world (natural and human world) should be expressed in terms of isolated propositions which are empirically verifiable or logically true. 'The world of the truth' rather than 'the truth of the world' is established by means of logical reconstruction of these isolated propositions which are empirically tested or logically verified. The most extreme case of this tradition can be found in the 'logical positivism' of the Vienna circle, where only either 'analytical propositions' which are empirically testable, or 'synthetic propositions' which are logically verifiable are counted as true (see Ayer, 1984, chap. IV).

If we apply this belief to moral education, such substantial content of morality as 'love,' 'honesty,' 'friendship,' etc., cannot be regarded as objects of scientific inquiry since they do not satisfy the condition of scientific inquiry in terms of logically or empirically verifiable law-like propositions. 'Honesty,' for example, is to be defined such as 'an act of not

telling a lie' - in a strict sense of it, the act of 'telling a lie' is also to be re-stated in a testable form. By this propositional definition, 'honesty' as a substantial content of morality can surely be an object of scientific inquiry, since this proposition can be empirically verified. Nevertheless, in the very process of scientific verification of whether an act of telling a lie is universally right or wrong, there lies a difficult problem. The first problem comes from the fundamental difference between normative truth and factual truth. According to the ideal of scientific truth, the truth of a moral proposition is basically to be empirically verified. Although it can be justified as a logical derivative from another moral proposition, this other proposition is also in the same fate in order to be justified. But, the fact that most of the people believe or act as if this proposition is right cannot necessarily be regarded as universal normative truth, as captured by the "naturalistic fallacy" of Moore (1903). The problem of mass culture can be regarded as an example of this problem. Moreover, even in the process of factual verification, it may be evident that most of the people neither act nor think as if 'the act of not telling a lie' is universally right. Within this scientific ideal of truth, this problem is so fundamental and decisive enough to lead us to the conclusion that substantial content of morality cannot be an object of rational inquiry and that morality is no more than an expression of personal emotions like taste, as claimed by emotivists (see, for example, Stevenson, 1945; Ayer, 1946).

The second belief that there is a universally right procedure of moral reasoning seems very important in this context, since it can make moral education possible without contradiction with the belief that the only universally right thing should be taught in education. But, our questions are: what is understood by 'moral reasoning'? How can it be justified that the cognitive structure of moral reasoning is universally right? Within the scientific ideal of truth, this belief is also to be empirically verified. Here, it seems helpful for us to examine further the Kohlbergian cognitive-developmental theory of moral reasoning, not merely its content but also its underlying assumption on which it stands.

In Kohlberg's theory, human moral development consists of three levels and six stages, in terms of different formal structures of moral reasoning. According to him, these stages are linear in the developmental process of the individual, and the higher stage includes the lower-stage. He claims that this developmental sequence is empirically true as well as morally right, and thus universal. According to this claim, a man who is in the higher stage of moral reasoning is regarded as a man of higher morality. Then, what is it to make the higher stage's moral reasoning distinctive from that of lower stage? For this, Kohlberg basically relies on the Piagetian structural developmental theory of human reasoning, which consists of three major stages: the intuitive, the concrete operational, and the formal operational. According to Kohlberg (1976),

> Since moral reasoning is clearly reasoning, advanced moral reasoning depends on advanced logical reasoning; a person's logical stage puts a certain ceiling on the moral stage he can attain. A person whose logical stage is only concrete operational stage is limited to the pre-conventional stages (stages 1 and 2). A person whose logical stage is only partially formal operational is limited to the conventional moral stages (stages 3 and 4) (p. 179).

With this claim, it follows that the fully formal operational reasoning is the basic prerequisite of the post-conventional stages (stages 5 and 6). Here, the basic concept employed to characterize the morally developed man is his formal, more precisely logical reasoning. According to Piaget (Piaget and Inhelder, 1958), the essence of formal operation is characterized by 'hypothetico-deductive thinking,' 'propositional thinking,' and 'combinational analysis,' which express common characteristics in the 'empirical-analytic' tradition of modern science. Kohlberg (1976) himself characterizes this formal operation as follows:

> Around age seven, the child enters the stage of concrete moral thought: He can make logical inference, classify, and handle qualitative relations about concrete things. In adolescence individuals usually enter the stage of formal operations. At this stage they can reason abstractly, i.e., consider all possibilities, form hypotheses, deduce implications from hypotheses, and test them in reality (p. 179).

If we follow this characterization of moral reasoning, it is no more than the formal logical structure of thinking which characterizes the very act of positivistic scientists. Hence, a man of morality is to be understood in terms of the moral reasoning of the positivistic moral theorists, who can be the best model of morally ideal man. Concerning the claim of the

procedure of moral reasoning, the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea basically follows this idea, when it emphasizes "the ability of analysis, inference, application and syntheses." It views that this ability is "essentially the same as that of 'ethical theorists'" (KME, 1982a, p. 18). It may be beyond question within this belief that to cultivate the higher capacity of moral judgement, we have to teach students how to think of moral problems based on the ideal method of moral reasoning provided by ethical theorists, or more concretely by positivistic moral psychologists. Thusly, according to the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea,

> In moral instruction, the higher emphasis should be given to the cultivation of intellectual ability to solve the moral problems instead of the mere transmission of ordinary moral norms. Like instruction of mathematics or natural sciences, therefore, moral instruction should include the training of moral judgement. That is to say, in moral instruction, the emphasis is to be given not merely to the moral knowledge which is useful to solve the moral problems, but to the training of the method to solve the moral problems which students would encounter in their lives (KME, 1982a, p. 25).

Here, it seems to be notable that there is a basic similarity between the cognitive-developmental approach to moral education and the Brunerian 'structure of disciplines' approach to curriculum in general, which emphasizes the formal structure or methodological characteristics of disciplines instead of the substantial content of knowledge. If we recognize that both approaches basically rely on the common theoretical ground of the Piagetian cognitive-developmental theory, it may not be strange that both intend to lead students to see the world with the same method idealized in positivistic science. The present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea also basically shares this idea, as expressed in its characterization of moral education as an independent subject matter.

> In contemporary society, the amount of knowledge has been rapidly increased by virtue of diverse advanced methodologies of inquiry. Thus, it becomes inevitable that schooling puts its emphasis on the structural and methodological characteristics of subject matters.... What characterizes a subject matter is not its content of knowledge but its methodological characteristics by means of which its knowledge is gained and understood.... Likewise, the increment of moral knowledge and the advancement of unique methodology to inquire into morality require that moral education be carried as a separate independent subject matter (KME, 1982a, p. 6-7).

If the basic concern of moral education is to help students to live their lives in a more meaningful and valuable way, we would not deny that our task is to teach them to make their moral judgements and to act on the basis of deep understanding of existing moral norms, virtues, principles, and problems in a wide context instead of blind conformity. It can be said in this sense that emphasis on moral reasoning in the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea, as in the cognitive-developmental approach to moral education, can contribute to allowing moral educators to question the taken-for-granted acceptance and blind imposition of existing social norms and to disclose the rational and comprehensive dimension of our moral judgement. However, its common understanding of moral reasoning as hypothetico-deductive type of reasoning based on Piagetian formal operation and its naive claim of universality of the formal structure of moral reasoning, tend to reduce our moral judgement and act to merely a derivative of the technique of 'empirical-analytic' thinking. It seems crucial in this context that Giroux characterizes the Brunerian social science model of citizenship education as follows:

> This model of citizenship education often ends up substituting general concepts for social concepts and then "hawks" the importance of "analytical" skills as the answer to critical thinking. What usually results is a process whereby the judgements made by authors who use these methods are not questioned. Instead, concepts are used along with "inquiry skills" that eventually elicit confirmation from students on problems governed by answers that can barely be challenged (1983a, p. 333).

There are many ways to understand the real world. The 'hypothetico-deductive' type of understanding can be regarded at best as merely 'a' way of understanding. Nevertheless, the exclusive emphasis on the right procedure of moral reasoning grounded in a particular way of understanding is to mould students to see the world only in that particular way such as positivistic moral psychologists do and close off other ways of looking at the world. Thus, it totalizes students with one way of understanding, delegitimating other possible and valuable ways. This leads us to be able to say that the attempt to teach students a procedure of moral reasoning, based on the methodological ideal of science, is no more than an expression of the 'prejudice against prejudices,' which also cannot be free from 'indoctrination.' Here, it seems that the fundamental paradox of moral education captured by Puka still remains unresolved as far as we hold the assumption that we have to teach only those things which are universally

correct or right.

Reflecting upon our moral experience, we cannot deny the importance of moral reasoning in our moral judgement and moral act. Especially, if we consider the problem of the previous 'virtue-items' approach in which students' moral reasoning tends to be extremely limited, it can be understood as a significant attempt that the present Moral Education Curriculum tries to disclose the rational dimension of morality and moral education, questioning the taken-for-granted acceptance and the one-sided imposition of the standardized set of moral norms. Nevertheless, in the attempt to universalize the formal structure of moral judgement, moral reasoning tends to be narrowed as a derivative from the 'hypothetico-deductive' or the 'empirical-analytic' type of thinking technique, following the cognitive-developmental approach. This narrow understanding of moral reasoning tends to mould students' moral reasoning into the thinking technique of positivistic science, delegitimating other valuable ways of reasoning.

E. Main Elements of Moral Education and Their Arrangement

The previous features of the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea which we tried to understand so far, were helpful at an abstract level for our understanding of the meaning of morality and moral education underlying the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea. How is the idea advocated in an abstract way translated into the construction of the actual moral education curriculum? Here, it seems to be helpful to note the inevitable involvement of socio-political dynamism when a new idea or orientation of curriculum is translated into the actual curriculum, although this dynamism also usually affects the very construction or adoption of the new idea itself. Thus, the actual construction of the main elements of moral education and their arrangement can be regarded as a feature through which we can disclose the meaning of morality and moral education at a more concrete level.

Let me examine first the whole structure of constructing the moral education curriculum across the grades from Primary School to High School. According to the present

Moral Education Curriculum of Korea, basic goals of moral education at each school level are prescribed as follows:

> (In the Primary School)
> (1) To help children understand the basic norms necessary for living as independent individuals and to guide them to exert themselves in their own growth through following the norms.
> (2) To help children understand the basic rules necessary for harmonious social life and attain the habits observing them autonomously.
> (3) To lead children to cooperate in national development and international understanding as Korean citizens, who are proud of their country (KEDI, 1982a, p. 33).
>
> (In the Middle School)
> (1) To understand the significance of personal happiness and self-development in social contexts, and establish the standards of moral judgement and practise them in everyday life.
> (2) To form amicable human relations and to have a democratic attitude which directs themselves toward the building of a welfare society.
> (3) To develop the character and the attitude that our nation needs for the restoration of national identity and for the regeneration of our cultural heritage so that Korea can contribute to the welfare and prosperity of humanity (KEDI, 1982b, p. 11).
>
> (In the High School)
> (1) Internalize values conclusive to self realization through a correct understanding of the position of youth in the context of one's life.
> (2) Have the basic morality of contributing to a continual development of the nation through the understanding of normative values inherent in the nation.
> (3) Be able to play roles in creating a new culture based on the cultural heritage of mankind.
> (4) Develop the consciousness of ethical issues besetting modern society and an ability to effectively cope with the ever-shifting surroundings.
> (5) Be inclined to strive for the development of democracy and the building of a welfare society with a lucid outlook on nationhood (KEDI, 1982c, p. 18).

If we look at these series of prescribed goals as a whole, we may be able to see both a common thread across all the school levels and the differentiation through grade levels. What is emphasized throughout all school levels seems to be the understanding and actualization of moral rules or norms in such a way as to be conducive to harmonious personal, communal, and national life. For this, at the Primary School level, the understanding and practising of the 'basic norms' or 'rules' for harmonious life are emphasized. In the Middle School level, the basic rules or norms are substituted in a more abstract form such as "personal happiness," "democratic attitude," or "welfare society," and in a more integrated way such as the development of the "character" and "attitude." The rational dimension of moral judgement

also begins to appear as establishing the "standards of moral judgements and practice." At the High School level, although these sequential characteristics appear to be ambiguous, morality tends to be situated in a wider context as expressed by "the cultural heritage of mankind," instead of that of a nation. The awareness of the conflicting and changeable dimension of morality is also introduced in terms of development of "consciousness of ethical issues" in the changing society.

This internal structure of construction of moral education curriculum is more clearly explained in the commentary on the construction of moral education curriculum. According to this commentary, the general goals of moral education are characterized as follows: "internalization of the basic virtues" and "formation of moral judgement ability" at the Primary School level; "development of moral judgmental ability" and "formation of autonomous morality" at the Middle School level; and "objectification of autonomous morality," "integration of character," "formation of value-orientation (on state, society, and human being)," and "understanding of basic ethical theories" at the High School level (KME, 1982b, p. 11). According to this formulation of the moral education curriculum, "internalization of virtues," "habituation of virtues or moral rules," "development of moral reasoning ability," and "formation of integrated moral character," become central tasks of moral education , which are sequentially integrated as a whole, i.e., moral education begins with internalization and habituation of moral virtues or rules, and ends with formation of integrated moral character. In the Moral Education Curriculum of Korea, the basic structure of moral education is described as follows:

> (In the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea) the main conceptual elements of moral education are conceived as (1) internalization of moral norms, (2) formation of moral habits, (3) development of moral judgement ability. These elements are sequentially arranged as basic goals of moral education on the basis of the developmental process of students. The general contour of this arrangement can be portrayed in such a way that the higher the school level is, the more emphasis is given to the moral judgement and the less the emphasis to the internalization and habit-formation of moral norms (KME, 1982b, p. 11).

Table 1. Basic Structure of Moral Education



(KME, 1982b, p. 11)

Table 2. Main Contents and Objectives of Moral Education

		main contents or problems	boundaries of life	main objectives
Primary School	lower grades	basic virtues	school and family	internalization of basic virtues
	middle grades	basic virtues	school and society	understanding factual and logical ground of moral norms
	upper grades	basic virtues	society and state	understanding of complementary or exclusive relations among moral norms
Middle School		moral problems in human relation	self and others	formation of autonomous morality and moral judgement
High School		moral problems in human society	moral life as a whole	integration of human character, realization of social justice

(KME, 1982b, p. 11)

This may be more intelligible if we look at the Tables 1 and 2, where the underlying structure of the construction of moral education curriculum is succinctly elaborated.

According to this formulation of the moral education curriculum, it follows that moral education should put emphasis on all the three elements of morality regardless of school level, but in different ways with respect to students' developmental level. That is to say, for younger students the emphasis is given to moral habits formation and internalization of moral norms, and for older students, the main emphasis is on the ability of moral reasoning. Moral reasoning is not regarded as significant at the early period of development until the upper grade level of the Primary School. But at the later period of development, the ability of moral reasoning is more highly emphasized than internalization and habituation of moral norms. It is also evident that the higher the grade level is, the more abstract and conceptual the way of dealing with morality becomes. It also appears to be clear within this idea that the formal goal of moral education is the formation of an integrated moral character and the above procedure of moral education will lead to this final goal.

This line of thinking governing the sequential arrangement of moral education seems to correspond to the basic idea embedded in the claim of the shift of emphasis from the 'virtue-items' to the formal procedure of moral judgement as examined in the previous parts. However, reflective readers may see here somewhat contradictory aspects involved in the actual construction of the moral education curriculum which appears to be incompatible with the previous claims. In the previous objection of the 'virtue-items' approach, wherein on the one hand it is claimed that since 'virtue-items' approach leads students to be 'slaves of virtue-items,' moral education should emphasize the integrated moral character through cultivation of students' ability of moral judgement. Especially, when it emphasizes the process of rational discourse, it is claimed that moral education should be concerned about the formal structure of moral discourse instead of its substantial content, following the idea of the Kohlbergian approach where any attempt to teach the substantial content of morality is blamed as 'indoctrination.' According to the above construction of the actual moral education

curriculum, on the other hand, to teach the substantial content of morality, such as internalization and habit formation of moral norms, is regarded as one of the essential elements of moral education.

What is it that makes this contradiction possible? How can this contradiction be justified? To respond to the questions, it seems to be useful to situate the present Moral Education Curriculum within the wider socio-historical context of the general curriculum field of Korea. As we have seen previously, there had been a chronic problem, the so called 'fragmentary knowledge' centered education, in Korea from the beginning of modern schooling. The adoption of the Tylerian approach to curriculum did not provide much help to resolve this problem. Rather, as we have already noted, this approach contributed to the perpetuation of the problem. It is in this historical context that the Brunerian 'structure of discipline' approach, which used to be called as the 'discipline centered' approach in Korea (Soontak Kim, 1983; Donhee Lee, 1983), began to affect the general curriculum field in Korea.

In the effort to introduce this idea to Korea, the contribution of Hongwoo Lee whose translation of Bruner's book, *The Process of Education* (1960), was published in 1973, seems to be most influential. To justify the necessity of a new orientation in the curriculum field, Lee (1974; 1977; 1978) tried to unveil the fundamental problem of the classical Tylerian approach as the 'objectives model,' as well as the 'evaluation model,' where the content of education is reduced to behavioral objectives which are testable. He claimed that in the Tylerian model the educational objectives reduced to the testable form should determine the content of education. For him, the content of education cannot be reduced to testable objectives; rather the content should be understood and taught as a whole. Considering the pervasive chronic problem of the 'fragmentary knowledge' centered education and of the Tylerian approach, this claim seemed to be powerful and decisive enough to make educators believe the inevitable necessity of another alternative approach to curriculum.

It may be in this context that the claim of the 'structure of discipline' approach to education became the most appealing and persuasive in the curriculum field of Korea.

However, this does not mean that there was no resistance to this new approach to curriculum. When the basic idea of a new approach began to be discussed with the critique of the previous orientation of the Tylerian approach, those who belonged to the latter academic community began to resist the new rationality. Especially, Lee's radical critique of the Tylerian approach as 'objectives model' called for strong counter argumentation on the side of the Tylerian community with diverse social, political, academic interests. The debates at the annual conference of the Korean Society for the Study of Education in 1974 can be regarded as a climax of this conflict. This moment, which was raised by Lee's presentation entitled, "The Classical Model of Curriculum and an Alternative," is succinctly described by Soontaek Kim (1983):

> The debate originated from the Hongwoo Lee's radical critique of the Tylerian curriculum orientation as 'objectives model' in spite of the fact that the Tylerian idea was still prevailing in the actual procedure of curriculum development even though the 'discipline-centered' approach had been adopted since 1973. The debate was very furious because his critique was severe enough to hurt those who had immersed themselves in the Tylerian curriculum orientation for more than thirty years after the independence of Korea. One objection was that Lee's characterization of Tyler, Bloom, Mager as the 'objectives model' is the category mistake, and the other objection was that unlike Lee's characterization, the objectives in Tylerian model is to be understood as a procedural stage for curriculum development rather than the presupposed particular objectives (p. 201).

What we can see from this description of the debate is the deep penetration of the Tylerian rationality into the curriculum community of Korea so as to lead the committed to defend the Tylerian model instead of trying to understand a new approach in a critical way. Of course, there were some efforts for a critical look at the 'structure of discipline' approach. For example, Soontaek Kim (1974) questioned its exclusive emphasis on the 'form' instead of the 'content' of education on the side of the Tylerian rationality. Donhee Lee (1983) also pointed out the inappropriateness of this approach in both the non-intellectual subject matters and non-academic students (pp. 157-158). However, the prevalence of the Tylerian rationality tended to limit the possibility of any critical scrutinization of the fundamental rationality, such as academic imperialism and methodological monism, embedded in the 'structure of discipline' approach.

It is in this historical context that the present Moral Education Curriculum came into being in 1983 advocating the 'whole person' approach or 'human centered' education. It is notable here that, unlike in the previous curriculum, in the present curriculum there in no authoritative figure. Such an absence can be understood as an effort to search for a fundamental way to educate the student as 'a whole person' in its full sense, with openness instead of dependence on a particular authority. But, in fact, the absence of a particular authority in the present curriculum led to the acceptance of both Tylerian and Brunerian authorities. That is to say, the previous conflicts between the Tylerian and Brunerian community could reconcile under the abstract notion of the 'whole person' approach or 'human-centered' education. In the present Moral Education Curriculum, the attempt to reconcile the conflicts between both authorities is also made, as it claims:

> Each approach [behavioristic and cognitive-developmental approach] tends to emphasize merely one aspect of moral education. In moral education to cultivate moral man, intellectual ability is necessary for clear analysis and judgement of moral problems and formation of moral will or habit which is also necessary for morally right act, as if in art education we emphasize both theory and practice instead of one aspect. If we choose a comprehensive approach based on the advantages of both, it may be the most desirable moral education (KME, 1982a, p. 28).

Going back to the problem of contradiction between the claim of emphasis on the formal structure of moral reasoning and the actual construction of moral education curriculum, it certainly looks awkward that the internalization of moral norms, formation of moral habits, and the development of moral judgement ability are conceived as the basic components of moral education within the present curriculum orientation where it characterizes itself as a shift of emphasis from the 'virtue-items' to the 'cognitive structure' of moral reasoning. But if we consider the above historical context of curriculum thought in Korea, this phenomenon can be understood in terms of a 'theoretical eclecticism' under the orientation of a 'whole person' approach or a 'human centered' education. Of course, this does not mean that the theoretical eclecticism itself cannot be questioned. However, let me examine first the ground rationality of the sequential arrangement of these claimed components of moral education.

In the present Moral Education Curriculum, these basic elements of moral education are arranged in such a sequence that the lower the school level is, the more the internalization and habituation of moral norms are emphasized, and the higher the school level becomes, the more moral judgemental ability is emphasized. This arrangement of the moral education curriculum is basically based on a particular view of the nature of students as 'present-being' as well as 'having-to-be.' We would not deny that our understanding of the student is essential in any attempt to educate them. But, our question is: How are they to be understood? In the moral education textbook for High School, *National Ethics*, the nature of a student is expressed as follows:

> In the period of childhood, a human being is governed by biological principles rather than rational principles. S/he grows up and gradually goes beyond these biological principles. Thus, in the period of adolescence, s/he comes to act in a rational way and begins to expand his/her social relations. In the period of childhood, s/he also conducts his/her acts mainly in terms of instinctive and direct response to the external stimulus of environment, but through growing up, s/he comes to act on the basis of rational and indirect thoughts (KME, *National Ethics*,[7] 1982, p. 15).

According to this understanding, children are instinctive and biological beings on the one hand, and adults are rational and thoughtful beings on the other. The basic logic embedded in this expression can be captured as follows: (1) children act on the basis of biological and instinctive principles and adults act on the basis of rational and abstract principles; (2) human beings have to act on the basis of rational and abstract principles; and thus, (3) adults are superior to children on their rational and abstract thought. In the arrangement of the basic components of moral education, the present curriculum is basically following this rationality, which can be seen as 'intellectualism' embedded in the Piagetian, Kohlbergian, and Brunerian lines of thought. Following the cognitive-developmental theory on child development of Piaget and Kohlberg, it characterizes the nature of young children as slaves of 'egocentrism.' They are viewed in terms of 'lack,' or 'inferiority.' For example, "they cannot understand the logical reason why a norm is to be kept;" "they have no conception of good and bad;" "they frequently fight one another because they interpret the rules egocentrically;" "they are lacking

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[7]Moral Education textbook for High School level.

in the ability of autonomous value judgement;" etc. (KME, 1982a, p. 23).

It also characterizes the nature of Middle School students as follows:

> As classified by psychologists, moral development of Middle School students is characterized as a period of transition from the previous heteronomous morality to autonomous morality. In this period, they experience a transition to adolescence physiologically and psychologically, and with respect to their abilities of mental operation, they are in the period where concrete operation is changing to formal operation and thus the ability of abstract thinking and hypothetical thinking is growing (KME, 1982b, p. 12).

Here, we can note that the 'psychologists' connote a group of cognitive-developmental psychologists, in particular Piaget and Kohlberg, whose theories and research findings are to be accepted as universal truth. However, it may be helpful to be reminded ourselves of the embedded assumption underlying the emphasis on Piagetian formal operation, the basic elements of which consist of 'hypothetico-deductive thinking', 'propositional thinking', and 'combinational thinking.' If the character of a morally developed person is to be determined by ability, or more precisely technique, in this type of thinking, a person who is well trained in this kind of technique is regarded as an ideal image of a morally developed person. But, according to the above characteristics of children, since they lack this ability, they do not know what is right and wrong. Thus they cannot act in a morally acceptable way. Even to adults, this idea is applied such that the act of a person who has the technique of formal and logical thinking can be regarded as morally acceptable whatever act s/he actually does. Kohlberg himself claims that "over 50 percent of late adolescents and adults are capable of full formal reasoning, but only 10 percent of adults display principled (stage 5 and 6) moral reasoning" (Kohlberg, 1976, p. 179). With the above character of a morally developed person, we may be able to imagine who would belong to this "10 percent of adults" - probably most of the cognitive-developmental moral psychologists and some others who have both sophisticated skills of formal reasoning and wide knowledge on ethical theories.

What would happen as the logical consequence of this formulation of moral development? It can provide the rationale for adults to exert control over children as well as for scientists over ordinary people. This seems to be the ground rationality on which the present

Moral Education Curriculum is standing. Here, we need to note that when the 'virtue-items' approach is questioned, this approach is not denied; rather it is viewed effective when "the intelligence or reasoning ability of learners is low" (KME, 1982a, p. 18). What logically follows from these assumptions is that younger students are to be taught to internalize and habituate the existing moral norms in a specified and fractionized form, but older students are to be taught to cultivate the ability of moral reasoning. With this plausible rationality, the conflict between the Tylerian and Brunerian or Kohlbergian communities seems to be resolved in the area of moral education providing different places for both communities to participate in curriculum: in the earlier level of school, the social learning theory and behavior modification theory are allowed, and in higher level of school, the cognitive-developmental approach and the value-clarification approach are seen to contribute. Thus, all different academic communities can come to co-operate happily under the orientation of the 'whole person' approach or 'human centered' education in the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea, regardless of whether or not students, ordinary parents, and ordinary teachers would also be really happy with this reconciliation among academic communities.

The present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea advocated the shift of emphasis from the substantial content of morality like 'virtue-items' to the cognitive structure of moral reasoning. However, in the process of translating this idea into the actual curriculum construction, we have noted the socio-political context of the curriculum field in Korea in which the conflicts between the Tylerian and Brunerian community had been pervasive. Within this context, the attempt to reconcile the conflicts between two communities made under the abstract notion of 'whole person' approach or 'human-centered' education. Thus, following the Piagetian cognitive-developmental theory on child development, the main elements of actual moral education curriculum were constructed and arranged in such a way that for younger students, the internalization and habituation of the existing moral norms in a specified and fractionized form are emphasized, and for older students, the ability of moral reasoning based on the 'hypothetico-deductive' type of thinking technique, is emphasized, providing the

rationale for adults to exert their control over children as well as for experts over ordinary people.

F. Construction of Classroom Activities

In the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea, as we have examined, the basic elements of moral education are conceived as internalization of moral norms, formation of moral habits, and development of moral judgement ability. These elements are arranged in such a way that internalization and habituation of moral norms are more emphasized for lower grade students and moral judgement ability is more emphasized for higher grade students. How is this idea translated into concrete classroom activities? What is the ground rationality of suggested classroom activities? The construction of classroom activities for moral education can be regarded as the most significant feature through which we can understand the meaning of morality and moral education embedded in the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea at the concrete level, since the actual classroom activity is the most concrete place where we can understand what is really happening in the moral education curriculum. Through this feature, we can also disclose the underlying rationality on which the concrete classroom interaction is constructed and proceeded.

In our effort to understand the meaning of morality and moral education embedded in concrete classroom activities, it may be helpful to see available materials for moral education in Korea. As described in the introductory chapter, the basic materials for moral education consist of, for each grade, a nationally unified textbook and the *Teachers Guidebook*. In all classroom activities, the textbook is central for both students and teachers since it is regarded as the basis not only of classroom interaction but also of all kinds of evaluation at the classroom, school, provincial, and national levels. The *Teachers Guidebook* is also important for the teacher since it provides the concrete daily teaching procedure based on the textbook including general background knowledge on moral education. These materials are influential in moral education and thus in curriculum change the main attention is given to these materials, which are

developed by a group of experts, under the administration of the Korean Ministry of Education. They are also provided by the government.

In looking at the actual classroom activities, however, we must not deny the unique and situational aspects of classroom interaction. No teacher teaches students in the same way that other teachers do. Even when a teacher deals with the same content in different classrooms, s/he may teach it differently. This spontaneous and creative dimension of teaching and classroom interaction may be one of the most important areas calling for our understanding through which we can find a possible way of educational reformation against the prevailing tendency of educational totalization. However, our main focus here is the significant feature of suggested classroom activities and the ground rationality embedded in the present Moral Education Curriculum, since the *Teachers Guidebook* provides the model of daily classroom interactions with students in a crucial way. Let me begin with an example of a suggested classroom activity.

There is a narrative in the textbook for the third grade of Primary School. This is a story about a father and his three sons entitled "Treasure in Orchard." To describe it briefly: There was a father who had an orchard. He worked hard but his three sons did not like to work at all. Before the father died, he said to his three sons that he had concealed treasure for his sons inside the orchard. The three sons dug out the orchard though found no treasure. However, when all the fruits in the orchard had ripened well by virtue of their hard work, they came to realize what the hidden treasure really was. This is, of course, a well known story used for teaching 'diligence or sincerity.' When I was young, I was also taught this story. It still reminds me of something meaningful when I think about the meaning of tradition.

However, our question here is not the content of the story itself or its appropriateness as the content of a moral education text, but is related to the purpose and the way this story is dealt with in the classroom. In the *Teachers Guidebook*, the related instructional objectives of this part are described as follows:

(1) To explain the importance and necessity of diligent life with examples.
(2) To list concrete examples of working diligently.

(3) To have an attitude to live in a diligent and sincere way (KME, 1982a, Grade 3, p. 56)

To achieve these instructional objectives, a model of instructional procedure is suggested. According to this procedure, the teacher begins to ask students to present their experiences of being happy with hard work and of being blamed for laziness. The teacher asks them why they are happy with hard work. With this preparation, the teacher is then to proceed his/her talk with students about the story. Let me show this procedure as provided since our understanding of this procedure is very helpful in understanding the rest of the suggested classroom activities.

On the basis of the story, the teacher asks students the following questions and lets them present their responses.
- What kind of person is the father?
  . He is diligent.
  . He worries about his lazy sons.
- What kind of persons are the three sons?
  . They do not like to work hard.
  . They are lazy people.
- What does the father usually ask of his sons?
  , He asks them to work hard.
  . Do work instead of playing.
- What is the final word of the father?
  . To find and equally share the treasure which he hid inside the orchard.

Teacher makes students to talk about what is realized by the three sons.
- Work is important in our life.
- Father was a really good father.
- They should work hard for one another(KME, 1982a, Grade 3, p. 57).

As a concluding step of this activity, it is suggested that "the teacher makes students know the reason why they should work diligently in their daily life and asks them to present examples of what they can do" (p. 57). For this activity, "to clean their home," "to help family affairs" in their family life and "to clean classroom," "to help other students in trouble," "to study hard," etc. are listed as examples. At the end of this activity, some test items in terms of which the teacher can evaluate students' performance with this procedure of activities are suggested in a multiple-choice form. The following test item is suggested as an example for the second instructional objective, i.e., "to list concrete examples of working diligently."

- Select one who is not a person of diligence.
  (a) One who works continuously until s/he finishes his/her work.
  (b) One who finds and does his/her work before others ask to do it.

(c) One who neither postpones work nor ascribes it to others.
(d) One who chooses and does only what s/he likes to do (KME, 1982a, Grade 3, p. 61).

If we recollect the sequential arrangement of the basic components of moral education, the selection of the topic in this activity as "diligence or sincerity," seems to correspond to the idea that the internalization and habituation of moral norms should be emphasized for younger students. Actually, most activities at the Primary School level focus on the 'basic virtues.' This idea, as succinctly epitomized in Table 2 (see p. 95), is systematically translated into activities throughout grade levels. The main topics of classroom activities are expressed in more abstract and general terms in accordance with the increment of school level.

However, our question here is how these topics are suggested to be dealt with in the classroom. Let me examine the suggested procedure of the actual classroom activities. At a glance, it appears to be faithful to 'student-centered' education as advocated in terms of the 'human centered' education in the present curriculum of Korea. Unlike the traditional mode of student-teacher interaction where there was little space for students' active participation, all activities appear to be proceeding on the basis of students' active participation, "to help students form a sound morality" (KME, 1982a, p. 4) as claimed in the present Moral Education Curriculum as the basic task of moral education. The teacher asks students to express their own experiences related to the topic. S/he asks students questions concerning the interests of the given text and helps them to make a conclusion. And s/he allows them to relate their own conclusion to their daily life and encourages them to practise it. This seems to be the underlying logic embedded in all classroom activities across all grade levels within the orientation of 'human centered' education. What is wrong with this logic? There seems to be little space for us to make this logic itself problematic when we understand it merely at an abstract level. This may be one of the most dangerous aspects of abstraction when it is understood without its dialectic connection to the concrete. Hence, we need to see what is really happening with this logic.

Let us look at the introductory step, where the teacher asks for students' experiences related to the topic of 'diligence or sincerity,' or more concretely 'working.' We may not deny the significance of students' own experiences of working in their understanding of the topic. What is to be questioned here is the way of dealing with them. In asking students their experiences in terms of happiness in hard work and of being blamed for their laziness, the meaning of students' experiences of working is already predetermined: hard working is always desirable and students should feel happy about it, whereas playing, identified with laziness, is undesirable and, therefore, should be blamed. This presupposition tends to lead both teacher and students to interpret their experiences in a predetermined way instead of trying to understand its real meaning with openness. Moreover, according to the presupposed meaning of working, students should feel happy with hard work, regardless of their real feeling. In most cases, students, especially younger students, do not interpret work and play in the same way that adults usually interpret them (King, 1984). In spite of this, to impose on them a way of interpreting their experiences in a predetermined manner tends to make them separate what they do in the classroom from what they have really experienced. We may be able to see here that what is really happening in the introductory step is to reduce their experiences in a particular form which is conducive for the predetermined instructional objectives. This tends to lead both students and teachers to reduce students' real and full experiences to particular topics instead of understanding them within a wider life context of their real experiences.

The second step is actually proceeding with little connection with the first step. If we understand the purpose of the introductory step as making students believe that hard work is important in students' lives and they should be happy with it regardless of their actual feelings, there may be no reason to relate the second step to students' real experiences. The second step also consists of questionings and answers, instead of the teacher's one-sided talk. But we also need to see what questions are asked and what answers are provided. If a teacher follows the suggested procedure, s/he is to ask students a series of questions from the given story: "What kind of person is the father?" "What kind of persons are the three sons?" "What does the

father usually ask of his sons?" "What is the final word of the father?" The common characteristic of these questions may be that there is a correct answer to them, if we read the story. Actually the correct answers to the questions are already provided in the suggested procedure.

In the concluding step, it is suggested that the teacher ask students why they should work hard and the practical implication of what they have learned. In this procedure, the answers are also provided such as "to clean their home," "to clean their classroom," "to study hard," etc. Thus, we can see that this step is also governed by predetermined questions and answers. This pattern of classroom interaction, where both teacher and students merely exchange the predetermined questions and answers, can be regarded as the basic underlying structure of all actual classroom activities regardless of grade levels. Of course, the main topics are different in its level of abstraction by grade levels in such a way that the higher the grade level is, the more abstract and general the topic becomes. But the actual procedures of classroom activities tend to be commonly governed by the predetermined questions and answers on the basis of given texts .

As we reflected on in the previous chapter, the foregoing way of dealing with the text reminds us of a pervasive preoccupation concerning text interpretation that there is and should be one correct meaning of a text. The underlying idea governing the suggested procedure of classroom activities can be regarded as one of the most faithful examples of this preoccupation, within which the meaning of the text - both of textbook itself and students' experiences or social realities concerning the topic in a metaphorical sense of the text - tends to be totalized in a predetermined form interpreted by experts. This preoccupation seems to be basically related to the prevailing assumption on education that the teacher should teach only such knowledge for which we can provide a correct answer, as commonly presupposed in both Tylerian and Brunerian approaches. It may be the most probable termination of both assumptions as shown in the above example of real classroom interaction that both teachers and students tend to become puppets who are merely playing the prepared roles by means of predetermined

questions and answers which are provided by expert curriculum developers. Here Giroux's characterization of the Brunerian social science model in citizenship education seems to be significantly related.

> Celebrating not the production of meaning but the consumption of "objective" meanings sanctified by experts, inquiry and skill-oriented pedagogy belies its own intentions. What appears to be discovery learning ends up as a series of pedagogical methods in which knowledge is depoliticized and objectively "fixed." Having limited possibilities to question the conditions under which knowledge is socially constructed, the social science model of citizenship education ignores both the social constraints that distort knowledge and the connection between knowledge and social control (1983a, pp. 332-333).

It seems significant in this context to remind ourselves that there is and can be no one correct interpretation of a text and that any text is no more than an interpretation of reality and it can never be the reality itself, as embedded in the temporal and incomplete nature of our understanding. This leads us to recognize that any interpretation of a text presupposes our own experiences of reality itself. In spite of this, to proceed with the classroom activities by means of prepared sets of questions and answers is not merely experientially dubitable but also morally questionable. The real strength of narrative texts, such as the story used in the above example, may lie in their fullness of metaphorical meaning, the deep meaning of which can be understood in a diverse and concrete way on the basis of one's own life experience. Nevertheless, to focus merely on the factual information and its instrumental utility for a given instructional objective, as suggested in the above procedure, tends to prevent both teacher and students from examining its deep and full meaning with relation to their living context.

In our effort to understand the suggested procedure of classroom activities, the underlying rationality of the 'instructional objectives' and the evaluation of them cannot be ignored. It is in the previous example of classroom activity on 'diligence or sincerity' that the instructional objectives of the activity are provided at the beginning and the examples of evaluation items for instructional objectives are also provided at the end of the activity in a multiple-choice form. This tends to be common in almost all the suggested procedures for classroom activities regardless of grade levels. They tend to be expressed in a more specified and sophisticated form at the Middle and High School levels. For example, the instructional

objectives of the activity dealing with the topic of 'human character' at the third grade of Middle school, are stated as follows:

1. To know the correct meaning of human character.
   1-1. To speak correctly about the meaning of human character as distinctive from human characteristic.
   1-2. To explain with examples that each individual has his/her own character.
   1-3. To explain with examples that everybody has a different distinctive characteristic.
2. To understand the meaning of the desirable human character and to make efforts to attain it.
   .....
3. To know the mutually evaluative features of human character and to endeavour sincerely to cultivate one's character.
   ..... (KME, 1982b, Grade 3, p. 37).

Examples of test items for these instructional objectives are also suggested at the end of the activity. For the instructional objective 1-1, for example, the following test item is suggested as an example.

- What aspects of a person are we really talking about if we say, "How can a person as a human being do such an act!" when we see him/her do a morally unacceptable act?
  (1) one's uniqueness
  (2) one's characteristic
  (3) one's human character
  (4) one's standard of act (p. 45)

We would not deny the educational objective or evaluation itself. In the actual classroom instruction, to recall the main focus or purpose of the educational activity usually tends to allow teachers and students to reflect on where they are and where they are going, and it also often provides them with a common place to participate in. Evaluation is, too, not only inevitable but also can be helpful to reflect on the real values of educational activities and to improve the quality of interaction in the future. What we are questioning here are: In what form and for what purpose are these instructional objectives and evaluations suggested and actually used? What is their underlying rationality? Where would such rationality lead education?

Here, we need to scrutinize, in a concrete way, the relations among the main content or focus of classroom activities such as 'diligence or sincerity' or 'human character,' the specified instructional objectives and evaluation items. If we look at the above example dealing with

'human character,' it can be recognized that 'human character,' as the main topic of this activity, is reduced or more precisely torn out as the manageable and testable pieces. In this procedure, we can see the inseparable relation between instructional objectives and evaluation items as pointed by Hongwoo Lee (1974) when he characterizes both the 'objectives model' and 'evaluative model' as different sides of the same Tylerian coin. The underlying assumptions implied in this procedure of reduction of the educational content to the testable pieces may be that the truth of the world is to be stated in a propositional form which can be logically or empirically verified as positivists believe, and that only testable correct knowledge should be taught in the classroom. The adoption of these assumptions on knowledge and education may be closely related to the administrative or managerial interest for effective total control of educational outcomes since it may be hardly possible or at least difficult to control the outcomes of classroom activities unless the objectives of classroom interaction can be specified in testable form; the more precisely the instructional objectives are specified, the more effectively the outcomes of education can be controlled, as if a factory manager can exert his/her control over workers most effectively when the duties of the workers are prescribed in a measurable form as precisely as possible. This idea is one of the most commonly accepted assumptions in the Tylerian community since it was introduced by Bobbit in 1920s. Bobbit himself expressed this managerial interest embedded in the specification of instructional objectives as follows:

> There is a growing realization within the educational profession that we must particularize the objectives of education. We, too, must institutionalize foresights, and so far as condition of our work will permit, develop a technique of predetermination of the particularized results to be obtained (in Kliebard, 1975a, p. 60).

The reduction of the content of education activities to testable instructional objectives as commonly suggested in all the classroom actiyities seems to be basically corresponding to this idea. However, it seems to be helpful to look at the social reality of the curriculum field where the Tylerian idea is still prevalent not merely in the academic community but especially in the actual procedures of curriculum development as we have seen in the previous parts. The pervasive taken-for-granted acceptance of the Tylerian rationality especially among curriculum

developers seems to make them construct the actual procedures of classroom activities on the basis of their habitual way of actual curriculum development no matter how curriculum orientation has changed. This shows how deeply the Tylerian rationality has penetrated curriculum practice in Korea and that the change of curriculum merely at the orientation level or conceptual level can hardly be translated into concrete classroom activities.

However, our concern here is with the possible danger of the reduction of educational activities to testable instructional objectives. For this, we need to look at the relationship between instructional objectives and the construction of classroom activities again. In the above example of 'human character,' to understand human character or the nature of ourselves can be regarded as the main focus of this activity. However, if we look at the instructional objectives, it can be seen that human character is torn out into testable pieces such as 'to know the correct meaning of desirable human character' in terms of instructional objectives. To check whether students achieve this objective, they are tested by means of multiple-choice test items. If they can choose the correct answer in the text, this instructional objective is regarded as being achieved. This is also the basic idea of Bloomian mastery learning model. Our questions here are: Does a student really understand the correct meaning of desirable human character when s/he selects the correct answer in the test item, based on the answer provided in the text book? Can the meaning of desirable human character defined in the textbook be regarded as the absolutely correct meaning of human character? Can the meaning of ourselves be the sum of the fragmented pieces as torn out in the instructional objectives? More crucially, can we provide any final answer to the question of who we are? If we can, what is it to be?

Here, it may be worthwhile to think of the real danger of the specification of educational knowledge, as pointed out by Kliebard (1975a):

> Educational products manufactured at such a level of particularity, even if multiplied a millionfold, could not only be trivial. History (assuming that history is the discipline represented by these performance outcomes) simply is not the accurate recitation of bits and pieces of information. Nor is any discipline a specific finite assemblage of facts and skills. So to define is to trivialize it (pp. 66-67).

It cannot be denied that there is such knowledge which can be correct like factual information.

What we need to consider is that there are other spheres of knowledge which are difficult to understand but which are not only inevitable but also valuable in our lives. In spite of this, to assume that in education only correct knowledge should be taught and to construct all the classroom activities on the basis of this assumption, can lead us either to negate any attempt to understand the latter sphere of knowledge in education or to reduce it to a particular prejudice maintained by a group of experts. By reduction of all the classroom activities to the testable instructional objectives, the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea, at the practical level, tends to lead to the second direction where both teacher and students become puppets who are merely repeating the correct answers provided by experts to unanswerable questions, in spite of the enthusiastic attempt to go beyond the 'fragmentary knowledge' centered education or 'virtue-items' approach to moral education at the conceptual level.

In order to understand what likely happens in the moral education classroom, we critically examined the suggested classroom activities with concrete examples. In this effort, we noted that the procedure of actual classroom activities are dominantly governed by the Tylerian rationality as embedded in the specified instructional objectives and the evaluation of these objectives by means of the multiple-choice test on the basis of the assumption that the only testable correct set of knowledge should be taught in the classroom. Although, in the procedure of classroom activities, students' active participation in the classroom interaction appears to be emphasized through the exchange of questions and answers, we came to understand that what was actually exchanged was the predetermined set of questions and answers provided by the experts. Such classroom activities tends to lead both teachers and students to become puppets who are playing prepared roles provided by experts, preventing them from understanding the rich and full meaning of classroom knowledge with relation to their living context.

G. Reflection: Underlying Rationality and Related Questions

In this chapter, we endeavored to disclose the meaning of morality and moral education embedded in the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea in terms of its significant features. To deepen our understanding in this process, we tried to make its underlying rationality more sensible, situating it in a wider social and historical context of the curriculum field in Korea. We also tried to relate the claimed ideas to actual curriculum practice to see how the abstract thoughts are translated into actual classroom activities and to disclose the rationality predominantly governing this procedure. For our further understanding of the meaning of morality and moral education embedded in the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea, it seems to be worthwhile to reflect on the basic rationality underlying the whole procedure of curriculum development and its problems concerning moral education. For this, let me re-examine the features we have seen.

Concerning the feature of the questioning of the 'virtue-items' approach, the basic aporia of the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea can be understood as the recognition of the chronic problem of the 'virtue-items' approach to moral education and an attempt to go beyond it. It regards the early moral education curriculum as the most faithful example of this approach and objects to it in terms of its unacceptibility as moral education since this approach requires students to follow and practise fragmentary 'virtue-items' in a blind way leading students to be slaves of 'virtue-items.' To go beyond this problem of the previous moral education, the present curriculum advocates the cultivation of 'moral character' as the goal of moral education.

Thus, we dealt with the 'emphasis on moral character based on moral principles' as a feature. In the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea, 'moral character' is understood in terms of moral principles. According to this characterization, a person of moral character is conceived as s/he who has integrated moral principles and practises them consistently without conflicts. But with this understanding of morality, as we have noted, there is aroused a fundamental dilemma in moral education under the taken-for-granted assumption that only

correct knowledge should be taught in education; we have to teach students to have correct answers to moral questions or problems, otherwise any substantial content of morality such as, virtues, moral norms, moral rules, etc., cannot be regarded as universally right. How can this dilemma be overcome?

An attempt to overcome this dilemma in the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea is made by assuming a certain hierarchical order among moral principles as we examined in its characterization of moral character. This dilemma can no longer be regarded as a real dilemma, if we can accept that there is an absolute hierarchical order among moral principles. But we noted that this assumption is untenable under the above assumption that only verifiable knowledge should be taught in moral education. For, most moral knowledge can neither be likened to such knowledge which can be empirically or logically verifiable nor can there be any final moral principles, such as Kant's 'categorical imperatives' or Kohlberg's 'principles of justice,' which are supposed to provide the precise hierarchical order to all the moral principles.

The other attempt to deal with the above delimma is also made by assuming a universally right formal structure of moral reasoning, as we dealt with it as a feature which invites us to the whole world of moral reasoning. This assumption appears to be more plausible since it stands on the recognition of the above dilemma. It may also be possible to resolve this dilemma if the claimed procedure of moral reasoning can be accepted as universally right. But, in the process of disclosing this idea, we came to recognize that it takes its ground from the methodological ideal of the positivistic scientists, in which the only rigorous method or, more precisely, the technique of hypothetico-deductive type of thinking like that of the positivistic scientists, does and should guarantee the righteousness of our moral reasoning as well as moral acts no matter what we think and do in actual moral situations. This assumption also cannot be regarded as tenable since it stands on the experientially dubitable as well as morally questionable ground which intends to delegitimate other ways to approach the real world by means of the positivistic scientists' methodological ideal.

In the process of actual construction and arrangement of the main elements of moral education curriculum, which we have seen as a feature, the ideas advocated at the abstract level tend to be transformed under the 'whole person' approach or 'human-centered' education in consideration of practical demands or of social realities - more specifically the reality of academic society - of Korea where the Tylerian rationality is widely prevailing in curriculum development as well as in curriculum thought. It may be helpful here to recall that most efforts for a critical examination of the Brunerian rationality have been made on the basis of the taken-for-granted acceptance of the Tylerian rationality. Thus, in the actual construction of basic components of moral education, this realistic reconciliation has occurred in the direction of the balanced emphasis on both 'habituation' and 'internalization' of social norms and 'moral judgmental ability.' These basic components of moral education are sequentially arranged by grade levels, i.e., the former is more emphasized in the lower grades and the latter is more emphasized in the upper grades following the Piagetian and Kohlbergian theory on the moral development of children.

In the construction of concrete classroom activities, which we regarded as a feature in the sense that it discloses the world of morality and moral education at a concrete level, we noted that the whole procedure of the given activities tend to be governed by the Tylerian approach as expressed by the specification of instructional objectives and of corresponding evaluation of expected educational outcomes. In the corresponding evaluation of students' moral acts, the 'standardized tests' are suggested as the ideal form to maintain the 'reliability' and 'objectivity' in teachers' evaluation of students' moral acts, regarding it as the "commonly agreed suggestion by present educational scholars" (KME, 1982a, p. 17). We also noted in the suggested procedure of concrete classroom interaction that students' real experiences of the topic tend to be reduced to the predetermined frame of interpretation and that the process of questioning and answering is also mainly governed by the prepared set of questions and answers based on the assumption that there is, and should be, one correct meaning of a given text.

At this moment of our reflection, one may ask how it is possible that two approaches, in spite of their conflicting characteristics, cooperate in the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea, especially in the actual curriculum organization and classroom activities. One answer to this question can be made by addressing the 'whole person' approach or 'human-centered' education as the general orientation of the present curriculum of Korea. But, as we we have seen, the characterization of the present curriculum of Korea in terms of the 'whole person' approach or 'human centered' education itself is superficial. What seems to be decisive in this collaboration, as implied in our previous reflection, is that both Tylerian and Kohlbergian approaches are offsprings of the same 'technocratic rationality,' which prevails deeply not only in the contemporary education field but also in almost all areas of human life. Giroux (1983b) characterized this rationality as dominantly governing contemporary educational thought and practice as follows:

> (1) Educational theory should operate in the interests of law-like propositions which are empirically testable.
> (2) The natural scientists provide the 'proper' model of explanation of the concepts and techniques of educational theory, design, and evaluation.
> (3) Knowledge should be objective and capable of being described in neutral fashion. Knowledge in this form of rationality is reduced to those concepts and 'facts' that can be operationally defined.
> (4) Finally, educators can and must separate statements of value from the 'facts' and 'mode of inquiry,' which ought to be objective (p. 412-413).

Of course, Giroux's characterization may be no more than pointing some basic manifestations of this rationality which have been dominating not only in contemporary education, but also in modern intellectual history. The fundamental assumptions of this rationality can be captured by the mechanistic and instrumental views of both the natural and human world and their relations. And its underlying interest can be characterized by total control or manipulation of the world as envisaged by Habermas in his characterization of the cognitive interest embedded in the empirical-analytic sciences (Habermas, 1972; with relation to education, see Macdonald, 1975; Aoki, 1980; 1982).

If we look at the underlying beliefs in both Tylerian and Kohlbergian approaches to moral education, it may not be difficult to recognize how this technocratic rationality deeply

prevails. Of course, these two approaches cannot be equated at a surface level. In the Tylerian approach, as we have seen previously, the content of moral education as particularized into a set of standardized testable objectives is emphasized, whereas in the Kohlbergian approach, a particular kind of thinking technique as universalized in terms of the formal structure of moral reasoning, is emphasized. Nevertheless, they can be regarded as different sides of the same coin, i.e., technocratic ideology (Kliebard, 1975a; Aoki, 1982; Giroux, 1981; 1983a), since both stand on the belief that theories as objectified through particularized technique by experts are prior to the actual life or reality and that moral education aims at effective total control of students in terms of a standardized set of moral acts in the Tylerian approach or a standardized form of moral reasoning in the Kohlbergian approach. This may be the most dominant ideology in modern intellectual history as manifested in the positivistic sciences. The present Moral Education Curriculum seems to be one of the most faithful examples of this ideology, as expressed explicitly:

> ...ethics and sociology provide the ground what should be taught and why they should be taught in moral education. But, to decide when and how they should be taught, we cannot but rely on psychological theories. It is difficult in Korea to find a verified psychological principle about students since no systematic theory on students has been developed yet. However, the research outcomes of foreign countries suggest more or less universal principles which provide us with significant guidelines for moral education in Korea (KME, 1982b, p. 9).

> Unless students' behaviors can be controlled by means of moral education, it is nothing but an incomplete education which can cultivate merely incomplete human beings. Schooling, therefore, must be recognized and planned with this character [effective total control of students' moral behavior] of moral education (KME, 1982a, p. 5).

What can be detected in the above passages may be 'academic imperialism' which is prevailing in contemporary society, 'academic colonialism' which seems to be the natural course when the former is applied to developing countries, and the interest of total control of the society by means of education. In this sense, it may not be regarded merely an exaggeration that the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea can be likened to the mixture of both Tylerian and Kohlbergian wine within the technocratic bag which is predominantly governing contemporary curriculum thought and practice. This may allow us to understand how it could

be possible in the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea that the apparently conflicting two approaches collaborate together.

However, our main concern here is not merely to characterize the underlying rationality embedded in the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea, but that, with such rationality, how the meanings of morality and moral education are manifested and where such assumptions would lead moral education. As implied in our previous reflection, in the technocratic rationality, morality is understood in terms of fixed law-like propositions which are verifiable and thus universal. In the Tylerian approach, this idea is manifested in terms of the content of morality, i.e., traditional moral virtues, moral norms, or moral rules are torn out into testable and controllable pieces, whereas, in the Kohlbergian approach, morality is manifested in terms of the formal-logical structure of moral reasoning, the correctness of which depends on whether or not it is empirically verifiable. The underlying interest is control of students by means of the particularized standards of moral acts in the Tylerian approach and by means of the standardized methodological ideal of positivistic science in the Kohlbergian approach. In the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea where both rationalities tend to be compromised, morality is understood in terms of law-like propositions in both substantial content of morality and formal structure of moral reasoning. The underlying interest can be understood as control of students in both what they believe and how they believe. In both approaches, the internal moral consciousness of the individual person tends to be totally rejected, or at least overlooked.

If we follow this rationality, how can knowledge or moral knowledge be understood? Within the technocratic rationality, knowledge tends to be viewed as a fixed set of 'facts' or 'concepts' which are claimed to be objective and universal. But, as we have seen, most of the substantial contents of morality which have been traditionally believed as the important constituents of moral knowledge cannot be acceptable as objective moral knowledge in this rationality, since they do not satisfy the positivistic epistemological conditions for true knowledge. Thus, it may be the most possible corollary of this rationality that moral knowledge

is either to be fractionized into testable and manageable pieces of action as attempted in the Tylerian approach, or to be reduced to the particular set of universalized formal principles of moral reasoning like the hypothetico-deductive kind of thinking techniques in the Kohlbergian approach. In each approach, whether or not a moral knowledge can be regarded acceptable tends to be decided in different ways. Nevertheless, what is common in both is that the acceptability of moral knowledge depends on a certain kind of impersonal authority: impersonal social or political authority in the Tylerian approach and professional or experts' authority in the Kohlbergian approach, and that the correct sets of moral knowledge are predetermined by those impersonal authorities before entering into educational practice. Thus, within technocratic rationality, both teachers and students tend to be totally alienated from the examination and production of moral knowledge. In the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea, where both approaches are collaborated, it tends to be regarded as taken-for-granted that moral knowledge deserving to be taught in the school depends on either impersonal socio-political or professional authority.

This technocratic belief of the meaning of morality and moral knowledge already implies a certain kind of assumption on the nature of human being, society, and their relations. Within the technocratic rationality, the personal concrete experience and lived meaning tend to be surpassed by the impersonalized, totalized, and objectified experiences and meanings which are usually represented by a group of rulers, experts, or the collaboration of both, for total control of people by means of a beautified and sophisticated rhetoric. For this purpose, it may be convenient and even necessary to assume that children as well as ordinary adults are by nature inferior, ignorant, and immoral, who must be controlled by the politically or professionally dominant group. It may be essential in this context to regard children as Lockean *tabula rasa*, or more precisely as raw materials, which should be shaped or molded in such a way as to satisfy the need of the particular group masked by the abstract and ambiguous rhetoric of the total utility or benefits of society or state. Here, we also need to note a particularized meaning of the society in this rationality, which presupposes it as a mechanical

totality. The living dialectic meaning of the society as a living community, which nourishes its individual members and is also nourished by its individual members, is totally neglected in this belief. Instead, society and state are objectified and reified as a big machine which works only for the needs or benefits of the owner. Thus, the individual is viewed as an instrumental part of the machine and morality or virtue of the individual is equated either to correct roles or functions, as a part of the machine in the Tylerian approach, or to correct procedural principles governing these roles or functions in the Kohlbergian approach. In the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea where both approaches tend to cooperate on the basis of the technocratic rationality, it may be no more strange to regard students as raw materials who can and should be shaped in order to make correct functionaries of a huge machine in the future.

It may not be difficult to grasp how the meaning of education and moral education can be understood in this rationality. According to the technocratic rationality, as logically followed from the previous assumptions on the meanings of morality, moral knowledge, students, society and their relations, education is likened to an important sub-part of a huge machine. Thus, it is essential for schooling to operate correctly and effectively in accordance with both fixed roles and functions as suggested by the Tylerian model, or prepared procedural rules or principles as justified by the Kohlbergian model. In this mode of education, students are regarded as nothing but raw materials, whose roles and functions are to be determined by the purports of the huge machine. The whole process of education is equated to the mechanical procedure which is governed by the impersonalized and absolutized huge system. Hence, the fundamental aim of education becomes the reproduction of the preplanned outcomes, and the underlying interest can be captured as effective management or control of students, in terms of predetermined instructional objectives. Within this rationality, teachers are regarded as important. But their roles and functions tend to be particularized as managers, monitors, or controllers of a given system, and the personal experience and meaning of teaching tend to be totally neglected under the mask of 'objectivity' or 'value-neutrality' of teaching. Thus the roles and functions of a teacher are also prepared and controlled on the basis of the impersonal

purports of the huge machine, and the teacher's autonomy and personal pedagogical commitment in his/her act of teaching tend to be extremly limited. It may be an inevitable manifested face of this rationality that both teachers and students become puppets who are merely verbalizing the provided questions and answers in daily classroom interactions.

Reflecting upon our experience of ordinary moral life, we would not deny that both moral knowledge and moral reasoning are always involved in our moral judgements and acts. This may be also true in the ordinary situation of communication on moral problems or issues including pedagogical situations. What is to be questioned here is the appropriateness of the particular manipulation of them in the prevailing technocratic framework, where moral knowledge is reduced to a system of law-like propositions and moral reasoning is specified as a hypothetico-deductive type of thinking technique. Of course, there may be a world to which this framework can be appropriately applied, i.e., the world of invented things like machines, the values and functions of which can be precisely predetermined. But it may be ontologically dubitable as well as morally questionable to assume that this framework can and should be applied to the human world, since the *telos* and the meaning of the world can neither be totally predetermined nor can they be objects of arbitrary manipulation by means of ordered functions or roles. Rather, the meanings of our lives, our society and ourselves are in the realm of infinitude, the fixations of which can never be free from the incomplete and temporal characteristic of our understanding, since they are related to our hopes, imaginations, aspirations, and humanity instead of reified fixed rules or sophisticated thinking techniques.

Our moral knowledge and moral reasoning are also concerned with this realm of reality rather than with artificial things. Puka (1976) seems to point out this character of morality when he writes that:

> People imaginatively form a view of the people they would like to be or the society they would like to have and in various ways pursue these ideals. They are called dreamers and fanatics to the degree that their goals surpass the realm of probable or even possible attainment by normal even exceptional people.... Morality cannot be determined by fact.... Morality is rather a matter of creative imagination linked to complexes of self-interest, socialization, superstition, overoptimism or cynicism, striving or insecurity, hope and joy, or self-hate and masochism (p. 63).

To take a simple example, if we acclaim a person who hands a purse found in a street to the original owner, this may be neither because s/he keeps moral rules nor because everybody acts like that, but because this expresses a world where we hope to live, a human being who we affirm to be, and an act which expresses humanity. It may be wrong, or at least simplemindedness, to assume that any reliable moral knowledge should be expressed in the form of precise law-like propositions, and to devalue or even totally deny traditional moral knowledge, as historical sediments of moral experiences, which tends to be expressed in an ambiguous or even contradictory form, merely because of its lack of precision or unverifiability by means of the positivistic methodological ideal. It may also be inappropriate to assume that the hypothetico-deductive type of reasoning or calculative mathematical kind of reasoning, like that of computers, should be regarded as the only reliable form of reasoning, and that our hopes, beliefs, or emotions are irrational which can never be communicated and thus are meaningless and trivial. For, in this assumption, the primordial dialectic relation between reasoning and emotion as signified in the origin of the Korean word ' *sangkag* (thinking)' from '*sarang* (love),' is totally missed. Although it is theoretically possible to posit thoughtless emotion and emotionless thinking, both are neither practically possible nor morally acceptable, since the former may be nothing but impulsive emotion and the latter is mechanical thinking. It is always possible, as our experience speaks to us, that emotion nourishes thinking, giving energy and direction to our thinking, and thinking also nourishes emotion, allowing endless enhancement of our emotion.

Nevertheless, modern intellectual history tends to be dominated by the tendency of narrowing, or more precisely mechanization, of our reasoning. Arendt (1971) seems to provide us with a succinct description of this tendency:

> With the rise of the modern age, thinking became chiefly the hand maiden of science, of organized knowledge, and even though thinking then grew extremely active, following modernity, crucial conviction that I can know only what I myself make, it was mathematics, the non-empirical science par excellence, wherein the mind appears to play with itself, that turned out to be the Science of sciences, delivering the key to those laws of nature and the universe that are concealed by appearances (p. 7).

This tendency has not been limited to the field of natural sciences but it has also been

dominating in the realm of philosophy as well as of the social sciences. Even in the field of moral philosophy this tendency of mechanization of our reasoning has also been prevalent in its modern history as culminated by 'emotivism.' According to emotivism, any attempt to search for reliable moral knowledge and judgement is to be abolished and thus our moral discourse and moral concerns become trivialized and meaningless since moral statements are nothing but the expression of the private feelings or emotions which cannot be verified and thus are no longer statements (Stevenson, 1945; Ayer, 1946). We would not deny that our moral judgements are closely related to our personal feelings or emotions, such as our hope, care, or love of our children, our society and ourselves which may be hardly verifiable in terms of the positivistic methodological ideals. But also, it cannot be acceptable to assume that the knowledge which can be verified by the empirical-analytic means is the only reliable and valuable kind of knowledge. This may be nothing but the "prejudice against prejudices," as Gadamer points out, which attempts to absolutize the positivistic kind of knowledge and reasoning and to delegitimate all other kinds.

It seems to be right in this context of modern intellectual history that Debrock (1976) sees the "almost lawful relationship between scientific knowledge and man's moral consciousness: the greater his scientific knowledge, the smaller his ethical certainty" (p. 3). Prichard (1967) also seems to point rightly when he claims that modern moral philosophy "rests on a mistake, and on a mistake parallel to that on which rests...the subject usually called the Theory of Knowledge" (p. 526). This tendency of narrowing or mechanization of moral knowledge and moral reasoning as well as our world and life in modern intellectual history, can be regarded as the most serious abyss in our contemporary understanding of morality and moral education. Green (1983) points out the problem of this tendency in our age as follows:

> ... in the post-industrial technological society (responsible not merely for a murderous war but for the first nuclear holocaust in human history), sciences lost their innocence and their humanity as well. 'Technological' or 'functional' rationality had replaced what was once thought of as scientific or experimental intelligence; the growth of positivism had split values from empirical inquiry and technical expertise. The increasing potent mass media was reinforcing a false public consciousness of an independently existent, predefined "reality," which then become no longer susceptible to ordinary interpretation or to change (p. 3).

It can be said in this sense that the technocratic rationality in which the present Moral Education Curriculum dwells is not merely a unique Korean phenomenon but is a manifestation of a wider shadow of the pervasive ideology prevailing in contemporary post-industrial technological societies.

It seems to be significantly related in this context that Aristotle disclosed the fundamental difference of moral knowledge from theoretical knowledge as well as from technical knowledge. According to Aristotle, moral knowledge belongs to the sphere of *praxis*, practical knowledge of *phronesis*, which is different from *theoria*, theoretical knowledge of *episteme*, in the sense that the latter, as represented by the model of mathematics, is unchangeable and depends on proof. Rather, moral knowledge can be seen closer to *poiesis*, technical knowledge of *techne*, which is, as exemplified by the knowledge of craftsmen, always related to experience and its concrete application, and hence it cannot be exactly like mathematics. But this does not mean that moral knowledge is exactly the same as the technical knowledge of craftsmen in the sense that we do not apply moral knowledge to a practical situation in exactly the same way that craftsmen use technical knowledge in making specific things. Unlike technical knowledge, moral knowledge is self-knowledge which we already know before learning as well as that which is what we are to be. Moreover, unlike the former which aims at making or production of specific things, the purpose of the latter is to govern one's action to which s/he belongs. In the sphere of moral knowledge, there can be no fixed right means or end in advance, but it always requires a self-deliberation or modification in the concrete practical moral situation. These distinctive characteristics and the real values of moral knowledge are succinctly expressed by Gadamer (1982) as follows:

> Moral knowledge is really a knowledge of a special kind. It embraces in a curious way both means and end and hence differs from technical knowledge [as well as theoretical knowledge]. That is why it is pointless to distinguish here between knowledge and experience, as can be done in the case of *techne*. For moral knowledge must be a kind of experience, and in fact... this is perhaps the fundamental form of experience, compared with which all other experience represents a denaturing (pp. 287-288).

In spite of the living characteristics and values of moral knowledge, as our historical sediments of moral experience, if we attempt to understand morality and moral education on

the basis of technocratic rationality, it may be inevitable that we are doomed to end with failure, which will lead us to either totalization of ourselves as functionaries for objectified and impersonalized purports of society on the side of system as attempted in the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea, or total annihilation of our genuine moral concern and destructive anarchistic indulgence into unreflected egotistic interests on the side of individual, as attempted in Simon's values clarification approach. This is what we envisaged in our previous reflection on the prevailing instrumental perspective on moral education (chap. 2). This implies that we need to go beyond the prevailing technocratic rationality if we can not regard such a world as what we as well as our children are to live and hope to be. Here, the "going beyond" should not be understood as if we need to invent another theory or concept about our life and ourselves. Rather it is to be understood as our endless endeavour to re-discover our world and ourselves and to re-affirm humanity itself, even though there can be no final termination of this effort.

V. Reflection: Toward a Re-Affirmation of Humanity

In Korean, the act of inquiry is signified by the word *hak-mun*. This word, which can be translated into English as "study" or "inquiry" (in both senses of act and product), consists of two Chinese characters, *hak* (學 : learning) and *mun* (問 : questioning). According to this etymological meaning, to *hakmun* means "learning through questioning." But the constituents of the letter *mun*, questioning, which consists of two elements, *mun* (門 : gate, door) and *ku* (口 : mouth, hole) seem to symbolize a deeper layer of the act of inquiry. What does it mean for us to study or to inquire into the world of morality and moral education in this study? This world may be already here and there in or with us as an ambiguous whole in a pre-reflective and pre-linguistic form, as Heidegger symbolized as *Dasein*. In order to make it understandable, we consciously enter into the world through a gate which comes to us by our questioning.

But, once we enter into the world, we find its infinitude which is far beyond our reach. Here arises a fundamental dilemma in the act of our inquiry. The understanding of the whole world can never be complete in a given moment of time or even at the end of our life. But we, as temporal beings, cannot postpone our lives until we understand the world completely. So, it may be inevitable for us to finish our journey at a certain moment even though it is still incomplete and, therefore, unsatisfactory. This may be what is disclosed about the nature of our inquiry, as symbolized by the etymological meaning of the Korean word, *hakmun*. It can be said in this sense of inquiry that there can be no final ending of inquiry, and that any ending of an inquiry can never be free from the infinite nature of our understanding. This also signifies that, like the endless dialectic between our preunderstanding and new understanding, the closing moment of an inquiry already contains the new opening moment of another inquiry. This may be the very moment where we are now standing in this study. As an effort to lead ourselves to the exit of this study (at the same time, this exit can be a new entrance of our next journey),

let me begin with my reflection on what we have seen in this study.

A. Reflection on the Historical Moment in Our Understanding of Morality and Moral Education

In this study, we endeavoured to understand the meaning of morality and moral education embedded in the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea. In this process, we have noted that to understand a text is neither to identify and agree with the claimed meaning proposed by the text, nor to criticize and deny it. Rather, the main task in our effort to understand a text must be seen as a searching for a proper place of the proposed world of a text within the possible total world, situating it in a wider context. In this task, as we have seen, our preunderstanding is not only unavoidable but also important in the sense that it protects us from limiting our understanding to the proposed world of the text and thus from being encaved in it, and that our awareness of it allows us to move beyond both my and the text's horizons. This implies that our understanding of a text cannot be separated from our self-understanding of the world to which the text addresses.

For our deeper understanding of the meaning of morality and moral education embedded in the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea, we tried to disclose its characteristic features with respect to the proposed meaning of morality and moral education. In this effort, we attempted to uncover the underlying rationality on which the present Moral Education stands, by trying to situate it in the social and historical context of the curriculum field of Korea as well as of the contemporary curriculum field in general, and by relating it to the actual curriculum development and to the concrete classroom situation, in order to concretize and deepen our understanding of the world of morality and moral education proposed by the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea. We also examined the underlying rationality dominantly governing the whole procedure, from the adoption of a general curriculum orientation to the construction of the actual classroom activities, and we have reflected on the fundamental problems of this rationality with relation to our questions

concerning the meaning of morality and moral education.

In our effort to disclose the meaning of morality and moral education embedded in the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea, one of the most significant points noted was the decisiveness of the transformative power of 'technocratic rationality' in which our whole understanding of the world, human beings, and human life, as well as morality and moral education, is changed in a crucial way. We could not deny the significance of the ideas advocated in the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea such as: the 'whole person' approach or 'human centered' education; the necessity of understanding morality and moral education as a whole; the emphasis on moral reasoning as well as on practising the moral act on the basis of one's moral reasoning; and the denial of making students slaves of the objectified 'virtue-items.' But what we observed in the process of the conceptualization and translation of these ideas into the actual moral education curriculum was that once these ideas are filtered through technocratic rationality, they tend to be transformed into a particular form: moral knowledge into testable law-like propositions; moral reasoning into positivistic kinds of thinking techniques; human beings into instrumental objects; children and students into Lockean *tabula rasa* or raw materials; society and state into impersonalized mechanical system; and education into a mechanical procedure for mass-production of standardized products. In this sense, technocratic rationality, which tends to dominate not only the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea but also the contemporary curriculum field in general as disclosed by the 'banking concept' of education (Freire, 1970a) or the 'metaphor of production' in education (Kliebard, 1975b), can be likened to the 'melting pot' where everything is decisively transformed into the same raw material which is ready for artificial manipulations for the purpose of external utility.

What would happen when our understanding of the meaning of morality and moral education is utterly transformed by means of 'technocratic rationality,' as it is actually beginning to happen not only in the curriculum history of Korea but also in the modern history of curriculum? As implied in our previous reflection on this phenomenon, we can envisage two

possible directions which may lead us to an unhappy or even disastrous situation, as we can see its symptomatic phenomenon in our modern history. The first direction can be characterized in terms of the 'total mechanization' of the natural and human world, as in the Skinnerian ideal of behavioral social engineering (Skinner, 1968) or the cognitive psychologists' ideal of computerization of human being (for this ideal, see Weizenbaum, 1976, pp. 154-181). This direction tends to be dominant in the contemporary field of moral education exemplified by the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea. The most serious and disastrous aspect of this direction can be envisaged in terms of the 'death of humanity' or 'dehumanization.' Terkel (1974) shows us an example of the symptomatic phenomenon of this direction in his monumental study of daily work in America.

> For the many, there is hardly concealed discontent.... 'I am a machine,' says the spot welder. 'I'm caged,' says the bank teller, and echoes the hotel clerk. 'I am a mule,' says the steel worker. 'A monkey can do what I do,' says the receptionist. 'I am less than a farm implement,' says the migrant worker. 'I am an object,' says the high fashion model. Blue collar and white calls upon the identical phrase, 'I am a robot.' (quoted in Weizenbaum, 1976, pp. 258-259)

This may be a less disastrous situation in the sense that they are still aware of their discontent with being treated merely as machines. But it may not be difficult for us to imagine that, at the end of this direction, the expression of 'I'm a robot' itself would become meaningless if human beings are decisively transformed into nothing but machines.

The second possible direction can be characterized by the 'total negation' of morality and moral education as exemplified by naive 'liberal humanism' or 'possessive individualism' (MacPherson, 1964). Of course, in this direction, the limitations and the dehumanizing character of technocratic rationality tend to be recognized, and attempts to go beyond it are also made. Nevertheless, what is paradoxical in this direction lies in its total denial of morality and moral education. According to this direction, the meaning of morality and moral education is re-defined in negative terms; for example, morality as the orders or commands of the rulers or those who have power, and moral education as the instrumental device for effective total control over the ruled or the powerless. Thus the meaning of morality and moral education tends to be totally denied since they are no more than arbitrary inventions for gratification of

the inventors' private benefits. In this direction, therefore, morality and moral education tend to be regarded as harmful for the rest of the people. It may be the most plausible conclusion of this idea that morality and moral education are the instrumental derivatives of power struggles, and any notion of morality and moral education, therefore, tend to be denied, being regarded merely as a fundamental source of oppression and dehumanization. What is ironical here seems that the objection to oppression and dehumanization itself is, inevitably, based on the moral concern of human existence without which any effort to uncover the dehumanizing elements of contemporary society would be pointless or in vain.

Of course, this total denial of morality and moral education may be understandable when we look at human history, especially political history, where the instrumental treatment of morality and moral education has been predominant. Moreover, in contemporary society, the one-sided domination of the technocratic rationality tends to accelerate the perpetuation of this tendency as we have seen in the contemporary curriculum field. It can be said in this sense that the total denial of morality and moral education can be understood as a significant temporal counteraction against the dehumanization and oppressive character of the dominant instrumental treatment of morality and moral education. However, what is paradoxical here is that, behind the total denial of morality and moral education, there is an implicit acceptance of the eroded meaning of morality and moral education transformed by the prevailing technocratic rationality. The difference lies merely in the total denial of morality and moral education in this direction, whereas, in the first direction, they tend to be totalized and absolutized.

This tendency of 'negative reductionism,' where the meaning of morality and moral education is re-defined in negative terms and thus totally denied on the basis of this re-definition, seems not to be limited merely to the meaning of morality and moral education. It also tends to be embedded in the current understandings of the meaning of words such as 'tradition,' 'society,' 'culture,' and 'humanity.' There may never have been such a time in human history where people were more hostile towards their own traditions, society, culture, and themselves than in our age. Our understanding of these words as well as that of morality

and moral education may be in the realm of the infinitude which comes to us as a whole with both negative and positive faces. Any fixation on them cannot be free from the incompleteness and temporality of our understanding. Nevertheless, if we totally deny the meaning of morality and moral education on the basis of the negatively re-defined conceptions of them, it may prevent us from attempting to search for a true meaning of morality and moral education, the living examples of which can be inevitably found in our own lives and in our history even if these examples may be rare. The total denial of morality and moral education can also endanger us by leading us to trivialize or annihilate any effort to improve the conditions of our lives, or lead us to engage in our arbitrary manipulation of morality and moral education in terms of their instrumental utility for the gratification of unreflected self greed. This historical situation of our age calls forth our endeavour for a critical understanding of the meaning of morality and moral education in terms of our concrete life situation, going beyond the prevailing technocratic treatment of them.

B. Reflection on Our Act of Understanding

In our further efforts to understand the meaning of morality and moral education, it seems to be worthwhile for us to reflect on the nature of our act of understanding, particularly its incompleteness and never-endingness. This reminds me of an old professor with gray hair who had devoted almost all his life to study. For a beginning university student, it was not merely curious but also overwhelming that he studied so hard in spite of his wide knowledge. Where does the end of study lie? So I asked him, "As far as I know, you have studied so much and you have incomparably wide and deep knowledge. In spite of this, why do you still study so hard?" Smiling softly, he closed his eyes as if trying to reflect on his whole life. After a while, he began his talk with a traditional parable of an old woman who with a tiny bowl continuously dipped water out of the sea. "I may be like this old woman."

Of course, the act of the old woman in the parable, as well as the act of the old professor, can be interpreted in a negative way, as examples of the narcissistic self indulgence

of the disinterested intellectual who have interest not in the concrete life situation but in study only for the sake of study. But we need to note the historical place of this parable, where, unlike in the contemporary age, there was no strict separation of 'knowledge' from 'life.' As disclosed by the history of the Korean word, *alm* (앎 : knowing) which was derived from the word *salm* (삶 : living), there was a time in history that the meaning of knowledge was understood in terms of its enlightening power for human life. At that time, knowledge and the act of practising knowledge could not be ends by themselves. They were appreciated in terms of their nourishing power for human life toward the realization of its highest possibility. Thus, behind the emphasis on knowledge and on the act of practising knowledge, moral commitments to the world, our lives, and ourselves were already presupposed, i.e., the more we know about the world, human beings and ourselves, the more we come to care for them.

This may be a phenomenon not only unique to Korean or Oriental history, but also featured in Western history as well. For example, Aristotle pointed out this primordial character of knowledge and the act of inquiry when he emphasized in the *Nichomachean Ethics* that we are inquiring not in order to know what virtue is but in order to become good. Grant (1969) also pointed out the antique belief in Western history in which the meaning of knowing as well as education tended to be understood in terms of their enlightening power for the best human life as a whole. He wrote:

> In the antique world, it was assumed (and that assumption was most fully articulated by Socrates) that the purpose of education was the search through free insight for what constituted the best life for men in their cities. ... such education was concerned not only with human concerns but with the non-human, because it was thought that man could understand what was best himself and the species only if he understood the cosmos as a whole (p. 121).

If we understand this primordial dimension of knowledge and our act of inquiring, it is not always necessary to make a strict distinction between knowledge and understanding. Thus, the act of the old woman may come to us with a positive and strong sense for the self-understanding of our act of understanding. We inquire into the world and ourselves in order to actualize the higher or highest possibilities of our existence in and with the world. It may not be quite right in this sense of the inquiry to regard our act of inquiry as an enterprise

for the fixation of final truths, which can and should be stated in terms of isolated law-like propositions. But it is rather an ongoing interaction between the inquirer him/herself as a whole and the world as a whole, as disclosed by the above parable. In this process of our inquiry, we do not merely rely on the methodological skills, thinking techniques, or the pre-planned frames of reference, but we project ourselves as a whole, including our concern about the world and ourselves, our sorrow, anger, ambitions, aspirations, and our hopes, i.e., our humanity itself. Even our selection of a certain methodological or theoretical orientation cannot be regarded as an arbitrary choice but rather as the expression or affirmation of ourselves not only as what we are but also as what we hope to be.

But, in our efforts to inquire into the world in order to actualize human goodness, as we have noted, the world does not come to us in an immediately intelligible form, but it reveals itself as an ambiguous whole with its thousands of manifestations, the understanding of which also depends on our interpretation. Although there is and can be no fixed final understanding of the world, we endeavour to understand it through our continuous dialectic between participation and distanciation, explanation and understanding, and pre-understanding and new understanding. What is to be noted here is that each moment in the above dialectic cannot be understood in a separated or fixed form. In the actual process of our understanding, as we have experienced in our previous actual acts of interpretation, all these moments come together in our efforts to understand. When we are distanciated from one sphere of meaning, we are already participating in other spheres of meaning at the same time, and through an ongoing movement of distanciation as well as of participation, we disclose a variety of possibilities of meanings and thus deepen our understanding. We also explain something explicitly or implicitly in order to understand it. We deepen our understanding through this explanation and our deepened understanding also leads us to another explanation which again leads us to deepen our understanding. At the same time, when we try to understand a world, we enter into it with our preunderstanding instead of *tabula rasa*, but, through the continuous dialectic between our own horizon and other horizons unfolded by the text or by manifestations of the world, we come to

reach a new understanding which is, again, fused into our own horizon as a form of preunderstanding for our further understanding.

However, in this process of understanding, we need to be aware that there can always be a temptation to finalize and fix our understanding once we attain an understanding. What we need to note here is that, as noted in the above parable of the old woman, we do not regard our understanding as the final one. But rather we regard it as 'an' understanding (another preunderstanding) which is always open to a new understanding. This infinite and endless dimension in our actual act of understanding seems what is envisaged in the *Holy Scriptures of Buddhism*, when it says:

> [B]e on guard against thinking of enlightenment as a 'thing' to be grasped often, lest it, too, should become an abstraction. When the mind that was in darkness becomes enlightened it passes away, and with its passing, the thinking which we can call Enlightenment passes also. As long as people desire enlightenment and grasp after it, it means that delusion [or ignorance] is still with them; therefore, those who are following the way to Enlightenment must not grasp after it, and if they gain Enlightenment they must not linger in it (translated by Jongik Lee, 1977, pp. 116-118).

If we reflect on our act of understanding, we can no longer assume that only the questions to which there are correct answers can and should be meaningful and can thus be taught, as assumed in the prevailing technocratic rationality. But rather, we come to understand that, as we have seen in our reflection in the meaning of inquiry, the genuine value of question as a 'gate' or 'entrance' into the world lies in its disclosing power of the world. It can be said in this sense that the question which has a correct answer cannot be regarded the only meaningful question, but rather it is no more than a pretended or false question which prevents us from being sensitive and open to the world and thus from searching for a deeper understanding of it. Thus, we should no longer expect either that there can and should be a final answer to our question, or that somebody or one of us can and should provide a certain final answer to our question. But rather we need to regard our question of the meaning of morality and moral education as an ongoing task which we need to re-ask whenever we confront a particular moral and pedagogical situation, and any answer to the question needs to be examined in terms of its meaningfulness with respect to its particular situation, recognizing the inevitable temporality

and incompleteness of our answer.

C. Fundamental Tasks for Further Understanding of Morality and Moral Education

At the closing moment of this study, it seems to be worthwhile for us to reflect on some fundamental tasks which are significant for our further efforts to deepen our understanding of the meaning of morality and moral education. In our effort to pursue further understanding of morality and moral education, we need to be mindful of the fullness or richness of the language which we use for disclosing the world. In our age, the meaning of language tends to be eroded by the prevailing technocratic treatment of it, and thus the fullness and the disclosing power of language tends to be missed, as we have seen in our previous reflection on the technocratic transformation of the meaning of words such as morality, education, moral reasoning, society, and humanity.

What we need to note here is that language has its own life and history which are also in the realm of infinitude. Although the fullness and infinitude of the meaning of language tend to make it difficult for us to understand its precise meaning, this cannot be a weakness of language; rather, it may be its real strength which discloses the world with its primordial richness and which allows us to experience the diverse and deeper layers of the world. This character of language is what Heidegger (1971) tried to disclose to us, when he wrote:

> To reflect on language ... demands that we enter into the speaking of language in order to take up our stay with language, i.e., within its speaking, not within our own. Only in that way do we arrive at the region within which it may happen - or also fail to happen - that language will call us from there and grant us its nature. We leave the speaking to language. We do not wish to ground language in something else that is not language itself, nor do we wish to explain other things by means of language (pp. 190-191).

However, this should not be understood to mean that we need to re-define the meaning of language, which may endanger us to engage in another distortion of language. Instead, we need to re-discover the rich and full meaning of language which is concealed in its own history as well as in its life in our history. Without this effort, it is always possible for us to get trapped by the eroded meaning transformed by the powerful machine called 'technocratic rationality.'

Restoration of the Connection between Morality and Humanity

One task, in our further efforts to understand morality and moral education, can be expressed in terms of the disclosure of the primordial connection between morality and humanity. Historically, there has been a predominant tendency to separate morality from humanity, regarding morality as a set of orders or commands from outside, such as orders of rulers or the powerful, commands of a particular god(s) or religion, arbitrarily invented political laws, socio-cultural norms or customs, or even law-like propositions invented by scholars. Of course, it may be ridiculous, or at least naive, to deny totally the relatedness of these things to morality. But even if we accept their inevitable relation to morality, how can it be possible for us to regard what is claimed good as what is really good or morally acceptable? This seems what Socrates tried to disclose to us when he asked in the dialogue, *Euthyphro* : "Is a thing holy because it is loved by the gods or is it loved by the gods because it is holy?" (Melden, 1967, p. 5). If a moral genius speaks to us to respect others, how could it be possible for us to examine whether or in what sense this suggestion is morally acceptable or not? We cannot deny the fallibility of ordinary human beings, and thus it is always possible for us to misunderstand what god(s), socio-cultural norms, moral geniuses, or even artificial laws really speak to us. Nevertheless, the original meanings of them do not come to us in an immediate intelligible way, but rather they come to us in an ambiguous form as a whole or even in a paradoxical form. Thus when we apply them to a concrete situation, we inevitably interpret them with respect to that particular situation. What is to protect us from an extremely arbitrary interpretation and application in the actual moral situation? Moreover, it is always possible that the original meaning of the teachings of god(s) or moral geniuses, for example, can be formalized, institutionalized, and distorted through history, as actually has happened. Then, how is it possible for us to differentiate distorted meanings from appropriate meanings?

All these questions seem to imply the inevitable primordial connection between morality and humanity. The etymological meaning of morality in the Korean language discloses this nature of morality. The Korean word for morality, ***do-duk-sung***, consists of three Chinese

characters, *do* (道 : way, path), *duk* (德 : big, infinite, related to the human mind manifested in human relations), and *sung* (性 : nature, endowment, innate character). According to this etymological meaning of the word, morality can be understood as an innate and infinite human character through which human beings can enlighten their ways of (good) life in and with the world. This primordial connectedness of morality to humanity seems to be envisaged not only in the Korean tradition. According to Hinduistic tradition, for example, humanity, symbolized as *Atman*, is viewed as the manifestation of *Brahman*, and thus the individual human being and the ultimate reality are understood as inseparable (see Zimmer, 1956; Capra, 1983, pp. 97-104). Socrates also seems to point to this character of morality when he claimed, in his dialogue, *Meno*, that virtue cannot be taught but it is a kind of endowment of the gods "by divine dispensation" (99E).

Nevertheless, in history, there has been a dominant tendency towards formalization, institutionalization and absolutization of morality as if it exists outside of the individual human being. Especially, in contemporary society, the meaning of morality tends to be understood as nothing but an objectified set of rules of particular moral, political, or religious institutions. Thus, the primordial relation of morality to humanity as well as that of deity to humanity tends to be forgotten in our age. In this historical moment, it can be regarded as one of the most significant tasks for us to endeavour to restore the dialectic relations between humanity, morality and deity which nourish one another. Without this effort, it can hardly be possible for us to protect ourselves as well as our children from being slaves of externally imposed form of institutionalized morality, or from the total annihilation of any effort to actualize the highest possibility of human life and to improve the condition of our co-existence in and with the world.

Rehabilitation of the Dignity of the Self

Who am I? What am I going to be? These may be the most familiar but most perplexing and significant questions in our lives, even though they tend to be expelled from the

realm of meaningful question in contemporary academic as well as pedagogical practice. But, without understanding ourselves, how can we understand others, society, the world? Moreover, our understanding of the self may be the fundamental and significant ground in our understanding of the meaning of morality and moral education. However, historically, there has been a dominant tendency to simplify, or more precisely, to mechanize the self in a predictable and controllable form, on the basis of the mechanical view of human beings. Especially, in our age where this tendency tends to be culminated, the meaning of the self tends to be torn out into material pieces. In this situation, we are not viewed as what we really are nor as what we hope to be. Instead, the meaning of the self tends to be determined by objectified external standards. What we should do in order to be the self is merely to adjust ourselves to the ordered external standards. Like a commodity, the value of the self lies in its external utility. Considering the historical context of our age, it may not be strange that contemporary educational practice is predominantly governed by this mechanistic and instrumental concept of the self, as we have seen previously.

If we follow this conception of the self, there can be neither autonomy nor responsibility for the self. Instead, there can only be the correct function and role of the self within the huge system. In this situation, if we carry out the given correct functions and roles in an exact way, we can remain as useful parts for the system. But if not, we may be removed and our roles and functions would be substituted by others, i.e., brand-new other parts moulded to fit into our places in the factory. In this situation, it may be ridiculous or meaningless if we blame or acclaim others' acts in the same way that we cannot blame a knife itself for the infliction of a wound. How can we blame the pilot who murders hundreds of innocent people, if his act is to carry out the institutionalized correct role as a mechanical part of a huge system? It seems to be worthwhile in this context for us to listen to Bercuson's voice when he expressed in his critical essay on contemporary Canadian university education:

> We expect doctors to make decisions about abortion and euthanasia but we do not force them to study philosophy, religion, sociology, or history to show them how such powers were used or abused in the past, the religious and moral implications of their decisions for the future of humankind. [But]... doctors, like lawyers, engineers,

> accountants, and other professionals, are increasingly becoming the hired gunfighters of our society, ready to do bidding with less and less thought as to the social or moral implication of their actions (Bercuson, 1984, p. 68).

Of course, no one would regard his/her professional act as that of a hired gunfighter. Many professionals, I believe, still consider the social and moral implications of their work. What Bercuson is pointing out seems to be the dominant tendency of mechanization and over-specialization of the present Canadian university education and its possible disastrous corollary. This tendency is not limited only to Canada, or to university education, but prevails widely in contemporary education of industrializing and technocratizing societies. It is in this historical context that we need to endeavour to rehabilitate the dignity of the self, the dignity of ourselves.

But, in this effort, we need to be aware of a temptation to understand the self in a fixed or reified form as the naive 'liberal humanists' do. In this line of effort, the meaning of the self tends to be reduced to a kind of fixed and unchangeable entity. Thus, whatever the self is manifested, such as immediate desires, needs, interests, etc., it tends to be regarded as the genuine self. Thus, the only spontaneous choice based on 'natural' preferences, talents, or interests tends to be regarded as the act from the authentic self (see Benn, et al., 1971), and any involvement of deliberation or reflection in our act is nothing but an obstacle in our free acts of the self. Of course, as we have seen previously, there is an appealing point in this line of thought when we reflect on our historical situation. Especially, in our age, any expression of the self tends to be surpassed and denied, and the reified and standardized roles and functions tend to be substituted at the place of the self. Human reasoning also tends to be equated to mechanical and calculative kinds of thinking skills or techniques. Under these conditions, we cannot deny the significance of the attempt to understand the meaning of the self as manifested and to preserve it as the indubitable ground for any free acts of the self. Nevertheless, what we need to be aware of in this line of thought is that the attempt to restore the dignity of the self can be undermined, since if we follow this line of thought, the self can be viewed as nothing but a monstrous animal who follows immediate impulses or momentary desires. This

understanding of the self tends to lead us to overlook the self-sublimating aspect of the self through the dialectic between one's concrete action and reflection.

It may be wrong, or at least naive, to assume that the self is fixed and unchangeable or to believe that the self has a thinglike self-evident entity. As implied in the traditional Korean saying that "we know the depth of water of ten *gils*,[1] but we do not know the depth of a human being of even merely one *gil*," we are not things which can be subjected to any simple fixation. Actually, we do not know what we really are and what we are going to be. Even within ourselves, we experience a variety of manifestations of the self which are often in conflict. Among the diverse manifestations of the self who feels hungry, who desires to steal a piece of bread, and who speaks to oneself that "It may not be myself who steals a piece of bread. Let's find another way," who is the real self?

It is in this sense that the meaning of the self is in the realm of the infinitude, which is to be continuously re-discovered and sublimated with relation to our concrete life in and with the world, through questioning: What does it mean to be myself in this particular situation of life? What of myself am I expressing when I act in a given situation? What of myself do I hope to be? Bultman seems to point out this open character of the self when he says that "man is the kind of creature for whom his being is an issue and a problem" (quoted in Murray, 1975, p. 73). In this sense, the meaning of the self does not belong to the realm of empirical-analytic kind of knowledge; it remains in front of us as an ongoing task to be re-discovered and re-affirmed in terms of our hope to be.

Re-Searching for the Dialectic Relation between Moral Knowledge and Moral Life

In the process of our endless effort to find and to enhance the meaning of the self, what is the proper place or meaning of the others' experience? This question invites us to the world of moral knowledge as well as knowledge in general, our understanding of which is significantly related to our understanding of morality and moral education. As we have seen, in

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[1]A Korean traditional unit of the length; one *gil* corresponds to the length of the ordinary person in height.

our age, knowledge becomes a kind of mechanical system, the sum of the empirically or numerically verified law-like propositions, as if they are pre-given from the external world apart from our own experience and life. According to this prevailing concept of knowledge, any piece of knowledge, in order to belong to the realm of reliable knowledge, is to be re-stated in an empirically or numerically verifiable form. If a piece of knowledge is verified in terms of the scientific methodological ideal which is articulated by experts, it is accepted as a piece of reliable knowledge which is regarded as universal, regardless of the involved human values or of the relevant actual situation. Once a certain amount of knowledge is gathered through this procedure, the world is reconstructed on the basis of the gathered pieces about the world. Thus, the world reconstructed in such a way becomes the only reliable world, and the actual or real world becomes an unreliable and thus unreal world. In a word, the world has been decisively transformed into a 'picture' drawn by the positivistic scientists, as pointed out by Heidegger (1977b). If we follow this concept of knowledge, as it seems to have actually happened in our modern history, the belief in the actual world becomes no more than an illusion or dream, and what is reliable is the conceptual world reconstructed by means of the positivistic scientific method.

When this concept of knowledge invades the realm of moral knowledge, as dominantly attempted in the modern history of ethics, what would happen? Any moral knowledge is to be torn out into testable pieces; for example, 'honesty' is to be re-defined as 'the act of not telling a lie is universally right.' But, according to the positivistic concept of knowledge, this proposition is also to be empirically or numerically verified in order to belong to the realm of reliable knowledge. How can moral knowledge be verified in terms of the positivistic methodological ideal? One attempt to pursue this question can be made by means of regarding the social, political, or religious authorities as the self-evident ground for moral knowledge, as the functionalists and the Tylerian approach have attempted. But, the problem in this line of attempt lies in the ambiguity and inconsistency of such moral knowledge, since it is usually expressed in an ambiguous and paradoxical form. And more crucially, it tends to be different at

different times and different places. Thus,it may be an inevitable termination of this attempt to give way to the moral nihilism where it is believed that "there are no moral facts, no moral truths, and no moral knowledge" (Harman, 1977, p. 11), including 'emotivism' in which our moral judgements become "nothing but expressions of attitudeor feeling"(MacIntyre, 1981, p. 11). This may be our historical place in our understanding of moral knowledge, and this is the most fundamental reason why our critical understanding of moral knowledge comes to us as a significant task.

What we are reminded here is the primordial connection between our knowing and our life, as we reflected on the etymological origin of the Korean word, *alm* (knowing) derived from *salm* (living). Our knowledge, especially, moral knowledge cannot be understood without this primordial connection between knowledge and life in the sense that moral knowledge which usually comes to us as an ambiguous and even contradictory form, can always be derived from human life, and in the sense that moral knowledge, in its genuine sense, cannot be separated from humanity oriented towards the realization of its hightest possibility. Even in other spheres of knowledge, if knowledge is separated from life in both senses, it may be dangerous, or at least meaningless, since it can be used for the total destruction of our world including ourselves and our children. This dimension of knowledge seems to be what is envisaged by Aristotle when he reminds us of the meaninglessness of our inquiry unless it contributes to human goodness, as we have seen previously, and by Gadamer (1982) when he claims that "the human sciences stand close to moral knowledge [and] they are 'moral sciences'" (p. 280).

Moreover, in our efforts to understand the meaning of moral knowledge we need to remind ourselves of the fundamental difference of moral knowledge from the prevailing concept of knowledge. As we reflected on in the previous chapter, unlike both theoretical and technical knowledge, moral knowledge is always related to our experience of life as well as to our humanity itself. With respect to the practical application of moral knowledge, the concrete life situation requires our self-modification of fore-knowledge instead of one-sided linear application. This fundamental character of moral knowledge, as a "really special kind of

knowledge" or "the fundamental form of our experience" (Gadamer, 1982, pp. 287-288), seems to disclose another significant possibility in our way of dealing with not only the old teachings of religions and moral geniuses but also with contemporary social norms and even political rules. That is to say, we may be able to appreciate them in terms of their disclosing power of the world of our moral life as well as of our humanity. Hence, we need not necessarily regard them as a system of fixed, unchangeable law-like propositions, but rather we can understand them as windows through which we can see the higher possibility of our life as well as ourselves. This character of moral knowledge also suggests that, concerning the relation of moral knowledge to the concrete moral situation, we deal with it as a medium through which we find and enhance ourselves and, at the same time, we deepen our understanding of it by virtue of the multi-dimensionality and richness of the concrete moral situations and ourselves.

In this sense, the ambiguous and even paradoxical character of moral knowledge cannot be its weakness, but it must be appreciated as the real strength and richness of the knowledge about and for our lives and ourselves. It may be in this sense that correctness or exactitude of knowledge in the sphere of human sciences as well as ethics cannot be regarded as its strength, but rather as its weakness, as pointed out by Aristotle and by modern hermeneutics (Heidegger, 1977b; Gadamer, 1982). In spite of this real character and value of moral knowledge, if we deny all kinds of moral knowledge on the basis of the narrow, or more properly, eroded concept of knowledge, this can be likened to "putting the whole house into the flame in order to remove fleas," as expressed by an old Korean maxim. It may be in this sense that to find the real meaning of all kinds of moral knowledge comes to us as a significant task.

Exploration of the Appropriate Meaning of Moral Education

Our reflection on the meaning of moral knowledge also enables us to search for another possibility in our undertanding of moral education as well as of education in general. According to the prevailing understanding of knowledge, as we have seen, knowledge is viewed as a systematic set of law-like propositions produced by experts by means of the positivistic

methodological ideal. If we limit our understanding of knowledge to this concept of knowledge, what can we do in the pedagogical situation? There may be little space for other possibilities in our understanding of education except the total mechanization of the whole procedure of education, as we have examined in our reflection on the contemporary Moral Education Curriculum of Korea, and on the curriculum field as well. If we follow this understanding of knowledge, it is inevitable that the knowledge which is verified by means of the scientific methodological ideal, be regarded as the only reliable kind of knowledge to be taught in school, and that the rest of knowledge which is beyond verifiability by this methodological ideal be treated as ridiculous, meaningless, or superstitious kinds of knowledge and thus totally ignored or even expelled from education. Thus, for example, exact knowledge such as when the Second World War began, tends to be regarded as a reliable kind of knowledge to be taught in school. But knowledge such as the meaning of the Second World War in our history tends to be regarded as useless, regardless of the actual meaning of it in our lives, since unlike the former kind of knowledge, the latter kind of knowledge does not satisfy the condition of reliable knowledge of positivistic science.

What follows from this concept of education and educational knowledge is that only the kind of knowledge to which there is a correct answer is to be taught in education. Therefore, any attempt to teach the kind of knowledge to which there is no correct answer is denied and objected to, regarding it as 'indoctrination.' Thus, in a society such as ours where this conception of education prevails, the attempt to teach knowledge such as birth control or nuclear power and the skills to utilize it effectively tends to be accepted as worthwhile, but the attempt to teach knowledge concerning the meaning of human life and for what purpose the former kind of knowledge or skills should be used or prohibited tends to be regarded as meaningless or even harmful and thus expelled from the realm of educational knowledge.

Moreover, according to this concept of knowledge and education, any knowledge should satisfy the positivistic methodological ideal in order to be accepted as the reliable kind of knowledge and thus as the worthwhile knowledge to be taught in school. Thus, the experts who

are systematically trained by means of the positivistic methodology tend to become the higher authoritative figures who judge whether a certain set of knowledge is deserved to be taught and how it should be taught in the school. In this situation, it may be taken for granted that the experts who have been trained by the positivistic methodology and who have conceptual knowledge in a specialized area come to exert their expertise over teachers and students as well as ordinary people. Thus, the knowledge of teachers and students grounded in their rich and concrete experience of their own lives and the actual world may inevitably be reduced to the predetermined conceptual framework of experts or totally rejected from the reliable source of knowledge. In an extreme case, the expert, who has no experience of teaching or child-rearing, comes to control the ordinary experienced teachers and parents, as it has been actually happening in contemporary curriculum decision-making. Moreover, the extra-ordinary terminology and sophisticated methodological techniques developed and used by groups of the experts in exerting their control over experienced teachers and students tend to block any possibility of genuine communication between two groups.

The tendency of one-dimensional emphasis on correctness in education is prevailing widely in contemporary moral education, as we have seen in the concrete classroom interaction suggested by the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea. The total negation of any attempts to teach the substantial content of morality is also based on this narrow understanding of moral education, as if to teach something necessarily means to impose on students such knowledge to which there are a correct set of answers by means of the positivistic methodological ideal. For example, both in the Simonian values clarification approach and in the Kohlbergian cognitive developmental approach which tend to be widely accepted in the North American context, the common denial of any attempt to teach the substantial content of morality, calling it 'indoctrination,' is also based on the taken-for-granted acceptance of this narrow understanding of education. Kohlberg claims that "like values clarification approach, the developmental approach opposes indoctrination... eliciting of the child's own judgement or opinion, rather than imposing the teacher's opinion on him" (Kohlberg, 1976, p. 185). Even

though it may be possible that a teacher imposes his/her understanding of a certain moral problem or issue to students as if it is the final judgement, this cannot always be the case. There can be many other possible ways of exchanging their opinions with students. Nevertheless, if we reject all the possibilities for teachers to express and exchange their own experience of moral life, moral problem, moral concern, their hope, and their humanity, what kind of pedagogical commitment and autonomy would remain?

It is in this situation that we need to explore a more appropriate meaning of education and moral education. As we have reflected on, moral knowledge, in the sense of practical knowledge, cannot be equated to the sum of law-like propositions which can be verified by the positivists' methodological procedure and which can be applied to the concrete situation in an one-sided way. But rather, it is the knowledge about and for myself, ourselves, and our world, not only as present beings but also as beings hoping to be. In pursuing and examining this kind of knowledge, there can be neither an Archimedian starting point nor a final end. Instead, we always begin with an understanding and end with another understanding. Concerning the relation of moral knowledge to actual moral life, it can be said that the moral situat calls for moral knowledge rather than that a particular moral rule or principle manipulates a moral situation in an arbitrary way as the dominant moral theorists usually do in their articulations of the moral dilemma situation. In the actual concrete situation, the diverse or even conflicting character of moral knowledge cannot be a weakness but the real strength of it, through which we can deepen our understanding of the situation in a diverse and concrete way and through which we can understand and actualize our higher possibilities of our existence with relation to the concrete situation

If we do not overlook these dialectic multi-dimensional relations among moral situation, moral knowledge, and our humanity, the pedagogical situation can be regarded as one of the most proper places to nourish all of the participants' understanding of moral situation, moral knowledge, and themselves, since all diverse and rich kinds of living moral situations, moral knowledge, and selves can come together not only for a deeper understanding but also

for finding and sublimating their higher possibilities of being in and with the world. If we understand the classroom interaction as a common place where diverse horizons come together and move toward higher horizons through the 'fusion of horizons,' the ambiguous and/or paradoxical character of the traditional moral knowledge such as teachings of religions or moral geniuses, or even socio-cultural norms, which used to come to us in metaphorical and/or narrative forms, must not be regarded as negative. But rather they can be regarded as another rich and concrete source for self-enlightening understanding of the meaning of morality and ourselves, going beyond the inevitable spatial-temporal limitations of our own horizons.

Nevertheless, in our endeavours to make the pedagogical situation a significant common place in order to find and enhance ourselves, we need to be aware of the temptation which may lead us to attempt to produce a set of law-like principles or standardized techniques for effective classroom interaction. The pedagogical situation is also in the realm of infinitude which consists of ongoing mutual efforts between teachers and students, as temporal and incomplete beings, to find and actualize higher possibilities of their beings in and with the world. In the process of these efforts, we would not deny the significance of moral knowledge, or even certain kinds of techniques concerning the way of dealing with morality or of classroom interaction. Nevertheless, what we need to think about here is that the concrete pedagogical situation itself calls for relevant knowledge or techniques instead of being manipulated by means of a set of predetermined knowledge or techniques. It is in this sense that the pedagogical knowledge can be meaningful and valuable when it is understood as practical or moral knowledge instead of theoretical or technical knowledge. This is a fundamental reason why our understanding of education and moral education always remains as a significant task which calls for our further continuous effort.

D. Toward a Re-Affirmation of Humanity

At this moment of stepping on the threshold of the out-gate of this inquiry (as well as on the threshold for further inquiry), what we need to remind ourselves is that all the tasks which we reflected on are to be understood and pursued as practical tasks instead of theoretical or technical ones. This is in both senses: in the sense that our understanding and pursuance of the tasks can hardly be achieved without our own participation in the very heart of our lives and without our inner power to vitalize our life and ourselves; and in the sense that our pre-knowledge or pre-understanding cannot be automatically applied to all particular situations, but rather that application itself is a kind of self-deliberative and self-enlightening moment. Danto seems to point out this moment in his appreciation of the meaning of the Way, *Tao*.

> A way is something we follow. It is something that can be stumbled across or pointed out. It can be lost and found again: It can be discovered. To know the way is to be able to arrive at a destination without getting lost. So knowledge of the way is a matter of performance and execution: of *doing* something rather than *believing*, something that is true: it is knowing *how*, in Gilbert Ryle's[1949] influential (and unwittingly Taoist) disjunction, in contrast with knowing *that* (something is the case)(Danto, 1972, p. 103. Original emphasis).

Such may be the meaning of morality and moral education as well as our tasks to understand it. For example, understanding 'love,' is neither a matter of making a precise definition or of a systematic theory about it, nor the matter of obedient application of the fixed definition or theory to the concrete situation. The meaning of love dwells in our concrete life as well as in our humanity, without which any notion of 'love' can be neither meaningful nor understood. We understand 'love your neighbour' as a disclosure of the higher possibility of our being in and with the world in terms of the concrete experience of our lives and ourselves. Again, when we apply our understanding of 'love your neighbour' to a particular situation, it does not come to us as a fixed standard of our concrete act. Instead, it comes to us as a whole fused into our own experience, beliefs, and hopes, i.e., into ourselves. Through our concrete act of living through it, we come to understand its rich meaning in terms of our actual life situation. It can be said in this sense that the application of our preunderstanding to the

concrete life situation is always the self-deliberating and self-enlightening activity.

What we can note here seems the centrality of humanity, our inner power of vitalizing our lives and ourselves. One of the most visible examples of our self-vitalizing power can be seen in that of our body. When the life of our body is threatened by lack of water or food, for example, we feel thirsty or hungry. And through drinking water or eating food, our body preserves its life by itself. When this self-vitalizing power of our body is weakened, it needs, in order to be re-strengthened, external help, such as that of medicine. It is in this sense that the real value of medicine or medical practice lies in its contribution to the strengthening inner self-vitalizing power of the patients, as believed in the Korean or Oriental medical tradition. What we need to note here is that the self-preservation of life is not possible at all if our body utterly loses its self-vitalizing power, as we have seen in the disastrous situation of the AIDS[9] patients.

Although, this metaphor of the self-vitalizing power of the human body may not be applied to our humanity in exactly the same way, it seems to give us a significantly relevant point in our self-understanding of the meaning of morality and moral education in our lives and the centrality of our own humanity. In the parable, "Treasure in the Orchard," which is used as a text for classroom activity in the present Moral Education Curriculum of Korea, it can hardly be possible not only for the father himself and his sons but also for us to understand the father's telling a lie unless we believe in any inner self-vitalizing power for our lives and ourselves. In modern history, this power tends to be overlooked or denied by the mechanical or even demonistic view of human being, whereby we are nothing but robots or untamed beasts, as we have seen in the prevailing understanding of children in contemporary educational practice. In such a society, there can be little space for our humanity to be found and affirmed. According to the prevailing understanding of ourselves, if our humanity is totally denied and thus totally forgotten, what would happen? One of the most horrible and disastrous situations we can envisage may be the world of the walking corpse where the self-vitalizing power of our

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[9] Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome

lives would have utterly vanished. In such a situation, any strong medicine for the preservation of human life may never work. It can be said in this sense that the most serious crisis among various crises of our age is the 'crisis of humanity,' where its self-vitalizing power is extremely threatened. Therefore, our fundamental task in the effort to understand the meaning of morality and moral education is to re-affirm our humanity which dwells in our ancestor's lives, in the ordinary lives of our friends, our children, and ourselves, and in the hope for the future society.

In our effort to re-discover and to re-affirm our humanity dwelling in the whole history of human life and in the whole sphere of our lives, we can see its diverse or even contradictory manifestations, as captured by the psycho-analytic therorists in terms of the 'death' and 'life' instincts (Freud, 1949; Marcuse, 1955; Brown, 1959). One thing we need to be reminded of here is that any understanding of our humanity basically depends on the interpretation of concrete human life as a whole. Of course, we cannot deny that there have been and are many examples which show us the viciousness and destructiveness of human beings. But at the same time it should not be overlooked that, in any characterization of the nature of human being, there is always inevitable involvement of abstraction, simplification, exaggeration, or even one-sided reduction of the reality which is in the realm of infinitude and incompleteness.

As Novak pointed out, we do not live by objectified moral laws or principles, but rather, we primarily live by stories as a whole. He wrote:

> A person does not live primarily by principles but by stories. And he or she comes to each situation as if it were a new episode in a story. One's personal story carries with it one's internalized experience, reflection, and sensitivity developed over the years. One comes to a situation, not newborn, but already in mid-course. One's tone, mannerisms, intuitions, and sensitivities reveal the "role" one is implicitly playing out. And that role may or may not be appropriate to one's own basic story or to the situation (Novak, 1971, p. 67).

Our understanding of humanity in the midst of our lives as stories can neither be a matter of empirical or numerical verification, nor can it be that of logical justification. But rather it is an ongoing effort to find and to sublimate the meaning of our being in and with the world. One

example of a concrete act of an ordinary person can be more meaningful and valuable in the effort to discover and enhance the meaning of our lives and ourselves than thousands of examples or any theoretical, logical arguments on the meaning of ourselves. What we need to note here is that our effort to find and enhance the meaning of our lives and ourselves is based on our beliefs in humanity without which our effort becomes meaningless, and that our judgements about the nature of human being and a certain act of a person in a given situation are inevitably based on our own humanity. If our reflection is not wrong, it can be said that our effort to understand the meaning of morality and moral education is basically a hermeneutic task of our lives, our world, our selves, not only as what we were and are but also as what we hope them to be. It can also be said that, at the same time, this task is basically a moral task since our effort can be hardly meaningful without our belief in and orientation toward human goodness. This fundamental relation of the understanding and humanity - as well as morality in its authentic sense - seems to be what is envisaged by *Lao Tzu*, when he said that:

> The wise man has no fixed mind, instead, he regards ordinary people's mind as his mind. We regard a good person as a good person. Also we should regard a bad person as a good person, since human virtue is good. We regard a truthful person as a truthful person. Also we should regard an untruthful person as a truthful person, since human virtue is truthful (my translation, Lao Tzu, *Tao Teh Ching*, chap. 49).

In our effort to find and enhance our weakened self-vitalizing power of our lives and ourselves in the context of our moral and pedagogical life, however, we may inescapably encounter the social reality of our age, where almost everything is converted into instrumental and economic value, and the power of the individual person is extremely surpassed by the huge impersonalized system. Under these circumstances, we are faced with the fundamental dilemma that one has to give up his/her humanity in order to survive in this world, or one has to give up his/her survival in this world in order to remain as a person of humanity. Of course, we cannot deny that the survival of the individual should always be respected and protected. Especially, in the situation where one's survival itself is extremely threatened as the Nazi death camps, any act of giving up humanity for survival itself can hardly be questioned. But, at the same time,

we also need to consider that our ordinary moral and pedagogical situation cannot always be likened to such an extreme situation. In this context, it also seems worthwhile for us to remind ourselves of Frankl's (1963) claim that, even in the situation where one's survival is extremely threatened, the survival itself tends to become meaningless without one's ultimate goals of life. Before all our lives and pedagogical situations become totally transformed by the prevailing technocratic rationality to the point of being irrestorable, and before our self-vitalizing power, thus, becomes totally vanished, we need to ask: Are our lives meaningful because we are surviving, or are we surviving because our lives are meaningful? If we renounce our effort to find ourselves and to be ourselves, and if we merely engage in the adjustment of ourselves to the system for the purpose of our momentary survival, who would care for our world, our next generations, and ourselves? What are we really surviving for?

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APPENDICES

Appendex A: "Moral Education" in the *School Curriculum* [10]

Primary School

A. **Goals:**

The goals of moral education in primary school are to help children understand the basic manners and moral rules needed in everyday life and build habits observing them, and to cultivate the ability and attitude of self-control in moral behavior:

1) To help children understand the basic norms necessary for living as independent individuals and to guide them to exert themselves in their own growth through following the norms.
2) To help children understand the basic rules necessary for harmonious social life and attain the habits observing them autonomously.
3) To lead children to cooperate in national development and international understanding as Korean citizens, who are proud of their country.
4) To alert children to the falsehood and the aggressive policy of North Korea, and to develop a strong conviction for peaceful unification through understanding of the superiority of democracy.

C. **Objectives and Contents by Grade Level:**

* Grade 1-2

1) Objectives:
   a) To attain a set of basic habits necessary for living as an independent individual.
   b) To build the basic habit of life for a good human relationship in the family, with neighbors and friends, and at school.
   c) To know the excellency of our nation and race and have love for the country.
   d) To see the pitiful state of living in North Korea and have brotherly sympathy for the people in the North.
2) Contents:

* Grade 1

   a) Norms for Individual Growth ;
      (1) Correct pose of body, and correct bearings
      (2) Regular life
      (3) Abstaining from wasting things
      (4) Precautions for safety
      (5) Doing one's own work by oneself
      (6) Correcting bad habits

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[10] KEDI, 1982, pp. 33-38.

b) Norms for Happy Social Life;
   (1) Appropriate greetings
   (2) Obedience to parents
   (3) Being on good terms with friends
   (4) Sympathy with the people in bad situations
   (5) Orderly manner in the crowd
   (6) Cooperation with friends
   (7) Respect for the opinions of friends

c) Norms for National Development? ;
   (1) Gratitude for the people who work for the nation
   (2) Respect and protocol for the flag, anthem, and the chief of the nation

d) Norms for the Peaceful Unification? ;
   (1) Sympathy for the miserable life of the north children
   (2) Being aware of the threat of the north communists

* Grade 2

a) Norms for Individual Growth;
   (1) Keeping his surroundings clean
   (2) Telling no lies
   (3) Sparing things and saving money
   (4) Having a strong body and taking heed of sanitation
   (5) Doing things that one can do by oneself
   (6) Reflecting everyday

b) Norms for Happy Social Life;
   (1) Etiquette for dining, visiting, and entertaining
   (2) Being on good terms with brothers and sisters
   (3) Modesty to grown-ups
   (4) Graceful concession
   (5) Observing rules
   (6) Participation in work activities at home and at school
   (7) Fairness to all friends

c) Norms for National Development;
   (1) Love for the national land
   (2) Pride to be a Korean citizen

d) Norms for Peaceful Unification ;
   (1) Sympathy for North people suffering from complusory labor
   (2) Watching out for the brutality of spies and guerrillas from North Korea

* Grades 3-4

1) Objectives:

a) To understand the meaning and significance of the basic norms necessary for living a proper life as an individual.
b) To understand the meaning and the inevitability of the basic norms for living as a member of the society and to help them live a harmonious social life.
c) To understand the relation between the nation and individuals for having the cooperative attitudes for national development.
d) To know the inhumanity of North communists and the living conditions of North people, and have precautions against the communism of North Korea.

2) Contents:

* Grade 3
  a) Norms for Individual Development ;
     (1) Decorating one's surroundings
     (2) Thinking highly of work
     (3) Valueing time
     (4) Love for animals and plants
     (5) Expressing one's poinion
     (6) Developing one's character
     (7) Prudence and caution
  b) Norms for Happy Social Life;
     (1) Correct and decent language
     (2) Gratitude for parental love
     (3) Appreciation for other's favor
     (4) Tolerance for faults of others
     (5) Good use of public facilities
     (6) Keeping one's promises
     (7) Cooperation in difficulties
     (8) Respecting other's rights
  c) Norms for National Development;
     (1) Cultivating the land
     (2) Valuing and taking good care of cultural heritage
     (3) Politeness to foreigners
  d) Norms for Peaceful Unification;
     (1) Sympathy with North people suffering from hard labor
     (2) Watching out against North communists' armed provocation
     (3) Pride in our freedom and liberty

* Grade 4
  a) Norms for individual development;
     (1) Cheerfulness

(2) Honesty
(3) Frugality
(4) Caution for health and safety of others and oneself
(5) Autonomy in one's own work
(6) Taking the lead in good deeds
(7) Breaking up difficulties with conviction

b) Norms for Happy Social Life;
(1) Proper manners for various situations
(2) Helping at home
(3) Faith in friends
(4) Helping people in adversity
(5) Public morality
(6) Doing one's own duties at home and at school
(7) Attending to the development of the town and the school
(8) Having no prejudices

c) Norms for Development of the Nation;
(1) Concerning oneself about the glory of the nation
(2) Concern about overseas brethren
(3) Understanding foreign people

d) Norms for Peaceful Unification;
(1) Understanding that North people live under the condition of oppression and control of communists
(2) Taking precautions against the North communists' arrangement for beginning a war
(3) Understanding that the South and North separation brings about severe losses to each side

* Grades 5-6

1) Objectives:
a) To reflect upon one's own behaviors and attitudes in order to have a foundation for an autonomous personality.
b) To understand the norms for everyday life and their relations for solving moral problems rationally.
c) To exert oneself in the national development corresponding to one's own standings.
d) To understand the superiority of democracy which has as its concern the desire for peaceful unification.

2) Contents:

* Grade 5
  a) Norms for Individual Development;
     (1) Making good use of spare time by following plans
     (2) Valuing efficiency and substantiality
     (3) Following one's own judgements
     (4) Improving by inquiries in difficult situations
     (5) Deliberation
  b) Norms for Happy Social Life;
     (1) Knowing the principles of manners and ettiquette
     (2) Gratitude for the ancestors' favours
     (3) Kindness
     (4) Respecting other's opinions
     (5) Observing rules
     (6) Responsibility for one's own deeds
     (7) Taking over the tradition of mutual aid
     (8) Courage for justice
  c) Norms for National Development;
     (1) The will of self-dependence of the nation
     (2) Continuing the patriotism of ancestors
     (3) Gratitude for the people working for human welfare
  d) Norms for Peaceful Unification;
     (1) Knowing that North communism is autocratic
     (2) Knowing and watching out for the inhumanity of North communists
     (3) Knowing that North people are longing for freedom

* Grade 6
  a) Norms for Individual Life;
     (1) Doing one's best in one's own work
     (2) Acceptance of one's station in life or respect for the station of others
     (3) Planning one's own future
     (4) Having ambition and exerting oneself toward its realization
     (5) Thinking rationally
  b) Norms for Happy Social Life;
     (1) Etiquette with good intention
     (2) Concern about peace in the family
     (3) Taking care of younger brothers and sisters or lower grade students
     (4) Reflection on other's situations
     (5) Valuing the benefits for the majority

(6) Fulfilling one's own duties for the society
(7) Service to others
(8) Fair judgements

c) Norms for National Development;
(1) Participation and cooperation in the national development
(2) Having pride in the national culture, and taking over and developing it
(3) Cooperation in the international exchange of culture

d) Norms for Peaceful Unification;
(1) Contradiction of communist society
(2) Being aware of the eradication of national cultural heritage by North Communists
(3) Effort toward peaceful unification

C. **Notes for Instruction and Evaluation:**

1) Instruction:
a) The morality class should be conducted in relation with specific moral situations. The moral situations should be taken in close connection with the world of experience of children.
b) Teachers have to make their efforts in motivating the moral practices as the essence of moral education. It is desirable to utilize the materials that can impress the children.
c) The process of rational arguments should be emphasized in the classes for solving moral problems.
d) Teachers need special care for their own speech and acts, because the formation of students' morality are greatly affected by the everyday speech and conducts, attitudes, and the way of thinking of teachers.
e) The curriculum content and its orders may be reroganized to be taught in harmony with the class situation and locality.
f) The contents of anti-communism included in other subjects should be synthesized and structuralized to be taught in this subject.

2) Evaluation:
a) The evaluation should not be limited to that of fragmentary knowlege, but should be extended to that of moral habits, attitudes, and reasoning.
b) The validity and the objectivity of evaluation should be maintained in the evaluation of morality.
c) The result of evaluation should be used to facilitate the whole development of moral life of children.

Middle School [11]

A. Goals

The goals of moral education in middle school are to help students understand and put to practice everyday moral principles and cultivate both the ability and attitude needed for the development and the unification of our nation. More specifically, they are as follows:

1) To understand the significance of personal happiness and self-development in social contexts, and establish the standards of moral judgement and practice them in everyday life.

2) To form amicable human relations and to have a democratic attitude which directs themselves toward the building of a welfare society.

3) To develop the character and the attitude that our nation needs for the restoration of national identity and for the regeneration of our cultural heritage so that Korea can contribute to the welfare and prosperity of humanity.

4) To understand the superiority of democracy and be prepared to cope with the provocative challenges of the North Communists in a way that ultimately contributes to the democratic and peaceful unification of the fatherland.

B. Objectives and Contents by Grade Level

• Grade 1

1) Objectives:

a) To have a basic understanding of the relationship between an individual and the society and of norms deriving therefrom as a means of developing daily practices which bear the awareness of faithfulness and industry.

b) To develop an attitude directed toward maintaining social order based on mutual respect and trust.

c) To develop a sense of commitment to the task of national development with pride in and love for the country.

d) To foster the belief in the superiority of our democratic system to communism by pointing out communist atrocities.

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[11] KEDI, 1982b, pp. 11-14.

2) Contents:

a) Norms for personal life

(1) Interdependency of human life
(2) Meaning of etiquette
(3) Planned life within one's means
(4) Being reflective on one's life

b) Norms for social life

(1) Love and respect
(2) Honesty and trust
(3) Law-abiding and social order
(4) Respect for others' opinions in democratic life

c) Norms for national development

(1) Relationship between the country and oneself
(2) Cultural heritage of our nation
(3) Independence, industry, and cooperation

d) The reality of North Korea

(1) Causes for territorial division and lessons
(2) Political situation in the North Communist Regime
(3) Economic situation in the North Communist Regime
(4) Social and cultural situation in the North Communist Regime

• **Grade 2**

1) Objectives:

a) To understand the moral principles needed for everyday life as a member of the society and to practice them in actual life.

b) To develop a sense of commitment to building a cheerful and bright society through a correct understanding of what a welfare society means.

c) To appreciate the urgency of problems facing the nation and develop a sense of participation in the task of national development.

d) To develop a correct understanding of the harsh reality of communist societies in comparison with the democratic system and to renew the determination to crush the communist schemes.

2) Contents:

a) Norms for personal life

(1) Human desire and happy life
(2) Good deeds and services for others

(3) Ways to happiness
(4) Pursuit of individual desires vs. one's responsibility toward society

b) Norms for social life
(1) Value of etiquette in social life
(2) Morality for family life
(3) Neighborhood
(4) Building a welfare society

c) Norms for national development
(1) Urgent national tasks
(2) National efforts for economic development
(3) Land development and the preservation of the natural environment
(4) National power and self-defense capability

d) Aggressive policy of communism
(1) Characteristics of communist societies
(2) Invasion of communist
(3) Cases of Communist invasion
(4) Conflicts within the Communist block

* Grade 3

1) Objectives:

a) To develop a disposition to approach one's life positively by understanding ways to build a commendable character.

b) To develop a sense of joint responsibility for building a good society by understanding that individuals, the family and the society form an integrated whole.

c) To develop a sense of commitment to building a democratic society in view of the present reality of the fatherland and its future profile.

d) To steel the will to crush the communist aggressive schemes and to achieve the unification of the fatherland through peaceful means.

2) Contents:

a) Meaningful life
(1) Character building
(2) Respect for others and toleration
(3) Overcoming the national tribulations
(4) Occupational life and the spirit of service

b) Society of mutual help
(1) Parental love and filial duties

(2) Love for one's Alma Mater and homeland
(3) Services for the public good
(4) Mutual help as a means of social development

c) Our country in the world
(1) Brotherhood
(2) Pride in the cultural heritage
(3) World situations and international cooperation
(4) Urgent problems facing the country

d) The will to achieve peaceful unification
(1) The meaning of territorial reunification
(2) South-North relations and the problems of reunification
(3) The scheme of North Korea for the communization of the South
(4) Peaceful unification and our posture

C. Notes for Instruction and Evaluation

1) Instruction:

a) The clarification of moral concepts, autonomous judgements for solving moral problems, and the motivations toward moral acts being most important in moral education, teachers must determine the most effective method for each case.

b) Everyday conduct, attitudes, and ways of thinking being very influential in fostering the morality of students, teachers should be careful to guard against any mistakes in these aspects.

c) Concepts to be taught may be changed or resequenced for classroom instruction according to the unique needs of community, school and learners.

d) Actual cases observable in daily life should be used as exciting examples to stimulate the interest of learners, together with a variety of instructional materials.

e) Concepts of anti-communism should be taught in reference to their relevant units, drawing on up-to-date materials of contemporary value.

2) Evaluation:

a) Moral thoughts, attitudes, and habits are targets to be evaluated in addition to the acquisition of knowledge.

b) Validity and objectivity should be ensured in the evaluation of morality.

c) It is important to establish a cycle that feeds back evaluation results to pupils' lives.

High School [12]

A. Objectives

The goal of moral education is to develop in students values conducive to national development and unification on the basis of the cultural heritage and reality of our nation. From this goal, the following objectives were derived. They are to have students:

1. Internalize values conducive to self-realization through a correct understanding of the position of youth in the context of one's life.
2. Have the basic morality of contributing to a continual development of the nation through the understanding of normative values inherent in the nation.
3. Be able to play roles in creating a new culture based on the cultural heritage of mankind.
4. Develop the consciousness of ethical issues besetting modern society and an ability to effectively cope with the ever-shifting surroundings.
5. Be inclined to strive for the development of democracy and the building of a welfare society with a lucid outlook on nationhood.
6. Develop a firm ideological posture against communism and forge a resolution to achieve national unification through peaceful means.

[12] KEDI, 1982c, pp.18-20.

B. Contents

1. Mankind and ethical codes
   a. Life and values
   b. Youth in a life cycle
   c. Values of youth
   d. Life of self-realization

2. Ethical and spiritual heritage of the nation
   a. The spiritual entity of Korean people
   b. Traditionally ethical norms
   c. Respect for human beings and regeneration of the nation
   d. Traditionally ethical norms in modern society

3. Culture and ethics
   a. Thoughts and scholarship
   b. Arts and life
   c. Science and mankind
   d. Religion and life

4. Ethics in modern society
   a. Industrialization and ethics
   b. Ethical problems in modern society
   c. Ethical issues in Korea
   d. Desirable ethics for social life

5. Ethics for national life
   a. The people and the state
   b. Spiritual foundation for national development
   c. Democracy in Korea
   d. Building a welfare state

6. National security and the peaceful unification of the nation
   a. Communism in theory and in practice
   b. Korea in the context of the international situation
   c. North Korea's social characteristics
   d. Aggressive scheme of communists in North Korea
   e. Policy for peaceful unification
   f. National security and our tasks

C. Notes for Instruction and Evaluation

1. Instruction

   a. Acquiring knowledge and understanding facts are treated as a means for internalizing values or inculcating an attitude.

   b. The daily bearing of teachers and the words they use have a profound impact on the forming of morality in pupils. This fact merits special attention.

   c. Contents and their sequence may be changed within the conceptual framework as unique needs demand.

   d. To deepen the interest of learners, reference should be made to practical issues of daily concern, with efforts being made to utilize a variety of materials.

   e. Anti-communism concepts should be dealt with in relation to other units and updated continually.

2. Evaluation

   a. Evaluation should give heavier weight to the consciousness of morality as reflected in thinking, behavior and attitude than to the understanding of facts and knowledge.

   b. Evaluation results should bring home the moral life to the pupils.

Appendix B: Time Allotment by Subjects

Primary School [13]

Subjects		Grade 1	2	3	4	5	6
Subject Areas	Moral Education	374 (11)[14]	374 (11)	68 (2)	68 (2)	68 (2)	68 (2)
	Korean Language			238 (7)	204 (6)	204 (6)	204 (6)
	Social Studies			102 (3)	102 (3)	136 (4)	136 (4)
	Mathematics	204 (6)	136 (4)	136 (4)	136 (4)	170 (5)	170 (5)
	Science		68 (2)	102 (3)	136 (4)	136 (4)	136 (4)
	Physical Education	204 (6)	238 (7)	102 (3)	102 (3)	102 (3)	102 (3)
	Music			68 (2)	68 (2)	68 (2)	68 (2)
	Visual Arts			68 (2)	68 (2)	68 (2)	68 (2)
	Practical Arts				68 (2)	68 (2)	68 (2)
Sub Total		782 (23)	816 (24)	884 (26)	952 (28)	1,020 (30)	1,020 (30)
Extra-Curricular Activities				34- (1-)	68- (2-)	68- (2-)	68- (2-)
Grand Total		782 (23)	816 (24)	918- (27-)	1,020- (30-)	1,088- (32-)	1,088- (32-)

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[13] KEDI, 1982a, pp. 12-13.
[14] Hours per week.

Middle School [15]

Subjects			Grade 1	Grade 2	Grade 3
Moral Education			68(2)	68(2)	68(2)
Korean Language			136(4)	170(5)	170(5)
Korean History				68(2)	68(2)
Social Studies			102(3)	68-102(2-3)	68-102(2-3)
Mathematics			136(4)	102-136(3-4)	102-136(3-4)
Science			136(4)	102-136(3-4)	102-136(3-4)
Physical Education			102(3)	102(3)	102(3)
Music			68(2)	68(2)	34(1)
Visual Arts			68(2)	68(2)	34(1)
Chinese Characters			34(1)	34-68(1-2)	34-68(1-2)
Foreign Language : English			136(4)	102-170(3-5)	102-170(3-5)
Vocational skill & Home Economics	Compul-sories	Life Skill (male) Home Economics (female)	102(3)	136-204(4-6)	
	Electives	Agriculture Industry Commerce Fisheries Domestic Affairs (female)			select 1-2 170-238 (5-7)
Free Choice			0-34(0-1)	0-34(0-1)	0-34(0-1)
Sub Total			1,0881-1,122 (32-33)	1,088-1,156 (32-34)	1,088-1,156 (32-34)
Extra-Curricular Activities			68-(2-)	68-(2-)	68-(2-)
Grand Total			1,155-1,190 (34-35)	1,156-1,224 (34-36)	1,156-1,224 (34-36)

[15] KEDI, 1982a, p. 17.

High School [16]

Subject Area	Subject	General Subjects				Specialized Subject
		Common Compulsory	Elective for Academic High School		Electives for Vocational Course of Academic H.S., and for Students of Vocational and other special H.S.	Compulsory and Electives for Vocational and Special H.S., and for Vocational Course of Academic H.S.
			Humanities & Social Science Course	Natural Science Course		
Moral Education	National Ethics	6 [17]				Subjects for Farming, Industry, Commerce, Marine & Fisheries, Domestic Affairs & Practical Arts, and Other Courses
Korean Language	Korean language (I, II)	14-16	14-18	8-10	3-8	
Korean History	Korean History	6 (4)				
Social Studies	Social Studies (I, II)	4-6 (2-6)	4		select 1 2-6	
	Geography (I, II)	4-6 (2-6) * select 1	4			
	World history	2 (2)	2			
Mathematics	Mathematics (I, II)	8-14	6-8	10-18	4-18	
Science	Physics (I, II)	4-6		4	select 1-2 4-12	
	Chemistry (I, II)	4-6		4		
	Biology (I, II)	4-6 * select 2		4		
	Earth Science (I, II)	4-6		4		
Physical Education	Physical Education	6-8	8-10	8-10	4-8	
Military Exercise	Military Exercises	12				
Music	Music	4-6 select 1	select 1 4-6	select 1 4-6	select 1 2-6	
Visual Arts	Visual Arts	4-6				
Written Chinese	Written Chinese (I, II)		6-14	4-6	4-6	
Foreign Languages	English (I, II)	6-8	14-16	14-16	6-16	
	German		select 1 10-12	select 1 10-12	select 1 6-10	
	French					
	Spanish					
	Chinese					
	Japanese					
Vocational Education & Home Economics	Industrial Engineering		select 1 8-10	select 1 8-10	select 1 select 4-8	
	Home Economics					
	Farming		select 8-10	select 1 8-10		
	Engineering					
	Commerce					
	Marine & Fisheries					
	Domestic Affairs					
Free Optionals			0-8	0-8	0-8	
Subtotal for each course		88-122 * (72-84)	90-116	90-116	10-36	Vocational Course of Academic High School 52-106 Vocational and Special High School 82-122
Total of curricular units		192-204				
Extra Curricular Activities		12-				
Total		204-216				

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[16] KEDI, 1982a, pp. 23-24.

[17] The number of units during the total High School years. One unit means "the amount of school learning undertaken by a 50 minite instruction per week for one semester" (KEDI, 1982c, p. 10).

Appendix C: Tables of Contents of Moral Education Textbooks

Primary School

Morals 3-1: First Semester, Grade 3

My Hope

Cleanliness and Beauty

Good Mind

Sunhee and a Swallow

Promise

Grateful People

Right and Beautiful Words

(About North Korea)

(About North Korea)

Kum-Su-Gang-San[11]

Towards a Better Country

Our Country, Korea

Morals 3-2: Second Semester, Grade 3

1. Value of Time
2. Prudent Deed
3. Fruitfulness of Work
4. (About North Korea)
5. Cultural Properties of Korea
6. Ways of Contribution to Our Country

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[11]A nickname of Korea which signifies its beauty.

7. Strength of Solidarity
8. Kind Korean People
9. Public Properties
10. Mutual Respect
11. (About North Korea)
12. A Kite Longing for the Unification of Korea

Morals 4-1: First Semester, Grade 4

1. Our Lives of Delight
2. Frugal Life
3. A Person of Honesty
4. (About North Korea)
5. Meaning of Decorum
6. Fairness of Deed
7. True Friend
8. (About North Korea)
9. People Who Secured Our Country
10. National Development and Myself
11. Our Hope for the Unification of Korea

Morals 4-2: Second Semester, Grade 4

1. Doing It By Myself
2. Initiation in Doing Things
3. Overcoming of Ordeals
4. Our Sweet Home

5. (About North Korea)
6. Love of School and Community
7. Public Morals
8. Paths of Loving Our Country
9. (About North Korea)
10. Worth of Solidarity
11. '88 Olympics' in Seoul

Morals 5-1: First Semester, Grade 5

1. Meaning of Kindness
2. Freedom and Responsibility
3. The Simplified Family Ritual Standards
4. (About North Korea)
5. Right Thinking and Judgement
6. Democratic Decision-Making
7. Life of Cooperation
8. People Who Devoted Themselves to Our Country
9. Strengthening National Power
10. Wisdom of Korean
11. My Wish
12. (About North Korea)

Morals 5-2: Second Semester, Grade 5

1. Good Use of Leisure Time
2. Autonomous Life

3. Life of Frugality
4. Tradition of Korea
5. (About North Korea)
6. Law-Abiding Life
7. A Tiny Discovery
8. Protection of Our Nation
9. Value of Freedom
10. Ways to Contribute to Our Country
11. (About North Korea)
12. Wishes of Human Beings in the World

Morals 6-1: First Semester, Grade 6

1. Autonomous Mind
2. Life of Doing One's Best
3. Forgiveness
4. (About North Korea)
5. Meaning of Decorum
6. Our Merry Home
7. Our Community of Love
8. Searching for Freedom
9. Value of a Nation
10. Our Nation of Developing
11. (About North Korea)
12. My Fatherland

Morals 6-2: Second Semester, Grade 6

1. Great Ambition
2. Life of Prudence
3. Rational Life
4. (About North Korea)
5. Life of Servitude
6. Fair Judgement
7. Right and Duty
8. Peaceful Unification of Korea
9. Ways of Developing Our Culture
10. (About North Korea)
11. Orienting Towards the World
12. On Graduation from the Primary School

Middle School

Morals 1: Grade 1

I. Life of Faithfulness

1. Human Being and Society
2. Interpersonal Relation and Decorum
3. Rational Life
4. Ethics for Sound Life
5. (About North Korea)

II. Society of Mutual Faith

1. Society of Love and Respect

2. Society of Mutual Trust

3. Meaning of Law and Social Order

4. Democratic Attitude in Social Life

5. (About North Korea)

III. Pride in Our Country

1. Love of Our Country

2. Cultural Heritage of Korea

3. *Se-Ma-Eul* Movement[19]

4. Meaning of Democratic State

IV. (About North Korea)

Morals 2: Grade 2

I. Happy Life

1. Life and Happiness

2. Meaning of Good Deeds

3. Life for Public Good

4. Toward a Happy Life

5. (About North Korea)

II. Society for Common Well-Being

1. Respect for Humanity and the Meaning of Decorum

2. Meaning of Family Life and Neighborhood

3. Prosperous Village

4. Community for Common Well-Being

5. (About North Korea)

III. Our Flourishing Country

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[19] New Community or New Village Development Movement.

1. Establishment of the Just Democratic State
2. Economic Development and the Welfare State
3. Land Development and Use of Natural Resources
4. Self-Defence and the Power of Nation

IV. (About North Korea)

Morals 3: Grade 3

I. Meaning of Life

1. Establishment of Humanity
2. Respect of Human Being
3. Overcoming of Ordeals
4. Attitude toward a Good Life

II. Society of Mutual Help

1. Social Life and Decorum
2. Love of School and Community
3. Life for Public Good
4. Life for Mutual Help

III. Our Growing Country

1. National Brotherhood
2. Creation of a New National Culture
3. Development of a Democratic State
4. Korea in the World

IV. (About North Korea)

High School

National Ethics

I. Human Being and Ethics

A. Human Being and Value Orientation

1. Characteristics of Human Being

2. Value Orientation and Human Life

3. Value Orientation and National Development

B. Adolescence in Human Life

1. Place of Adolscence in Human Life

2. Characteristics of Adolescence

3. Tasks for Adolescence

C. Efforts for Self-Actulization

1. Development of Characteristics and Cooperative Life

2. Harmonization of Intellect and Virtue

3. Ideal and Reality

4. Formation of Autonomous Character

D. (About Communism)

II. Philosophical Tradition of Korea

A. Traditional Philosophies and Ethics

1. '*Hong-Ig-In-Gan*' [20] as the Philosophical Foundation of the Establishment of the Ancient Korea.

2. Traditional Ethical-Consciousness

3. '*Wha-Rang-Do*' [21] and the Philosophy of '*Pung-Ryu*' [22]

B. Foreign Philosophies and Ethics

1. Buddhistic Ethics

2. Confucian Ethics

2. Christian Ethics

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[20] Human being who distributes benefits widely for others.
[21] A form of education for young elite practised during the period of the Silla Dynasty of Korea.
[22] Aesthetic or elegant form of life lived by the tradational Korean.

C. Ethical Tradition of Korea

1. Respect for Human Being
2. '*Sung*'(Sincerity) and '*Kyung*'(Respect)
3. '*Hyo*'(Filial Piety) and '*Chung*'(Royality)
4. Cooperation, Solidarity, and Care for the Nation

D. (About Communism)

III. Culture and Ethics

A. Philosophical Idea and Its Value

1. Meaning of '*Hak-Mun*'(Study or Discipline)
2. Philosophical Ideas
3. History of Western Philosophy
4. Standard of Value Judgement

B. Art and Life

1. Meaning of Art
2. Art and Life
3. Traditional Art of Korea
4. (About Communism)

C. Human Being and Science

1. Development of the Age of Science
2. Science, Technology, and Human Being
3. Nature of Science and Scientific Method
4. Our Attitude in the Age of Science

D. Religion and Human Life

1. Nature of Religion
2. Ethics in Religion and the Sound Religious Life
3. (About Communism)

IV. Society and Ethics

A. Modern Society and Ethics

1. Pre-Modernity and Modernity

2. Capitalistic Ideology and Developmental Mind

B. Contemporary Society and Ethics

1. Characteristisc of Contemporary Society and Ethical Malaises

2. Ethical Problems in Contemporary Korea

C. Life Ethics in Democratic Society

1. Ethics in Family Life

2. Ethics in Work Place and in Profession

3. Life Ethics in Contemporary Society

D. (About Communism)

V. State and Ethics

A. Nation and State

1. *Raison D'ètre* of a State

2. Nation and National State

3. Establishment of a State and Nationalism

B. Contemporary Views on the State

1. Pluralism

2. Totalitarianism

3. Communism

4. Reconsideration of the Traditional View on the State

C. Ethical Foundation of National Development

1. Freedom and Order

2. Pluralism and Unification of National Decision

3. Spiritual Culture for National Development

D. Realization of a Welfare State

1. Trace of Modernization

2. *Se-Ma-Eul* Movement and Spritual Enlightenment

3. Establishment of the Democratic Welfare Society

E. (About Communism)

VI. (About Communism and Unification of Korea)